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Executive Summary
The Patient Safety Collaborative Evaluation Study (The PiSCES Study)
Background
Having investigated avoidable deaths and other occurrences of harm to patients at Mid-
Staffordshire Hospital, the Francis Inquiry made 290 recommendations for actions to reduce the 
likelihood of such events recurring. A prominent part of the government’s response was to ask Don 
Berwick to chair a National Patient Safety Advisory Group to advise the government on a ‘whole-
system’ Patient Safety Improvement Programme. The Group proposed establishing Patient Safety 
Collaboratives (PSC), drawing upon the experience of Quality Improvement Collaboratives, 
particularly the Institute of Healthcare Improvement (IHI) 'Breakthrough Series' From 2014, 
Collaboratives in the NHS were implemented through the regional Academic Health Science 
Networks (AHSN).
Most research about the effects of Collaboratives has been uncontrolled and fragmented across a 
range of activities and target outcomes, often self-reported. Few studies report clearly how 
Collaboratives carried their work out, making it hard to identify what the ‘active ingredient’ is. Few 
contained evidence about the determinants of ‘success’ (as opposed to abundant hypotheses and 
conjectures). Neither is it known what kinds of clinical work (e.g. for which care groups) may be 
more amenable than others to improvement by PSC methods, although Collaboratives based 
hospitals have been most widely reported. 
We evaluated how this action taken in response to the Francis Inquiry was implemented and some 
of the consequences, and used our findings as the evidence base to present some some policy 
implications and further research proposals.
Research Questions (RQ) 
This study addressed six research questions:
9
 RQ1:  How has PSC implementation varied across the 15 Academic Health Science Network 
(AHSN) regions?
 RQ2:  What organisational changes have providers made? How have they done this and what 
have they learned from the PSCs?
 RQ3:  How were resources used for PSCs’ implementation activities? What are the costs of 
participation and implementation?
 RQ4:  Have the PSCs made a detectable difference on rates of harm and adverse events 
involving patients as measured using routine data?
 RQ5:  Has change in practice taken place on the front-line of services?
 RQ6:  What generalisable knowledge can be shared about this?
Methods
We made a mixed methods observational comparison of PSC mechanisms, contexts and outcomes. 
We combined three methods each of which broadly corresponded to one stage of PSC 
implementation:
1. An Implementation study   of how PSCs were set up, of AHSN roles in establishing and 
maintaining regional networks, and of how provider-level NHS managers and clinicians 
used PSC-initiated ideas and resources to influence clinical practice, monitor and improve 
clinical quality and safety. Our study looked at all 15 PSCs, studied three of them in greater 
detail, and within them selected different types of provider for in-depth study.
2. Patient safety culture surveys  . The Francis and Berwick reports emphasised strengthening 
safety culture as a method for making clinical practice safer. Using the Safety, 
Communication, Operational Reliability and Engagement (SCORE) survey, we measured 
changes in patient safety ‘culture’ in six clinical teams undertaking PSC-initiated activities. 
We also analysed NHS Staff Survey data. 
3. Analysis of routine administrative data  . To assess how much patient safety and outcomes 
had changed we quantitatively analysed routinely collected administrative data relevant to 
PSCs’ intended outcomes.
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Our data sources were 61 semi structured in-depth interviews of key informants: SCORE survey 
data from 72 sites (first round) and from the six of these sites which had also made a second-round 
(repeat) survey during the study period: and England-wide data on in-patient satisfaction, quality 
improvement, managerial support for staff, fairness and effectiveness of procedures for reporting 
errors, recommendation of one’s own work-place, incident reporting and hospital mortality.   
Findings
How PSC implementation varied across the 15 AHSNs (RQ1)
Each AHSN applied elements of three strategies for improving patient quality and safety at provider
level: 
• A facilitative strategy, which built where possible on existing QI and safety work in 
healthcare providers, but was constrained by the local history and resources – or lack of 
them – in these areas of work. A facilitative strategy made it harder to attribute any changes 
in working practices and outcomes unequivocally to PSC activities. 
• An educative strategy of educating, training and developing individual ‘change agents’ to 
implement changed working practices to improve patient safety at clinic level. 
• A national priority focussed strategy of adopting ‘work-streams’ from among the current 
national priorities, resulting in several PSCs developing similar work-streams (e.g. sepsis 
prevention).
There were tensions between the facilitative approach and the national priority focus, which some 
informants thought was closer to a performance management approach. In general, PSCs and NHS 
staff favoured shifting from a ‘blame’ culture to learning culture focused on service development as 
more conducive to activities to improve patient safety. Where SCORE surveys were used (which 
was increasingly, but from a small base), they were implemented the same way everywhere. 
PSCs differed in terms of which elements and mechanisms of collaboratives they emphasised. 
Partly because the Francis report was a response to problems in hospital services, and because 
Collaboratives originated in (US) hospitals, participation was proportionately greater among acute 
hospitals than elsewhere, which partly reflected the technical challenges of making the 
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Collaborative model relevant to non-hospital services. General practices apart, the only non-NHS 
providers participating were some care homes and pharmacies.
Organisational changes that providers made and what they have learned from the PSCs (RQ2)
Not all provider organisations participated in the PSCs. The willingness of NHS senior managers to 
engage with PSCs varied across setting. When they were willing, organisational upheaval including 
leadership changes made trusts’ engagement harder to sustain. 
In providers that did participate, the main organisational factors reported to aid PSC implementation
were:
• Initial expenditure for start-up training and preparing management information systems to 
serve (also) as a measurement system for clinical teams’ QI work
• Recruiting trained QI and safety experts or ‘champions’ at all organisational levels, most 
critically at Board and clinical team levels; this was often done with PSC support and 
encouragement.
• Ensuring that these champions had the leadership skills to motivate and empower clinical 
teams and to create safe spaces for staff to speak up or suggest changes.
• Building structures and processes, at both whole-organisation and at clinical team levels, to 
sustain the changed working practices. 
• Allocating staff time not only to engage in QI and learning events, but so that they can 
subsequently utilise their learning at work.
• 'Bottom-up' approaches to safety improvement promoted provider-level engagement and 
motivation by adapting the activities that PSCs were promoting to local needs.
• Measurement support for front-line staff
At the time of this study, the development and use of formal measurement systems to support QI 
activities had not yet materialised. The other change we had expected but did not observe was in 
safety climate, particularly at clinical team level. Although PSC activity, including the SCORE 
surveys, had impacts upon clinical teams’ working practices in the sites we studied (see below) 
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these changes occurred without measurable changes in workplace safety climate. In summary, we 
found: 
1. Some qualitative evidence of safety climate change in the intended direction, including 
increased staff engagement and shifts away from a blame culture towards a more ‘open 
learning culture’. 
2. No significant change safety climate in six study sites by early 2018 on most of the SCORE 
survey domains. 
3. Change in the intended direction in the relevant NHS staff survey data domains, but 
evidence that this change began before PSCs existed.
To suggest that any safety culture changes in particular clinical teams are diluted within much larger
NHS Digital data-sets might be valid for the NHS Staff Survey but is not applicable for the SCORE 
survey results, which were precisely localised to the relevant clinical teams. A possible explanation 
is that safety climate changes are as much a consequence as a cause of changes in working 
practices, in a virtuous circle of mutual reinforcement.
Organisational changes do not occur straight away; sufficient time is required to implement a 
complex set of activities across all levels of the NHS:
1. At least 18 months for PSCs and then providers to establish themselves and start to change 
working practices. In practice this can take a lot longer before any impact is seen at the 
patient level.
2. Allowing individual staff members time at work to attend learning events and then put what 
they learnt into practice.
3. Continuing the PSCs long enough to engage ‘late adopters’ besides ‘early adopters’.
4. Time for plan-do-study-act (PDSA) cycles and other QI activities be repeated and become 
institutionalised on an open-ended time-scale.
Other major constraints surrounding the activities of PSCs we found were NHS providers’ 
concurrent operational pressures and the concomitant resource and financial constraints, staff 
shortages and turnover. At an individual level the barriers included difficulties utilising expertise 
post training due to factors including a performance culture (i.e. conflicting priorities in the work-
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place), lack of time, high staff turnover (including shift rotations and moves between work 
locations), and psychological resistance to change.
Costs of participation in and implementation of PSCs (RQ3)
One of our study PSCs provided broad information how spending on PSCs had been allocated at 
AHSN level (to which programmes, and to broad categories such as support staff, training etc.). At 
the time of our fieldwork detailed information to account for; the training and network activity the 
PSCs provided, monetary flows from PSCs to providers, as well as indirect opportunity costs the 
provider organisations incurred was not completely available. The same applied to information 
about how these extra resources impacted on health benefits for the patients due to changes in 
working practices noted below, making it unfeasible to evaluate the cost effectiveness of the PSC 
programme. 
Have the PSCs made a detectable difference to rates of harm and adverse events involving patients as 
measured using routine data? (RQ4)
We analysed routine administrative data about relevant safety outcomes and found that: 
1. Qualitative evidence of changed working practices which one would expect (given their 
supporting evidence) to improve patient safety and service quality.
2. Quantitative analysis of administrative data showed no significant change by early 2018 that
could plausibly be attributed to PSCs alone.
3. Longer-term changes in the intended direction were occurring.
In our judgement the reasons for these paradoxical patterns are: 
 1. Dilution of any effects of PSCs upon service outcomes because the available datasets 
combine data about activities in which PSCs were involved with data about much larger 
activities in which PSCs were not yet involved,such as trust-level data. 
 2. PSCs’ effects were constrained by countervailing factors: demand overloads, insufficient 
staffing relative to demand, staff turnover and financial constraints.
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 3. Time lags: when our fieldwork finished PSCs were about half-way through their initially-
planned life-span and had spent much of it getting their activities started. This meant the 
period for which routine data could have captured any relevant effects was a year or less. 
We infer that PSC activity had many of its intended effects but they were too localised and diluted 
to be measurable in the larger-scale routinely-reported administrative datasets. 
Change in practice on the front-line of services (RQ5)
In our case study sites we found evidence of changes in practice at front-line, clinical team level. In 
practice the participating clinical teams had become more multidisciplinary. They had also started 
to undertake what in effect was the Model for Improvement: collecting information about their 
working practices, changing the latter, reviewing the effects, then making further adjustments: the 
quality improvement cycle. The SCORE survey, and its practical impacts, can be understood as a 
special case of such activity, and one with a relatively quick impact upon working practices. 
SCORE surveys developed beyond measurement activity into a practical intervention on the part of 
PSCs. Changes in working practices were both clinical (e.g. falls reduction) and organisational (e.g.
pathway re-design) and were reported in both hospitals and general practices.
Conclusions: Policy and management implications
The findings summarised above tend to support some of the policy-makers’ original assumptions 
about how PSCs would work but suggests revisions to other policy assumptions that would lead to 
more effective PSCs and thus safer care for patients:-
 1. PSCs have not yet had sufficient time to establish and sustain the clinical team-level safety 
improvement activities and outcomes that current policy intends. Our evidence suggests 
three years from the outset is in practice too short a time for that. In our opinion (albeit an 
opinion consistent with our findings so far) PSCs should continue in their current form for 
longer before any judgement can be meaningfully made about their impact on patients. 
 2. The PSCs are complex adaptive systems, reacting and responding to different local 
situations in varied ways. Attempts to manage PSCs uniformly and force them into 
particular directions (including work streams) are likely to hamper their ability to promote 
the locally-originating work that will ultimately lead to better patient care. In our opinion 
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NHSI should study the emergent systems, support positive behaviours and resist the 
temptation to apply a ‘one size fits all’ managerial approach.
 3. NHSI and the Department of Health need to provide clear and supportive timelines and 
financial arrangements for the PSCs. One disruptive aspect of the implementation of the 
PSCs was the lack of clear direction from the central NHS bodies, partly due to the 
perceived chaos surrounding the change from NHSE to NHSI, and to the financial 
uncertainly that PSC leads felt. At the time of writing there are suggestions that NHSI 
should review the PSCs. In our opinion it is too soon for that and it will again create an 
impeding uncertainty.
 4. Recognition of the influence of the wider evidence-based medicine (EBM) movement and 
institutions (e.g. NICE) in promoting safety culture, something PSCs’ activity reinforced and
exploited. However development of EBM is uneven (for example, it is better developed in 
general medicine than mental health). Start-up support for Collaboratives may be especially 
important in domains where EBM remains less developed and embedded.
 5. Culture change is too big for PSCs alone to achieve without a massive increase in their 
scale. Learning by clinical teams is a discrete step linking culture change to changed 
working practices and this has implications for the kind of training required. The necessary 
kernels for this training are quality improvement methodologies and the psychology of 
change (‘human factors’). As PSCs have shown, clinical teams are the critical audience for 
this training.
 6. If providers are to become ‘learning organisations’ for PSC purposes the requirements 
include: a 'bottom-up' approach to safety management; that provider managers allow clinical
teams discretion to adapt QI activities to their local needs; that clinical teams are allowed to 
take ownership of a given project or changes in work processes, something our evidence 
suggests also promotes staff engagement and motivation. This is a different approach from 
the work-stream specific collaboratives; mandating clinical teams to work on areas they 
have not chosen will probably not have as effective outcomes for patient care.
 7. NHSI is now addressing the absence of cross-provider measurement systems for PSC 
purposes (for clinical teams across different providers to compare activities and learn from 
each other). Caution will be needed in how these cross-provider data are used. The focus has
to be on data for improvement; if the data are used for performance management (or even 
perceived as such) the benefits of the collaborative approach will diminish. 
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Abbreviations and acronyms used in the report 
A&E Accident and Emergency (department) 
AHSN Academic Health Science Network
AHRQ Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (USA) 
AKI Acute Kidney Injury 
ALoS Average Length of Stay 
AMI Acute Myocardial Infarction 
BMJ British Medical Journal 
BTS Breakthrough Series (collaborative) 
CABG Coronary Artery By-pass Graft 
CCG Clinical Commissioning Group 
CI Confidence Interval 
CLABSI Central Line-Associated Bloodstream Infection 
C-M-O Context-Mechanism-Outcome (configuration)
CQC Care Quality Commission 
CQUIN Commissioning for Quality and Innovation (framework) 
CVC-BSI Central Venous Catheter Blood-Stream Infection 
CVD Cardiovascular Disease 
DH Department of Health (England)
EBM Evidence-Based Medicine 
ED Emergency Department 
GMC General Medical Council 
GP General Practitioner [medical] 
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HED Health Evaluation Data (database) 
HIV Human Immunosuppressive Virus 
HRG Health Resource Group (variant of the Diagnostic Related Group payment system) 
HSMR Hospital Standardised Mortality Ratio 
ICD10 International Classification of Diseases, 10th revision. 
ICSI Institute for Clinical Systems Improvement 
ICU Intensive Care Unit 
IHI Institute for Healthcare Improvement 
MAU Medical Assessment Unit 
NHSE NHS England 
NHSI NHS Improvement 
NICE National Institute for Health and Care Excellence 
NIHR National Institute for Health Research 
NPSA National Patient Safety Agency 
PenCLAHRC NIHR Collaboration for Leadership in Applied Health Research and Care South West
Peninsula
PDCS Plan-Do-Check-Study (cycle) 
PDSA Plan-Do-Study-Act (cycle) 
PPI Patient and Public Involvement 
PSC Patient Safety Collaborative 
QI Quality Improvement 
QIC Quality Improvement Collaborative 
QOF Quality and Outcomes Framework (in GPs’ contract with the NHS) 
RQ Research Question 
RAMR Risk-Adjusted Mortality Ratio 
RSMR Risk-Standardised Mortality Rate 
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SAQ Safety Attitude Questionnaire 
SBAR Situation, Background, Assessment and Recommendation (communications model)
SCOPE- PC Systematic culture inquiry on patient safety – Primary Care [in Dutch]. 
SCORE Safety, Communication, Operational Reliability and Engagement (survey) 
SD Standard Deviation 
SHMI Summary Hospital-level Mortality Indicator 
SMR Standardised Mortality Ratio 
SPC Statistical Process Control 
SQUIRE Standards for QUality Improvement Reporting Excellence 
SSI Surgical Site Infection 
TDA Trust Development Authority 
TQM Total Quality Management 
UTI Urinary Tract Infection 
VTE Venous Thromboembolism 
WHO World Health Organisation 
WHOSCC World Health Organisation Safe Childbirth Checklist 
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The Patient Safety Collaborative Evaluation Study (The PiSCES Study) 
Chapter 1:  Study aims and research questions
Having investigated a series of avoidable deaths and other occurrences of avoidable harm to 
patients at Mid-Staffordshire Hospital, the Francis Inquiry1 recommended 290 actions to reduce the 
likelihood of such events recurring. The creation of Patient Safety Collaboratives (PSC) was 
prominent in the government’s response, and elaborated in the subsequent policy and guidance 
statements. For this report we evaluated how this action taken in response to the Francis Enquiry 
was implemented, assessed some of the consequences, and used our findings as the evidence base to
present some policy implications. 
In part tacitly, NHS policies have assumed that PSCs will work through a specific complex of 
mechanisms, outlined in Chapter 2. Existing research into PSCs and equivalent collaboratives (see 
Chapter 3) still contains gaps and ambiguities about whether or how these mechanisms work, and in
what contexts, making it hard to predict from existing studies alone what PSCs in the NHS are 
likely to achieve. In many studies, their ‘black box’ (associational, correlational) research design 
leaves unclear what links the establishment of a collaborative and any ensuing change towards safer
working practices, and what contexts are required. Taken together, the ambiguities among these 
findings suggest unrecognised contexts at work, in effect under-defining the mechanisms that were 
being tested and/or conflation of different types of collaboratives. Furthermore, policy regarding 
PSCs is likely to be differently interpreted and operationalised by different agents2, who will in 
effect be implementing somewhat different variants of PSC i.e. different interventions. 
1.a.  Aims  
This report summarises the findings of one of five research projects in the overall evaluation of the 
impact of the government’s response to the Francis Report. Our aim in this project was to evaluate 
the PSCs' work, paying attention to variations in PSC activity, processes and outcomes, in order to 
produce findings relevant to policy formation, to the ongoing management of the Patient Safety 
Collaboratives, and to the design and implementation of future improvement efforts. We particularly
wanted to examine the mechanisms that PSCs have put in place to achieve their goals. It would be 
hard to exaggerate how important an issue patient safety is in the NHS and for patients themselves. 
The National Patient Safety Agency NPSA) estimated that 300,000 people a year are harmed by 
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medical error and 30,000 ultimately die from these mistakes: a higher number than the combined 
annual mortality from breast, prostate and colorectal cancer.3 Other studies have produced even 
higher estimates, e.g. that up to one in three hospitalised patients experience an adverse event4. In 
6% of cases the adverse event is severe enough to prolong hospital stay and send the affected 
patient home with a permanent or temporary disability.4,5 The serious consequences added to the 
large scale, and international recurrence of the problems that Francis and related policy documents 
reported and tried to address confirm the continued international relevance of research on 
collaboratives. 
1.b.  Research questions  
Reflecting both NHS policy priorities and some of the research gaps in the existing research on 
Collaboratives, this study addressed the following research questions: 
 RQ1:  How has PSC implementation varied across the 15 Academic Health Science Network 
(AHSN) regions? 
 RQ2:  What organisational changes have providers made? How have they done this and what 
have they learned from the PSCs? 
 RQ3:  How were resources used for PSCs’ implementation activities? What are the costs of 
participation and implementation? 
 RQ4:  Have the PSCs made a detectable difference on rates of harm and adverse events 
involving patients as measured using routine data? 
 RQ5:  Has change in practice taken place on the front-line of services? 
 RQ6:  What generalisable knowledge can be shared about this? 
In these questions we take terms such as ‘made’ in a realist sense, as referring to ‘mechanisms’ of 
action. By ‘mechanism’ we mean ‘individuals’ reasoning, action and use of resources’, including 
those whose operation and effects may be hidden from immediate observation6 and must therefore 
be inferred. By ‘outcomes’ we mean the empirical effects of these mechanisms, intended or 
otherwise (including for example emergent outcomes and ‘side-effects’). We conceptualise the 
outcome of mechanism A in terms of whether mechanism A helped produce outcome B, where 
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‘help’ means that the mechanism promoted or increased B, but without claiming that A was the only
reason why B changed. So in this study we examine what PSCs contributed to the development, 
activities and outcomes of QI activities generally, both pre-existing and newly initiated by the PSCs.
By ‘context’ we mean ‘a moderator, not causally dependent on the mechanism, which is either 
necessary for the mechanism to produce the outcome, or which intensifies the outcome that the 
mechanism produces’. Thus contexts do not include intermediate outcomes (mediators), but they do
include barriers and facilitators to a mechanism’s work (RQ4). For all practical research purposes, 
‘safety culture’ is defined by scores on safety culture surveys. 
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Chapter 2:  Policy background and assumptions 
The Francis report did not mention Patient Safety Collaboratives by name. Part of the UK 
government’s response to it was to ask Don Berwick to chair a National Patient Safety Advisory 
Group to advise the government on a ‘whole-system’ Patient Safety Improvement Programme for 
achieving ‘zero-harm’ to NHS patients. It was this group which proposed establishing PSCs7, 
apparently drawing upon three main prototypes. 
1. Quality Improvement Collaboratives (QIC), which originated in the Northern New England 
Cardiovascular Disease Study Group (1986). Subsequent examples have been reported in 
Australia, Canada8, France9, the Netherlands10, Norway, Russia, Sweden, the UK and the 
USA, Peru and several African countries.11 
2. The Institute for Clinical Systems Improvement (ICSI) approach which concentrates on 
developing guidelines and promoting culture change across most of the providers in a 
region12 more resembles the Wisconsin Collaborative13 or indeed the NHS clinical and 
professional networks of the 2000s.14,15 
3. The Vermont Oxford Network ('data-driven') model, centred on a database, periodically 
reporting mortality, morbidity and patterns of medical practice in each of its member-
organisations.16 The Institute of Healthcare Improvement (IHI) 'Breakthrough Series' (BTS) 
Quality Improvement Collaboratives were an elaboration of the Vermont Oxford approach.17
Previous collaboratives have thus used different improvement methods to effect the different 
aspects of healthcare quality; safety, timeliness of care, efficiency, effectiveness, equity and 
delivering patient centred care. However the BTS form of Collaborative appears to have had the 
strongest influence on the development of PSCs. The founders of the IHI developed the BTS Model
for Improvement from previous work in other industries such as car manufacturing. The Model for 
Improvement consists of three questions; what is the aim the project is addressing, how do you 
measure the system’s performance and what changes can be made (e.g. through the Plan-Do-Study-
Act (PDSA) cycle). Although not specifically stated at the outset this method was implicitly 
assumed to be the one the PSCs would primarily use. We therefore have drawn on the North 
American models to interpret the NHS policy documents where the latter were silent or ambiguous 
about how PSCs were to work. 
The government’s response also built upon earlier work by the National Patient Safety Agency 
(NPSA), the NHS Commissioning Board and Health Foundation’s ‘Safer Patients’ collaborative 
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which was initiated in 2004, based on a 'change agent' model, and extended in 2008. As early as 
2004 the NPSA devised an Incident Decision Tree for differentiating culpable safety failures from 
system failures.18 Certain previous lapses in patient safety had also generated their own public 
inquiries: those regarding breast cancer screening at Exeter19 and those which led to the Shipman20, 
Ledward21, Bristol Royal Infirmary22 and Alder Hey23 inquiries. An attempt to replicate the 
Michigan project copied its approach to training and networked team working, but was centrally- 
not clinician-led.24 The PSCs were launched in October 2014 as a national programme expected to 
last at least five years to support individuals, teams and organisations to build the necessary skills 
and knowledge to enhance patient safety and quality improvement and thus reduce the numbers of 
avoidable harm cases across England. With an estimated budget of £12 million per annum, of which
some was retained for management and measurement at national level leaving £7m for the regional 
coordinating bodies, the PSCs were to be organised and delivered regionally by 15 Academic 
Health Science Networks (AHSN) in order to respond to local variation and need. In 2016 NHS 
Improvement (NHSI) mandated another national set of Collaboratives specifically for maternity 
services.25 
2.a.  PSCs as mechanisms for reducing errors and system failures  
The overall objective of PSCs was to ‘spread best practice, build skills and capabilities in patient 
safety and improvement science, and to focus on actions that can make the biggest difference to 
patients in every part of the country […] to tackle the leading causes of harm to patients’7, ¶12. The 
UK government intended that by 2020 NHS England would create a comprehensive, effective, and 
sustainable improvement system to ‘deliver’ a culture of continual learning and improvement in 
patient safety, ‘notably in cancer, heart disease and stroke’.7 More specifically, PSCs were to focus 
on the issues indicated on the Patient Safety ‘Wall of Priorities'. Three main policy documents (The 
Berwick and Keogh reports, and Hard Truths) elaborated these ideas.
Don Berwick’s report26 made the case for a PSC-based approach. In it he distinguished three main 
causes of the problems reported at Mid-Staffordshire Hospital and Winterbourne View: 
1. Failures in organisational and work-routine systems
2. Human error.
3. Neglect or wilful misconduct – a rare event.
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PSCs could address the first two problems. The third would typically have to be addressed by 
means of sanctions and was therefore outside the possible remit of a PSC. However managers 
should not usually apply sanctions in response to errors made in good faith.
'While “Zero Harm” is a bold and worthy aspiration, the scientifically correct goal is 
“continual reduction”. All in the NHS should understand that safety is a continually 
emerging property, and that the battle for safety is never “won”; rather, it is always in 
progress.'26 
Keogh similarly argued that:
‘Understanding the causes of high mortality is not usually about finding a rogue surgeon or 
problems in a single surgical speciality. It is more likely to be found in the combination of 
problems that to a differing extent are experienced by all hospitals in the NHS: busy A&E 
[accident and emergency] departments and wards, the treatment of the elderly in and out of 
hospital, and the need to recruit and retain excellent staff. Such issues are complex and 
require a ‘whole system’ approach to deal with them’27, p.17.
The Keogh report’s ‘ambitions’ focused upon improving and widening the measurement of service 
quality and safety, and on improving staffing and staff skills relevant to patient safety.
The Department of Health’s official response Hard Truths7 recommended:
 1. Preventing such problems by creating an open culture responsive to staff with sufficient 
'psychological safety'28 to enable staff and patient feedback. 
 2. Detecting and dealing with problems quickly by
(a) improving information sharing and 
(b) implementing new inspection regime (an addition to Berwick’s proposals).
 3. Taking action quickly to ensure quality and safety are maintained. 
 4. Clarifying accountability (another addition to Berwick’s proposals). 
 5. Ensuring staff are properly trained and motivated to perform their roles. 
Therefore NHS policy implicitly took PSCs as involving networked implementation of measures to 
increase patient safety, through networks centred on AHSNs as the main coordinating body. These 
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networks were to promote ‘learning organisation’ methods of 'quick action' for changing working 
practices through PDSA (also known as Plan-Do-Check-Study (PDCS)29) cycles30, and 
strengthening staff training and motivation in regard to patient safety. Across primary, community, 
mental health, acute and ‘other sectors’ PSCs were to ‘use evidence based improvement 
methodologies’, focusing on those with the biggest impacts on patients.7 
2.b.  Components, activities, structures  
2.b.i.  Networked implementation
Since the 1990s UK governments have often used networked structures as the vehicles for the 
implementation of such policies as managing clinical quality31,32 and promoting evidence-based 
practice. A networked approach avoids the appearance, and to a certain extent the reality, of public 
bodies directly managing clinical practice. It preserves a collective form of clinical autonomy for 
the medical and other clinical professions. However, putting in place 'centred' networks with an 
accountable 'network administrative organisation'33 maintains an element of the public 
accountability and control that is foundational to the NHS. A more recently realised advantage is 
that networked approaches are, unlike direct line-management, compatible with the otherwise 
unconnected policy of ‘diversifying’ the sources and ownership of NHS-funded healthcare 
providers.34 The rest of this section describes the characteristics of the PSCs that have been 
emphasized in this approach to their implementation. 
2.b.ii.  A coordinating body
NHS England (NHSE) was initially designated as the body responsible at national level for 
coordinating and monitoring PSCs. NHSE nominated and set the main priorities for the Patient 
Safety Collaboratives to work on, keeping responsibility for professional education and assigning 
the Care Quality Commission (CQC) responsibility for patient information. Other national bodies, 
including NICE, remained responsible for developing and promulgating safe, high-quality 
evidence-based practice. Subsequently national-level responsibility for the Collaboratives 
transferred from NHSE to NHS Improvement (NHSI). The transfer took over a year to complete 
and during this period inertia and uncertainty affected ongoing programmes including the PSCs. 
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Since then the coordination of the PSCs has been the joint responsibility of the PSC leads with a 
nominated director of an AHSN, with NHSI representatives who report to the board of NHSI board.
At regional or sub-regional level each PSC has a coordinating body whose members typically 
included an organiser (‘lead’, director), facilitators, subject experts, change experts, and quality 
improvement experts. The role of this coordinating body includes: 
1. Team building, avoiding didactic teaching in favour of time spent comparing and 
learning local applications of ideas, so as to reinforce teams’ motivation and self-
confidence. 
2. Providing support from national experts in patient safety, improvement science and 
‘large scale change’.7
3. On-site support (e.g. by visiting facilitators, email, conference calls). 
The intention implicit in NHS policy was thus that PSCs 
1. Engage local providers and experts in patient safety improvement work, in order to 
design jointly an innovative approach to large scale change, and 
2. build on existing national and regional initiatives in patient safety and upon improvement 
collaboratives that have had an impact in other clinical areas.7 
This means a PSC’s coordinating body has to manage knowledge diffusion between its member-
organisations, not just within the coordinating body itself.
To implement this approach in the NHS, PSCs were established at a regional level as 'centred' 
networks with AHSNs as the networks’ hosts, i.e. their coordinating and managing body, 
accountable to higher-level NHS bodies. The AHSNs were to provide for each PSC its coordinating 
infrastructure (staffing, budgets, IT, premises etc.), undertake measurement and monitoring of the 
PSC as a whole (see below); provide training, organisational and practical support for the provider-
level teams; provide a venue for mutual monitoring and reporting back of their PSC’s focal 
activities and corresponding outcomes, within each provider level team and that team’s 'home' 
organisation; and recruit provider organisations to the PSCs, in particular the priority-relevant 
departments and teams in the main provider organisations in their region. Together the 
Collaboratives, participating clinical teams and the clinical teams' 'home' provider organisations 
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were to agree which safety priorities to address. The PSCs were also to help their member-
organisations become learning organisations in respect of patient safety. AHSNs administered their 
PSCs in different ways. Some had the PSC as a separate entity with a specific lead and budget 
whereas others incorporated the PSC and its associated funding within existing AHSN activity.
2.b.iii.  A specified focus
During the set up phase the PSCs were allowed to develop as the regional teams saw fit. Some 
teams selected specific areas of activity from the ‘wall of priorities’. Others did not focus on 
specific conditions and let the provider organisations choose their activities, which the PSC then 
supported in a variety of ways. The wall of priorities were disparate and ranged through preventing 
specific conditions (e.g. venous thromboembolism (VTE), pressure ulcers) to services for large 
populations (e.g. ‘People with Mental Health Needs’, ‘Children’) to inter-organisational care 
coordination (‘Handover and Discharge’, ‘Transition between paediatric and adult care’). By the 
end of 2017 the priorities had been narrowed to three main themes (‘work streams’): maternity care;
care of the deteriorating patient; and safety culture. This represented a significant shift in the 
priorities for the PSCs, from mostly local autonomy to a more central control. 35% of PSC funding 
was attached to national and 65% to local priorities. 
2.b.iv.  Transparency, monitoring, measurement and targets
The Francis report recommended that each NHS organisation should publish, at least annually, a 
report on its progress in achieving its planned actions. The Department of Health (DH) should also 
publish a report, at least annually, collating information about the decisions, actions and progress 
reported by other NHS organisations and the House of Commons Select Committee on Health 
should incorporate progress on implementation as part of its standard reviewing of organisations. 
Berwick himself recommended that the NHS 'Use quantitative targets with caution. … narrowly'.26 
but Hard Truths stated that PSCs’ reporting, transparency and monitoring (but not yet ‘targets’) 
work would mean: 
‘Building on the experience of previous improvement programmes there will be a focus on 
measurement from the outset to ensure that organisations are able to track safety incidents 
over time as well as testing some innovative measures of safety culture and teams’7, ¶1.45.
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The measures in question were to include ‘readily available’ comparisons (across providers) of data 
about safety of care and care outcomes; and the measurement of quality and patient safety and the 
skills for engaging patients actively. Specifically, the CQC and NHSE would increase the data about
safety and quality available to patients, including data on staffing, pressure ulcers, healthcare 
associated infections and ‘other key indicators, where appropriate at ward level’.7 In line with the 
NHS Outcomes Framework the priorities for measurement were maternity, medication errors and 
deterioration in children. Additional priorities were (as avoidable sources of severe harm) missed 
and delayed diagnosis, deterioration of patients, medical device errors and sepsis; and (as 
vulnerable groups) offenders, acutely ill older people, and patient transitioning from paediatric to 
adult care.
The corresponding practical steps were to set up a national ‘measurement unit’; to promote 
understanding and use of measurement for these purposes; to develop measurement tools, databases
and an (unspecified) ‘infrastructure’; and to ensure that methods, tools and infrastructures were 
clearly stipulated, communicated and used. The Francis report also recommended reinstating NHS 
England’s patient safety alerts to hospitals and the NHS Safety Thermometer. From 2012 NHS 
providers were paid a small bonus, through the Commissioning for Quality and Innovation Scheme 
(CQuInS) for collecting data on pressure ulcers, falls, catheter and urine infections, and venous 
thromboembolism.35 The Patient Safety Collaborative Logic Model36 specified four sequential 
components through which the measurement aspect would be realised:
1. Set up a measurement unit. 
2. Promote understanding and use of measurement.
3. Develop measures and databases.
4. Communicate and use the measures. 
Policy makers assumed an improved understanding and use of measurement would stimulate a local
review of the underlying problems that caused unstable or deteriorating measures,35 and that this 
would reduce variability in safety practices across the health and care system; and promote the 
implementation of larger scale, sustainable, measurable (quality and safety) improvement.
After 2014 the policy emphasis shifted more towards a performance management-like approach. 
NHS England’s Patient Safety Team published the NHS Serious Incident Framework (2010: revised
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2013, 2015) and in 2015 NHSE published a list of National Clinical Audits and Clinical Outcome 
Review programmes for NHS trusts to include in their Quality Accounts for 2016-17. Hospital, 
community and mental health trusts were given a statutory ‘Duty of Candour’ that included 
informing and apologising to patients for any significantly harmful mistakes in care but this 
accountability appeared hard to balance with the ‘safe space’ policy of allowing blame-free 
recognition and correction of bona fide mistakes.37 At the time of writing (March 2018), the General
Medical Council (GMC) appeared to have prioritised candour over ‘safe spaces’ by taking legal 
action (including an appeal to the High Court) to have a paediatric registrar removed from the 
Medical Register following her involvement in the accidental death of a patient that occurred in part
due to systemic organisational failures.38 
More concretely the Keogh Report into 14 NHS hospital trusts with consistently high hospital 
standardised mortality ratios (HSMR) and/or Summary Hospital Morality Indicator (SHMI) rates, 
especially for emergency (rather than planned) care, discounted environmental explanations for 
their safety levels:
‘Factors that might have been expected – and are frequently claimed - to impact on high 
mortality, such as access to funding and the poor health of the local population, were not 
found to be statistically-correlated with the results of these trusts. The average for the 14 
trusts [with highest HSMR] is broadly the same as the England average in terms of funding 
and the socio-economic make-up of the populations they serve’27, p.16.
Keogh therefore used multidisciplinary teams to make a ‘rapid responsive review’ of each such 
trust, followed by a ‘risk summit’ of ‘all involved statutory parties … to agree with each trust a 
coordinated plan of action’27, p.4.
Any network aiming to influence quality and safety of care has, by some means, to have an impact 
upon and within each of its member-organisations. The individual(s) who represent each member-
organisation within the network have to transmit its policies into the 'hinterlands' of their 'home' 
organisation.15 One thing that PSCs added to earlier professional and clinical networks was that they
involved not only individuals but whole clinical teams, who meet regularly and between meetings 
exchange ideas informally. In the BTS model, organisations work together for 9-12 months, and 
participants having at least two meetings, each lasting two days, to:
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1. Form an initial understanding of what changes they regard as crucial for their chosen focal 
project(s). 
2. Assess progress towards implementing these changes, sharing key findings about the 
outcomes
3. Learn and disseminate practical lessons about the above.
The participants would report their provider-level changes and results to each other, share 
experiences, and plan how to spread their innovations to other services.
2.c.  Healthcare providers as learning organisations  
More generally, PSCs were expected to influence working practices in their member-organisations 
by helping the latter develop into ‘learning organisations’.
'The most important single change in the NHS in response to this [Francis] report would be 
for it to become, more than ever before, a system devoted to continual learning and 
improvement of patient care, top to bottom and end to end.'26 (original emphasis). 
The NHS was ‘to become, in other words, the world’s largest learning organisation’.39 Implicitly 
each PSC was intended both to act as a 'learning organisation' itself and to stimulate its member-
organisations to do the same. 
In the BTS model the participants meet repeatedly to learn quality improvement methods (typically 
from clinical experts and experts in quality improvement methods3), about practical changes made 
elsewhere, and about the evidence for resulting improvements. Methods for promoting team 
learning (and safety culture generally) include leadership walkabouts, multi-disciplinary 
collaboration, front-line engagement in development cycles, data-driven improvement, protocols for
improved hospital communication (e.g. the Situation, Background, Assessment and 
Recommendation (SBAR) model) and safety-specific communication (e.g., theatre safety briefings, 
safety huddles).40 
According to the Patient Safety Collaborative Logic Model36 similar things will occur through the 
AHSN and a PSC’s other member-organisations sequentially:
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1. Developing, disseminating and using relevant evidence. 
2. Developing relationships with ‘stakeholders’ (whether this means between the member-
organisations, within each member-organisation, or both is unstated). 
3. Establishing communication and messaging (same proviso). 
4. Prioritising (i.e. selection of PSC focus: see above).
5. Establishing effective networks and ‘cluster groups’ ( i.e. groups clustered around each focal
activity). 
6. Establishing an effective communication strategy. 
The same source says that ‘local’ (implicitly, provider-level) ‘capability building’ will occur through
developing local capability in implementing and spreading patient safety activities, and providing 
requisite training and ‘tools’. As a result providers will develop the capacity to measure, investigate 
and improve patient safety.
Learning organisations typically combine learning at three levels: the whole organisation, the work 
(in healthcare, clinical) team, and individual levels. For PSCs, current policy characterises them as 
follows.
2.c.i.  Whole-organisation learning and leadership
At whole-organisation (hospital, general practice etc.) level ‘learning organisation’ activities were to
involve a set of consistent, mutually reinforcing activities including:
1. 'Leadership activities', based on a different list of priorities than for measurement work. 
These leadership activities were to focus on outcomes from the NHS outcomes framework 
(specifically, venous thromboembolism (VTE) prevention, healthcare-associated infections 
and pressure ulcers), in addition to major causes of death and severe harm (falls, handover 
and discharge, nutrition and rehydration, acute kidney injury) and the care of vulnerable 
groups (mental health, people with learning disabilities, children, offenders, acutely ill old 
people, children passing into adult care).
2. Developing and applying scientific staffing ratios.26
3. Bringing tacit knowledge into healthcare providers’ organisational learning. 
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4. Having a clear, simple focus of responsibility for safety and improvement, 
5. Internal rather than external monitoring of safety and quality.26
6. Transparency of, and responding to warning signals in, complaints and quantitative ‘metrics’
about any deterioration in quality of care.
2.c.ii.  Clinical teams’ learning
For clinical teams the essential activities were to be
1. Standardisation of routine clinical care processes so improve reliability41 and safety.
2. Continuous improvement for each work-team and its adjacent teams. 
As noted above, the quality improvement activities through which this is done were to be organised 
in a strongly inter-organisational way. 
2.c.iii.  Individual learning 
Individuals within these teams, and by implication including those in management roles, required:
 1. Training, education, capacity building in: 
(a) continuous improvement
(b) understanding and use of evidence and investigation. 
 2. Protected time for reflective practice.
The relevant training was both technical (e.g. about the WHO Surgical Safety Checklist 
(WHOSCC) and about infection control) and organisational (e.g. how to introduce evidence-based 
changes in working practice, how to use safety measurement). In addition to establishing the PSC 
programme NHS England, in partnership with The Health Foundation, created a programme called 
‘Q’ with the aim of developing 5,000 improvement fellows across the country. 
2.d.  Managing climate and culture at provider level  
UK policy statements emphasised managing organisations' cultures as the means through which 
PSCs and their member-organisations would improve patient safety and quality of care, in this 
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respect adopting the assumptions of the Michigan ‘keystone’ collaborative.42 According to The 
Commons Constitutional Select Committee, NHSI believed that
‘leadership is the most powerful influence on the culture of an organisation. … there is a 
link between chief executives with a clearly communicated strategic vision, long term goals 
and organisational plans for patient safety and staff well-being and good patient safety 
performance’37 (p.19).
Through 'learning organisation' methods, the senior management within each provider organisation 
and each clinical level team would influence the organisation's climate, and in particular its patient 
safety climate or culture43,44 i.e. the subset of organisational culture or climate containing ‘the 
attitudes, values, norms and beliefs that relate specifically to patient safety’45 (p.312). Policy 
expressly assumed that this management of culture, like organisational learning, would occur at 
both whole-provider and at clinician (clinical team) level:
‘the Public Inquiry and […] reviews led by Professor Don Berwick and Sir Bruce Keogh 
show that safe care is dependent on healthy cultures: having the right values, behaviours and
optimum systems and conditions to minimise harm and to learn from patient safety 
incidents. Professor Michael West’s recent study […] describes these conditions and how 
they can generate either “bright spots” or “dark spots” in care’ 7,¶1.48.
However the Francis report described bullying of whistle-blowers, concealment or falsification of 
evidence of harm to patients, and an ‘insidious’ tolerance of poor quality and safety standards. 
Subsequently the House of Commons Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, 
among others, noted the persistence of a defensive ‘blame culture’ in the NHS (and the weakness of 
the powers of the Health Service Investigation Branch).37 Only 43% of respondents to the 2015 
NHS Staff Survey responded that their organisation was fair in its treatment of staff involved in near
misses, errors and incidents.46 
In response the Francis report and subsequent policy documents recommended ‘strong and stable 
cultural leadership’. The normative content of the culture which PSCs were to promote included 
prioritising patient safety: ‘shared values in which the patient is the priority of everything done’; 
transparency, including an 'open and fair culture', expectations of openness, candour and honesty’; 
support for staff to improve their practice continually; ‘abandon blame as a [management tool] and 
trusting the goodwill and good intentions of the staff'26; and zero-tolerance of substandard care. It 
recommended ‘empowering front-line staff with the responsibility and freedom to deliver safe 
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care’. This policy tended to assume that managers can change an organisation's climate or culture47–
49 (which although not easy might be easier than changing, say, a hospital’s physical infrastructure, 
workforce or socio-economic setting). 
The leadership element would arise through36:
1. Facilitation of patient and public engagement in the co-production of care and decision 
making.
2.  ‘Leadership’ (senior management) understanding of quality improvement for patient safety 
purposes. 
3.  This understanding becoming ‘embedded ward to board’.
4.  The above will lead to increase patient and public ‘engagement’ in improving services, and 
in turn to 
5. ‘Visible leadership’ for patient safety and quality improvement.
The culture or climate described above would arise through36: 
1. Promotion of a climate of openness, person / patient centeredness and clinical effectiveness, 
which would lead to:
2. Organisational listening, learning and support for staff. 
3. Team working (implicitly, by inter-professional clinical teams) and 
4. A ‘culture of openness’.
Policy statements expected these changes in patient safety culture to influence each PSC member-
organisation's patient safety climate. 'Climate' denotes the organisation's observed environment, 
objectives, norms, activities, resources and membership as front-line workers perceive them. Brand 
names notwithstanding, ‘culture’ surveys43 usually measure workplace climate: that is, what the 
members of clinical teams think and feel about patient safety in their workplace, as opposed to 
managers’ and policy makers’ beliefs and attitudes (organisational ‘culture’) concerning patient 
safety. There is some evidence that attitudes to inter-organisational relationships reciprocally both 
influence and reflect the ways in which organisations collaborate in practice.50 Analogously, the 
same might be expected to apply to clinical working practices.51 
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2.e.  Changed clinical working practices  
The collaborative model assumes that teamwork leads to better clinical decisions and hence to 
better patient outcomes.52 The eponymous collaboration is within and between provider-level 
clinical teams (possibly more than one from each member organisation, in which case a 'site project 
leader' may coordinate them). The teams are typically multi-professional and typically include a 
'team leader', clinician(s), opinion leader(s), and quality specialist(s). The teams adopt quantified, 
normative goals for improving patient safety and/or other aspects of quality of care. At the outset of 
their work they set measurable targets, collect baseline and then further data to track their 
performance, and periodically report it to the collaborative’s coordinators. This requires the 
members to agree what data the collaborative has access to and how it will be analysed, and for the 
site teams to know the importance of data collection from the outset, and how they will analyse 
their data. In the BTS prototype the participant clinical teams plan, implement, and evaluate many 
small changes repeatedly and in quick succession, e.g. by dealing with one defect per month.43 After
a problem is identified, debriefing teams is the critical mechanism used for learning and 
improvement.53 Depending on circumstances the improvements may concern team organisation and 
relationships, technical (clinical) aspects of work, or both. The methods used are usually adopted 
more-or-less ready-made from existing quality management methods (e.g. quality circles, statistical 
process control etc.) and essentially follow the PDSA model. 
In PSCs, say NHS England36, team based working will become the norm. Inter-organisational 
collaboration between clinical teams, ‘learning organisation’ activities and climate management 
together would change clinical working practices. Important quick-acting mechanisms that would 
change working practices in this way were PDSA cycles and activities to increase staff training and 
motivation. The CQC has also recommended the use of ‘human factors principles’ and ‘root cause’ 
analyses of clinical mistakes. Using the term ‘innovation’ for these changed working practices, the 
Patient Safety Collaborative Logic Model36 foresaw them arising through:
1.  The development of interventions in different contexts and settings. 
2. The use of local investigations (of safety problems) to ‘support’ innovation. 
3. The creation of an infrastructure for innovation use and sharing. 
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4. Provision of ‘local’ (provider-level) support to ‘deliver’ patient safety. 
5. An increased proportion of staff capable of innovating. 
6. Development of systems for promoting and sharing innovation. 
2.f.  Improved quality and safety  
NHS England anticipated36 that the above activities would, as immediate outcomes, increase safety 
improvement capability, increase inter-organisational collaboration about safety, reduce variability 
in safety practices between healthcare providers (see above) and increase the ‘alignment of system 
priorities and policies with improvement goals'. In turn these intermediate outcomes would, NHS 
policy statements said, lead to the implementation of larger scale, sustainable, measurable 
improvement. Patients would become more involved in care planning, and care plans would include
a summary of patients' needs and preferences. Patients who needed one would have a named care 
coordinator. NHS providers would make greater use of patient feedback (including complaints) and 
of patient representation in governance structures. A consequence of 'leadership activities' would be 
'greater numbers of patient and public empowered and routinely involved in decision making 
around patient safety'.
Routinely collected data were to be the measures of the anticipated improvements in patient safety 
and clinical quality; supplemented with any more specific, locally collected data which may be 
available and relevant. For attribution purposes, the measures were to be analysed at the level of the
providers, of the specialities and clinical teams, and of the care groups, in which PSC-instigated 
activities have occurred. The timescales over which PSCs were expected to show results is five 
years (2015-2020) but to secure any continuation of funding early enough to make continuation of 
the PSCs practicable, ‘results’ may have to be shown sooner than that, especially if the 
government’s responses to the Francis Report again become politically salient. 
2.g.  Contextual requirements  
Berwick and others stated that various contexts are likely to moderate the implementation and 
effects of PSCs.
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A set of concurrent policies was intended to reinforce PSC activity and its effects. These included 
the 'Sign up to Safety' campaign54 and Health Education England’s obligation to ensure staff 
training focuses upon delivering safe, dignified, compassionate care. The Sign up for Safety 
initiative aimed to enable organisations and individuals to ‘commit to five safety pledges’, develop 
their own local safety improvement plans, share information and learning about methods that 
increase the safety of care, and promote a ‘just culture’.54 The Francis Report recommended that not
only providers but also commissioning, regulatory and ‘ancillary’ healthcare organisations should 
decide how to apply the Report’s recommendations to their own work. NHS England established a 
Health Service Investigation Branch, charged with creating ‘safe spaces’ in which practical lessons 
could be learned from clinical mistakes but the House of Commons Public Administration and 
Constitutional Affairs Committee criticised its limited capacity and weak legal powers, and more 
generally the ill-coordinated plethora of organisations with responsibilities for investigating clinical 
mistakes or for promoting a ‘learning climate’ in the NHS.37 
Against this background, certain other concurrent policies appeared to complicate and even impede 
the construction of PSCs. Berwick found 
'The current NHS regulatory system is bewildering in its complexity and prone to both 
overlaps of remit and gaps between different agencies. It should be simplified.'26 
To that end Berwick recommended that the CQC be converted into a non-departmental public body 
accountable to Parliament rather than the Secretary of State. Another complication was the more 
diverse (which in practice meant increasingly privatised) range of NHS-funded providers.34 
Alongside network structures and in place of line management, two other means were necessary for 
implementing patient safety policy. One means was by managing safety climate (see above):
‘As the NHS evolves into a network of increasingly autonomous units, the overall climate 
will define what the NHS means and does’.55 
Contracts were the other means:
‘Contractors of outsourced services should also be required to abide by these [NHS 
constitution] requirements – these requirements could be included in the terms on which 
providers are commissioned’.55 
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Similar requirements should, Francis argued, apply to individual NHS employees. In these 
circumstances it was necessary for the success of PSCs that 'all incentives should point in the same 
direction’26 i.e. that of supporting safety improvement.
Keogh27 noted four main systemic ‘foundations’ of high quality patient care: using patient 
experience (e.g. complaints) data to instigate corrective action; ensuring that risks to safety are 
recorded, understood and managed, and in particular that ward staff carry out basic observation of 
patients; using mortality and other data to analyse and improve quality of care; and assuring 
provider-level government and ‘leadership’, with a coherent connection between ‘clinical 
leadership’ and ward level perceptions of what the main risks to safety are. These were largely 
within managers’ and clinicians’ control but austerity policies restricted NHS organisations’ 
capacity to meet Keogh’s fifth condition: having sufficient staff and a reduction of workforce 
problems (high sick-rates, unfilled vacancies, use of agency staff). In all 14 Rapid Response Report 
(RRR) trusts, Keogh’s reviewers found that workload and financial pressures impeded the first four 
conditions to varying extents.27 As Berwick had anticipated:
'Financial goals require special caution; they reflect proper stewardship and prudence, but 
are only a means to support the mission of the NHS: healing'.26 
As further contextual assumptions The Patient Safety Collaborative Logic Model lists (verbatim):
1. Continued political backing and available funding for the [PSC] initiative, in particular 
continued recognition through the system of the importance of the Berwick Report. 
2. Transfer of patient safety function to NHS Improvement will retain consistency of 
leadership.
3. Hospitals have safe staffing levels across the NHS in England. 
4. Improvement training of staff ‘actually makes a difference’ i.e. changes staff attitudes, 
motivation skills and behaviour. 
5. Staff have capacity and time to do improvement work even if they have the skills and 
knowledge. 
6. Leadership team will flex and change over the five years. 
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In addition (although more an aspect of the PSC itself than of simple context) AHSNs will continue 
and maintain a positive leadership role for patient safety. 
2.h.  How will PSCs work? Policy assumptions, programme theory  
Every policy is a theory: that is, a theory that a specified intervention, implemented in a specific 
context, will cause a predicted set of policy outcomes.56 Whilst the policy outcomes are a normative 
choice, the causal questions of whether the chosen intervention produces them, and if so in what 
contexts, are empirical questions that can be tested – and refined – by comparison with the relevant 
evidence. From the above policy statements described above we can therefore connect and 
summarise the causal and contextual assumptions which together constitute the ‘programme 
theory’57 of PSCs: that is the explicit or implicit 'logic model’58 or ‘theory of change’59, whether 
empirically valid or not, embodied in national policy towards PSCs. In doing so we differentiate the
original explicit assumptions from the additional (originally tacit) assumptions that appear to be 
required to fill any gaps in the explicit assumptions, interpreting the additional assumptions in the 
most-evidence-based and logically consistent way possible, in order to evaluate the PSC policy and 
its implementation at their strongest. NHS England also published The Patient Safety Collaborative 
Logic Model in November 2015, which states (in part) the programme theory for PSCs. It lists as 
parallel PSC activities, with respective outputs and goals: Measurement; Learning; Capability 
Building; Leadership; Culture; and Innovation. The ‘core principles’ set out in 201460 stipulated that
all PSCs should work on strengthening safety culture, QI capability and measurement. Other 
prototypes and policy documents (see above) however imply a more coherent sequential 
relationship between them. 
Figure 1 shows the contexts, mechanisms and outcomes that policy-makers’ programme theory of 
PSCs explicitly or implicitly assume. Given our study design (see Chapter 4) we take these terms in 
their realist senses.57 
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Figure 1: Policy makers' programme theory for PSCs 
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In Figure 1 each solid arrow represents one mechanism within the ensemble of mechanisms through
which a PSC produces its outcomes. In policy implementation contexts, each mechanism consists of
individuals’ reasoning, action and use of resources. Each dotted line represents a context which in 
the realist sense means a moderator, not causally dependent on the mechanism but either necessary 
for the mechanism to produce the outcome, or which intensifies the outcome that the mechanism 
produces. Thus contexts do not include intermediate outcomes (mediators). The ‘Sufficient staff’ 
context means that staff have enough time to make use of training and implement improvements 
(capacity). Lastly, the PSC outcomes are the empirical, causal effects, intended or otherwise (e.g. 
emergent outcomes, side effects), that these mechanisms and contexts together produce. 
One requirement for PSC policy to ‘work’, in the sense of producing the outcomes which policy-
makers intended, would be that all the causal links between the above events and activities existed, 
or were created; and if they were, that they then had the effects that PSC policy assumed. In 
summary (and for reference in later chapters), the policy of creating PSC assumed the presence and 
efficacy of the following mechanisms, correspondingly labelled on Figure 1. 
 Mechanism 1:  The egional coordinating body and network make providers become more 
‘learning’ organisations, assuming: 
Context (1.a):  central policy and organisations continue to support PSCs and their activities.
 Mechanism 2:  Each regional coordinating body establishes one or more cross-organisational 
networks of clinical teams
 Mechanism 3:  Each regional coordinating body and network establishes cross-organisational 
measurement systems, assuming (again) that: 
Context (3.a):  central policy and organisations continue to support PSCs and their activities.
 Mechanism 4:  The providers that have become learning organisations develop an 
organisational culture and climate more conducive to patient safety and quality 
improvement, which assumes:
Context (4.a):  staff training works (i.e. skill training is effective [in changing workplace 
attitudes and skills) and that the staff have time once they have returned after training to 
implement their learning. The availability of time to improve has been a significant 
problem in previous Collaboratives. 
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 Mechanism 5:  Changed safety culture and climate help clinical working practices to change, 
assuming that:
Context (5.a):  staff training helps create or strengthen new working practices
Context (5.b):  the provider has sufficient staff
Context (5.c):  contractual incentives align with new working practices
 Mechanism 6:  The cross-organisational network(s) of clinical teams help clinical working 
practices to change
 Mechanism 7:  The cross-organisation measurement systems help clinical working practices to 
change
 Mechanism 8:  The changed working practices result in the outcomes of increased patient 
safety and quality improvement.
As previously explained, when stating (above) that ‘Mechanism A helped produce B’, ‘help’ means 
that the mechanism promoted or increased B, without claiming that A was the only reason why B 
changed. Underpinning the whole ensemble of mechanisms is the assumption that if the working 
practices and culture (and/or climate) that prevent patient harm in the safest workplaces are 
transferred to other workplaces, there will be fewer occurrences of avoidable harm to patients and 
quality of care will improve. Implicitly, the harm and dangers to patients at Mid-Stafford and 
elsewhere were caused more by unsafe clinical working practices and ‘blame cultures’ than, say, 
underfunding, non-clinical management practices (e.g. focus on central targets), managerial 
attention being distracted from other issues by the imperative to become a foundation trust, 
workforce shortages, or ‘policy mess’. Hence the programme theory of PSC implicitly rests more 
upon a ‘high reliability’61–63 and a ‘latent factors’64 theory of safety than upon a ‘normal accident’ 
theory.65 Where policy statements were silent or did not specify very tightly how PSCs were to be 
constructed, the individual PSCs had discretion in how to interpret the policy and therefore how to 
design, implement and link the mechanisms shown in Figure 1. 
The rest of this report is mostly structured according to this programme theory (‘theory of change’).
We use the above list of mechanisms to group and analyse the existing research findings (Chapter 
3), and then the key findings (Chapters 5-8). On that basis, the Conclusions (ch.12) uses an develop 
a revised, more evidence-based theory of change (‘logic model’) for PSCs. 
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Chapter 3:  Research background: Do collaboratives work as NHS policy 
assumed? 
Because Patient Safety Collaboratives in England draw on North American designs and experience, 
and upon the ‘high reliability’61–63 and ‘latent factors’64 theories of safety, substantial research 
already exists about many, but not all, of the policy positions and assumptions outlined in Chapter 
2, and therefore about their implicit programme theory. To present this research and explain the 
selection of research questions for the present study, we therefore follow the structure of that 
programme theory. For each mechanism we outline what the existing evidence would lead us to 
expect about the working and impacts of the NHS Collaboratives and in doing so we focus on inter-
organisational collaboration rather than quality initiatives limited to one organisation. 
3.a.  Establishing a collaborative  
Before any PSC mechanisms can come into effect the Collaborative must be set up. Collaboratives 
can be used as a deliberate spread strategy for existing evidence: of practical ideas for services, of 
the Collaborative method itself, or of quality improvement methods.66 Indeed networks appear well-
adapted for dealing with complex,67 'wicked' problems68 such as patient safety because healthcare 
networks generally, including collaboratives: 
1. Establish ‘horizontal' links for joint working, resource-sharing and information exchange 
between the different organisations, in particular the relevant clinical teams within each, 
which all have an interest in the issue. 
2. Incorporate and build on existing activities ('path dependency'). 
3. Engage professionals more readily than formal managerial structures often can. 
4. Mediate discrepant, even conflicting, interests among the members. 
5. Harness their members' multiple links outside the network to help transmit new knowledge 
(e.g. evidence-based medicine) into it 69,70. 
6. Provide a direct means for influencing the ‘hinterlands’15 where work relevant to the 
network’s aims actually takes place within each member organisation. 
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Above all, networks provide a means of coordinating cross-organisational action in pursuit of 
shared aims.71 Such ‘learning communities’ often emerge largely independent of management 
hierarchies.72
Collaboratives have been described as ‘a temporary learning organisation’66 (p.347) that function 
and may originate, as 'communities of practice' 73 to stimulate innovation and learning 74,75 and to 
promote goodwill, solidarity and collaboration, hence the sharing of learning, across all ranks and 
professions.76 Such collaboratives therefore tend to: 
1. Be multidisciplinary.77
2. Have a self-selected membership77, with the risk of that membership becoming so 
homogeneous that certain occupations or viewpoints are excluded by default.78 
3. Adopt goals that emerge from their members' experiences and interests and are not 
necessarily explicit, especially in the early days of the network, which means members 
assume that participation is mutually beneficial to themselves66,79, i.e. promotes goals they 
had before the Collaborative formed. 
4. Organise themselves in ad hoc, informal ways, especially initially; coordination of activities 
between the network members occurs through a combination of trust80, persuasion and 
reciprocity in dealings between them.81 
Cunningham’s systematic review78 found that the networks that contributed most to quality and 
safety work relied on particular individuals, often managers or clinical leaders, who 'transmit 
information, bridge disparate groups, liaise across parts of networks and enable social and 
professional interaction'. Reliance on these members may make networks vulnerable if it becomes 
too heavy. Hulscher’s systematic review82 reported finding only a minority of studies stating that the
expert ideas and support provided (by the network coordinating body) was related to the ‘success’ 
of collaboratives. In some of the Michigan Collaboratives the coordinating body was staffed by one 
of the participating hospitals83 (rather than a separate organisation). Nevertheless a coordinating 
body’s work in constructing these links, developing and applying these managerial, techniques still 
incurs transaction costs, in particular the costs of meetings.66 
An early review66 found that 92 collaboratives took a mean of 17 months from project start to first 
tangible improvements. For the Michigan Surgical Collaborative, Englesbe84 estimated that a 1.8% 
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fall in surgical complications was required to recoup the cost of the collaborative. Voluntary 
networks have to be financed by the members themselves, raising the question of what the costs of 
participation are, and Hulscher et al.16 noted the lack of research about this. 
3.b.  Learning structures  
NHS policy documents describe PSCs as ‘learning’ entities (Chapter 1), implying that the provider 
organisations within a PSC and the coordinating body all ought to function as learning 
organisations, together constituting a ‘learning’ network. Örtenblad and Koris85 define a learning 
organisation as one that contains (or ought to): learning at work, organisational learning, learning 
structures, and learning climate. That implies the presence of these things a both inter-organisational
(collaborative, network, PSC) level and within the member-organisations. 
Different writers prioritize them differently, but learning structures typically: 
1. Undertake systematic ‘knowledge management’.86 For a PSC, that includes formalising 
(documenting) and disseminating workers’ (clinicians’) knowledge87 between its member-
organisations, not only within the coordinating body itself. 
2. Transfer knowledge from outside the collaborative into its member-organisations.87 
3. Build ‘relational capital’ between the participants.88 
4. Routinely analyse errors or accidents to reveal any systemic causes arising from the 
organisation’s structure or working practices. 
5. Create flatter managerial hierarchies with decentralized control89 to encourage the spread of 
knowledge, especially ‘whole-picture’ understanding.90 
6. Measure activities and outputs; discussions of these metrics are themselves a learning 
activity.87 
7. Establish a specialised quality or research and development (R&D) department to enable 
work-teams to improve their performance without relying solely upon audit.86 When, as 
often happens, the links between a healthcare process and its outcomes are tenuous,41 they 
can only be discovered through large-scale formal research rather than informal learning-at-
work. 
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3.c.  A specific focus  
Collaboratives are more likely to succeed when they focus upon care groups where: 
 1. Evidence-based interventions are known but not universally applied.66 
 2. Practical examples exist showing how improvements were made in practice. 
 3. Clinicians support the proposed improvement.16 
 4. The proposed improvement is strategically important to the clinicians' 'home' organisations 
and therefore has senior management sign-up (which may literally involve the symbolic 
action of signing a form16). 
 5. The Collaborative set safety and/or quality improvement targets at levels that can be 
achieved, on present knowledge.16 
 6. Monitoring and educating patients is involved.16
 7. The Collaborative focuses on a care model (e.g. the Chronic Care Model) which is already 
long-established among its member-organisations 16.
 8. Teams focus on specific, easily ‘digestible’ targets.91 
Existing studies offer conflicting findings as to how narrow (specific) collaboratives’ focus ought to
be. Franco and Marquez argue that Collaboratives with multiple components are more likely to 
succeed than those using just one.92 Against this, Aveling and colleagues argue that attempting to 
follow too many protocols, especially conflicting protocols and especially in the absence of staff 
training prevents health-workers implementing working practices that are safe for the patient.93 
3.d.  PSC mechanisms  
3.d.i.  Mechanism 1: The coordinating body helps providers become learning organisations
The assumption that collaboratives’ coordinating bodies help providers become learning 
organisations is given some credence by research about healthcare networks generally, 
collaboratives and learning organisations specifically. Network activity has been found to produce 
'cultural convergence among the network member-organisations and individual members.89,94–98 
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However the research on networks (including collaboratives) overlaps little with that on learning 
organisations. Few studies report how networks help their member-organisations specifically 
become learning organisations and some report circumstances in which the opposite may occur. 
Collaboratives can, and in the NHS are intended to, act as implementation structures on behalf of 
'third party payers' (as was the Michigan Surgical Quality Collaborative).84 In such cases, 
collaboratives become mandated ‘programme networks’99 centred upon a coordinating body 
('Network Administrative Organisation' (NAO)100). Certain characteristics tend to make such 
networks more effective at policy-implementation, and might therefore be expected to be observed: 
1. 'Vertical' links between providers and the network coordinating body.33,100–102 
2. 'Reticulist' managerial skills71,103 and approaches to problem-solving based around 
negotiation (‘soft’) are generally more useful in voluntary networks than directive (‘hard’) 
management styles that rely heavily on formal organisational structures.104
3. Inclusion of experts or researchers who have first-hand knowledge of 'best practice', but who
are able to present it in general terms so that network members can re-interpret and adapt it 
for themselves. 
4. Dense networks are not required and may be inefficient78,100, but that point is contestable 
because dense networks may serve multiple functions besides programme implementation 
alone105 so we cannot say anything definitive about network density. 
NHS policy assumed (see Chapter 2) that support from central policy and national organisations 
would help Collaboratives develop their member-organisations into learning organisations. That 
may depend on whether ‘support’ means ‘assist the activities that Collaboratives already chose 
independently’ or ‘select and mandate what Collaboratives are to do’. Over-centralised management
appears to inhibit organisational learning and the production of new knowledge.106 Clear and 
specific goals are prerequisite for steps to improve patient safety, but NHS hospitals and teams 
within past collaboratives have faced multiple, overlapping, disjointed, even competing, goals.107 
The contrast between voluntary collaboration and implementation structures led Addicott to regard 
governments' use of programme networks for policy implementation as 'the distortion of a 
managerial technique' 32 insofar as: 
1. The network members' objectives differ from (or even conflict with) the policy mandate. 
2. The network is firmly embedded within a centralised vertical accountability chain. 
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Analogously, the 'Learning Community' or ‘Communities of Practice’ have developed from means 
of personal growth into management tools.75,108 Hulscher’s systematic review82 found that 
professional performance scores did not vary between clinics that participated voluntarily in 
Collaboratives and involuntarily-participating clinics. 
3.d.ii.  Mechanism 2: Collaboratives establish inter-organisational networks of clinical teams
Many studies mention the role of clinical teams in collaboratives and there appears to be a critical 
mass of 20-40 teams. A consensus on the goals and services is required to focus the teams’ joint 
efforts upon.109 Both the teams and the Collaborative coordinators require sufficient time for teams 
to learn what changes to make, as well as how to plan and sustain them.16 Activities used for inter-
organisational collaboration included meetings, tool-kits, ‘change packages’, coaching, site visits, 
conference calls and electronic media (such as webinars).110 Inter-organisational collaboration 
appears to help improve collaboratives’ outcomes.11,111 through (among other things) sharing 
practical knowledge: ‘vicarious learning’. Few studies however report how a collaborative’s 
organising body might help such teams, or a network of them, to form. Khodyakov112 describes how
a Rapid Spread initiative (Project JOINTS), a US network of state hospital associations and 
hospitals, spread adoption of a ‘bundle’ of interventions to prevent surgical site infections (SSI) 
using regional meetings, site visits and on-line materials to raise awareness of current practice in 
SSI prevention, guide teams to develop a QI plan, implement it, conduct small tests of the results 
and share their experience. Kilo17 describes BTS Collaboratives having a central planning group of 
individuals experienced in leading QI activities in a specific topic area (e.g. coronary artery by-pass 
graft (CABG) outcomes), with 25-40 member organisations as the optimal network size. Hospitals 
participating in some of the Michigan Collaboratives only received their payment for participation 
if they sent a physician representative and a programme coordinator to each quarterly meeting of 
the Collaborative.83 
3.d.iii.  Mechanism 3: Collaboratives establish cross-organisational measurement systems
Collaboratives’ success requires setting targets, collecting data, testing changes.16 Reames et al.113 
suggest selecting measures of local ‘defects’ with greatest potential for safety improvements, for 
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example by using objective measures (e.g. measuring patient temperature) rather than confirming 
compliance with process (in that example, that a warming blanket was used). An evaluation2 of the 
Welsh Collaboratives mentions the danger of standards becoming little more than aspirational wish-
lists. In order to have the potential to generate improvement, the published data and measures would
cover practice variations, care improvements, capacity for improvement if additional resources were
available, and comparisons with best-in-class providers elsewhere.13 The Michigan Keystone 
surgery collaborative may have been less successful than the Michigan Keystone ICU collaborative 
because many sites participating in the former lacked means for collecting data and feeding the data
back to clinical teams.113 In the UK, there is more evidence that patient safety failures occur in 
particular services (e.g. those reported in the public inquiries cited in Chapter 2) than across entire 
hospitals at once.114 Even when data are fed back, a study of NASA (whose safety management 
methods some healthcare providers have imitated) mentions the danger of ‘outcome bias’ i.e. of 
near-misses being perceived as successes because no harm occurred, not as warning-signs.115 So 
training in data use is also required. 
Sharing comparable data puts provider-level teams under competitive and peer pressure that 
maintains the 'pressure' for them to change their working practices.16 Within a UK stroke 
collaborative, some (not all) clinical teams took performance benchmarking and comparison ‘as 
friendly rivalry or as time-consuming’.116 ‘Soft’ governance117 is another motivator. A Collaborative 
in Wisconsin concentrated on making performance data publicly available to employers and patients
because 
‘it became evident to all that if the provider community didn’t take the lead in developing it, 
it might soon be mandated through regulatory means’(p.45).13
Publication of quality data is also associated with increased hospital compliance with quality 
standard, reflecting commissioner interest in, and influence over, that compliance.118–120 The 
Wisconsin Collaborative used the data to counter special pleading (‘Our patients are different’) and 
found that sharing practical ideas informally was as important to QI as formal meetings among 
provider organisations.13 
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3.d.iv.  Mechanism 4: ‘Learning organisations’ develop a safety culture and climate 
NHS policy documents say little about the internal management and structure of the provider 
organisations which, partly by participating in Collaboratives, are to become ‘learning 
organisations’. Advocates of the ‘learning organisation’ say that it involves (or ought to) learning at 
work, organisational learning, learning structures and a learning climate.85 The ‘Integrated (Health 
Care) Team Effectiveness Model’ (ITEM) model121 assumes that a team's organisational setting (its 
goals, structure, rewards, training, task design, team composition, autonomy, and interdependences) 
influence the team's work processes (communication, leader-ship, decision-making) and psycho-
social traits (cohesion, norms) and that these in turn impact upon team effectiveness at its tasks. 
Vogus and Iacobuuci122 write of ‘mindful organizing’ i.e. anticipating, preventing and correcting 
errors. 
Several reviews and studies suggest that a supportive ‘home’ provider-organisation ‘amplifies’ the 
ability of teams and individual members of a Collaborative to learn and change working 
practices.11,66 One amplification is that top management123 (and clinical teams’ ‘champions’124,125) 
broadly accept the collaborative's aims66,126,127 and thus permit 128, even initiate or reward11, 
individual and team learning129 and (because of their seniority) provide credible feedback to the 
participants.130 Individuals who had themselves been convinced by the collaboratives’ activities 
made persuasive champions in one primary care collaborative.131 In general, acute hospitals are 
likely to have fully developed quality management systems, and to comply with quality standards, 
when the Board (or its equivalent, or a standing subcommittee of the board132) discusses quality 
issues.107,126,133 It is necessary that the senior managers supporting the Collaborative have 
‘organisational leverage’ (are powerful and can call on resources) and technical expertise16, and 
often interacted with medical staff regarding quality strategy.134 A US study123 concluded that a 
hospital collaborative was most successful when the ‘guiding coalition’ in each participating 
hospital included staff from different professions and of different hierarchical status; when all 
members participated in its work; and when the coordinating body was able to manage conflicts 
between them. Doctors were more likely to participate in improvement projects when they 
perceived that the hospital CEO encouraged such activities135 but even so the Welsh PSC 
experienced some medical disengagement from cultural change activities.2 
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Interventions such as the WHO checklist were more likely to succeed when they had an enthusiastic
or charismatic local (especially medical) champion2,16 compared to those perceived as another top-
down imposition.2,136 Day-to-day support of the collaborative’s work by someone who works within 
the provider team is critical.16 Against all this, however, the balance of evidence in Hulscher’s 
systematic review82 was against the assumption that ‘staff involvement’ promoted collaboratives’ 
success. Five out of the six papers in that review82 reported no relationship between ‘leadership 
support’ and collaboratives’ ‘success’ but Singer and Vogus127 reviewed 15 studies reporting 
managerial practices that promoted a safety culture. Rotation of early-career doctors is also an 
obstacle to their individual learning, a least in terms of learning the work-systems in a particular 
hospital.2 Herepath et al.2 describe the ‘distributed’ leadership of the Welsh PSC but also the risk of 
‘WalkRounds’ becoming an occasion for ‘good news stories’ rather than transparent discussion. 
Another amplification is that managers use the Collaborative’s activities not only to solve 
immediate problems but also to draw organisation-wide lessons from them ('double-loop 
learning'137). When this happens the cycle of learning itself can become something that the 
participants can reflect upon, creating triple-loop (third-order) learning.138 It has been reported139 
that greater ‘structural empowerment’ of nurses, including nurses’ collaboration with doctors, is 
associated with stronger patient safety culture. Organisation-wide learning can correct individual 
errors (e.g. outcome-, confirmation- , recency- and hindsight-bias) in noticing near-misses and other
safety defects.115 
Although many studies assert that ‘culture’ change drives quality improvement126,140 few define the 
concept of ‘culture’ precisely.141 It is multiply ambiguous across studies142 and often lacks 
theoretical underpinning.143 Drawing out assumptions from previous studies, we define an 
organisation’s ‘culture‘ as the observed set of beliefs and attitudes that those who control the whole 
organisation (i.e. its owners, top managers) have about how their organisation ought to work and 
about how it does in fact work. This means it contains both empirical and normative components144 
and is embodied in beliefs, attitudes, documents, artefacts, myths etc.145 ‘Climate’ we define 
analogously as the equivalent beliefs held by the staff in a particular work-unit (e.g. team, 
department, occupational group).140 Any organisation with multiple work teams, professions, 
departments etc. is therefore likely to have multiple local climates although climates and culture 
approximate to each other except when work teams are particularly alienated from their managers. 
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Culture and climates guide and reflect the senior managers’ and the workplace teams’ daily work, 
influencing their behaviour and organisational effectiveness.146 A systematic review143 found that the
most often cited components of patient safety culture were: 
1. Leadership commitment to safety;
2. Open communication founded on trust;
3. Organisational learning (see above) 
4. A non-punitive approach to adverse event reporting and analysis: ‘respectful interaction’122;
5. Teamwork (or ‘collectivism’147). 
6. A shared belief in the importance of safety, hence in understanding the causes of errors.127 
One normative hierarchy differentiates types of organisational culture developmentally, in 
ascending order of merit, from ‘pathological’ through ‘reactive’, ‘calculative’, ‘proactive’ to 
‘generative’ (promoting patient safety has become a routine activity).148,149 All this takes time; some 
studies145,150 suggest up to ten years. 
The trial-and-error character of learning cycles is usually assumed to require an organisational 
culture that tolerates open dialogue, contested viewpoints, doubts, criticism, and the exposure of 
mistakes151,152, that is a ‘no-blame’ culture whose ‘psychological safety’28,128,153 tolerates human 
errors arising from bad luck or unforeseen circumstances provided that practical lessons be drawn 
from them. The requisite culture is held93,154 also to be a 'just culture' that acknowledges the 
responsibilities of both work-systems and individual professionals for patient safety. The practical 
difficulty however lies in allocating responsibility correctly between them, and in defining what 
errors are blameworthy.155 Simple algorithms have been proposed18,53 for the purpose, but it might 
also be argued that they are simplistic given the complex interdependencies of individual agency, 
professional and organisational structures.93 A safety culture is more likely to develop for projects of
high importance to managers.115 
Singer and Vogus127 argue that interventions to ‘shape’ a safety culture must target any of three 
elements: those ‘enabling’ internal ‘leaders’ and external actors (including Collaboratives) to 
emphasise safety; front-line staff ‘enacting’ actions that deal with threats to safety; and ‘elaborating’
in the sense of learning from the experience. Without describing the organisation-level mechanisms 
that did so, Provonost reported that a collaborative among 99 ICUs in Michigan (2004-5) raised 
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their teamwork climate scores, with the patient outcomes noted below.42 In Californian mental 
health services (with no collaborative) a ‘constructive’ organisational culture was found146 to 
influence work attitudes directly, and organisational climate indirectly (and, through both, it 
influenced staff turnover). A systematic review in 201344 reported mixed findings about the effect 
attempts to manage patient safety cultures had upon patient safety climate, with four out of eight 
controlled studies finding no effect. ‘WalkRounds’ (i.e. ward rounds by those leading PSC activity 
within a workplace and Board members)156,157 and multi-faceted programmes at 'unit' (departmental 
or workplace) level may have a positive impact on patient safety climate158 but the review found no 
evidence that nine other hospital-level programmes did so. 
Obviously other quality improvement initiatives besides a collaborative may also contribute to 
changing safety climate.43 Speroff159 found, in America, that hospitals with a ‘group’ culture tended 
to have higher safety climate scores than those with an hierarchical culture. It is methodologically 
challenging to disentangle the effects of the many different components of safety culture, 
organisational culture and the effects of Collaboratives, in the presence of other competing 
imperatives and pressures.16,44 Empirical studies and normative works often assume that 
organisations usually have just one predominant culture (or climate, at team level). In healthcare 
organisations, however, official managerial norms and ideologies, including health policy 
imperatives, usually coexist with multiple professional cultures, the latter sometimes conflicting 
among2,160, and even within161, themselves, and sometimes motivating resistance to managerial 
initiatives162 and changes in clinical practice.41 In addition to cultural differences between 
organisations148,159, different professions have distinctive patterns of communication163 and this can 
be a source of communication and therefore teamwork breakdown across professions.164 
Organisational cultures and climates may even be specific to department or team level.140,143 When 
goal alignment and compatibility of interests among a health organisation’s different “stakeholders”
are weak, learning organisation activities may be contested67,112. The same applies when safety 
‘solutions’ are transferred between sectors. Willmott165 and Ormerod166 are therefore sceptical about 
the possibility of culture-management. 
Nonetheless, staff behaviour based on ‘consulting, mobilizing [others’ involvement], and 
adapting’160 (original emphasis) can enhance collaboration and mitigate the often-disputed symbolic
boundaries concerning expertise, ‘ownership’ of patients and decision-authority. One attempt at 
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overcoming these differences has been to develop and apply specially-developed communication 
tools such as the SBAR tool with the concomitant training, which in a study in Arizona increased 18
out of 27 measures of teamwork climate and safety climate.163 
3.d.v.  Mechanism 5: A stronger safety climate produces safer clinical working practices
To focus on safety climate as a cause of safe (or unsafe) working practices seems to offer the 
prospects of ‘feed-forward’ methods of predicting safety risks, not just reacting to them, and of 
managing the ‘human factors’ (management and first-line supervisory style, communication, 
training, workforce and working practices141) that impact upon safety167 to create ‘high reliability’ 
teams or organisations.168 A stronger safety climate aids front-line staff to develop a heightened 
commitment to the safety of those with whom they work, eliciting discretionary effort and 
behaviours that increase patient safety.122 ‘Respectful interactions’ facilitate the exchange of 
information and ‘mindful organizing’ that prevent errors127 and presupposes giving front-line 
employees a degree of control over their work.122 The intended changes in clinical teams’ working 
practices are both: 
1. Clinical or technical: the team adopts more strongly evidence-based methods of care and
2. Organisational: closer coordination of work between team members, which involves staff 
having means of recommending and making organisational changes. 
Attempts to improve coordination appear to be successful less often than attempts to change clinical
practice82 even though (one study169 found) organisational causes contributed to 93% of preventable 
adverse events. Analysis of a random sample of US hospitals170 explicitly assumed that acute 
myocardial infarction (AMI) readmission is sensitive to medical, and health failure readmission to 
nursing, working practices. Cross-professional collaboration 'enables the synergism to solve 
difficult clinical problems'16 (p.33). Studies outside the health sector report that a safety climate is 
one factor (among others) promoting compliance with prescribed safety procedures, use of safety 
equipment, and whistle-blowing.171 A Netherlands study172 identified four stages by which working 
practices improve: 
1. Orientation and awareness; no systematic quality improvement yet, single-profession peer 
review at most. 
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2. Preparation. 
3. Experiment and implementation: the start of practical projects. 
4. Integration into normal working practices. 
Obtaining the practical benefits of an evidence-based working practice such as the WHO Surgical 
Checklist requires, first of all, fidelity of implementation173 and consistent ‘leader’ emphasis upon 
safety.127 
Various studies130 give evidence as to whether collaboratives improved working practices, without 
necessarily corroborating that safety culture or climate was the mechanism specifically responsible. 
Hansen et al.170 found modest associations between front-line medical and nursing (but not 
managerial) staff perceptions of safety climate safety climate and risk-standardised 30-day 
readmission rates for AMI and HF patients respectively (but not vice-versa and not for pneumonia 
patients). The strongest associations were for ‘unit’ safety norms, overall emphasis on safety and 
collective learning. The most relevant working practices were educating patients for self-
management post-discharge and avoiding premature discharge. The NHS primary care 
Collaboratives claimed a reduction of 34% in coronary heart disease (CHD) risk, and a reduction of 
one day in orthopaedics average length of stay (ALoS) through an orthopaedics collaborative in the 
UK.66 An overview of 27 BTS-model Collaboratives in twelve middle- and lower-income 
countries92 found that 87% of the Collaboratives showed 80% 'performance' levels, increased from 
often very low baselines; the lower the baseline, the greater the improvement. Health centres 
maintained the improvements in performance levels longer than hospitals did. A collaborative in 
Massachusetts increased compliance with five performance measures for stroke treatment in 
emergency medical services.174 Six US hospitals which strengthened their safety climate in respect 
of learning environment, senior management support and psychological safety achieved greater use 
of evidence-based strategies for reducing risk-standardised mortality rates (RSMR) for AMI 
patients and a larger fall in RSMR itself than did four hospitals which were less successful in 
producing those culture changes.175 A study of NASA115 suggested that in a climate that emphasised 
safety, near-misses were more likely to be reported and hence could be used as a warning sign of 
safety problems. Brewer176 found an association with a 'group' culture among nurses and reduction 
of patient falls in 16 US 'medical surgical units’. Supportive organisational climates for NHS staff 
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were associated with lower hospital standardised mortality ratios.107 Other studies also report 
instances in which stronger safety climate was associated with improved patient safety.126,177,178 
Against this, a study of primary care in the Netherlands179 found that a strong 'group' culture was 
negatively, but a 'balanced culture' was positively, associated with the quality of diabetes care for 
patients. (These classifications of organisational culture come from the Competing Values 
Framework.180) However these relationships were 'rather marginal' and there were no associations 
between organisational culture, team climate ('teamwork') and clinical patient outcomes. Another 
Netherlands study181 found that in general it appears difficult to apply QIC methods to care process 
redesign. 
An evaluation40 of the UK Health Foundation's Safer Patients Initiative found no evidence of 
improvement in clinical outcomes or care process quality metrics. The 'Matching Michigan' 
project's attempt to replicate the Michigan Keystone collaborative in the UK had at best an 
equivocal effect on clinical practice.136 Aspects of non-implementation of the WHO surgical 
checklist included non-completion of the checklist, the absence of team members whilst the 
checklist was used, and the checklist design.182 That collaborative appeared to show a 'decline 
effect', with parallel practice improvement occurring outside it and safety climate was not related to 
the maintenance or spread of collaboratives.82 Although Dillon and colleagues115 report many 
studies outside healthcare suggesting that safety climate is indeed associated with safety 
performance (including accidents), Christian and colleagues171 nevertheless found that personal 
motivation and knowledge were more closely associated with those outcomes. Yet individual 
learning is also part of the ‘learning organisation’, so that finding contradicts neither the ‘learning 
organisation’ assumptions nor the assumption that changing organisational climate impacts upon 
working practice; only the assumption that changing organisational climate has the most impact. 
It is difficult to see what connection there could be between changes in organisational climate and 
changes in service safety and quality that did not in some way involve changed clinical working 
practices (‘microsystems’109). Consistent with that assumption, two studies have found that 
departmental or team-level initiatives appear more likely to succeed than hospital-wide activities in 
improving clinical work.44,183 To a realist way of thinking, this contradictory pattern of evidence 
suggests that the mechanism being studied (here, using changes in safety climate to change clinical 
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working practice) is context-dependent; it ‘works’ for certain care-groups or in certain 
organisational settings but not others. In the Netherlands, larger hospitals, but not necessarily those 
participating in a collaborative, proceeded faster through the stages noted above.135 In contrast 
another Dutch study of a collaborative across 17 hospitals (aiming to implement one-stop outpatient
services) found that only three out of seventeen teams achieved the Collaborative’s goals, and 
without using PDSA cycles.181 ‘Normalising’ new working practices was easier when a team was 
already familiar with similar ideas and working practices, the ‘champion’ was a volunteer, the team 
was stable and the new working practices were integrated into other existing management (e.g. 
medical record) systems124,182 or the latter could be easily adapted to suit them.184 Healthcare teams 
are stable in some settings but in others (e.g. emergency departments (ED)) often temporary and ad 
hoc.164 Nevertheless, ED caseloads are diverse, variable and unpredictable. ED treatments are often 
highly interdependent and require a coordination-focused model of patient treatment185 for which 
team-based working fits well with existing, technically-determined working practices. It appeared 
harder to achieve ‘depth of change’ for asthma than for diabetes, heart failure or depression care.125 
Certain contexts may help the implementation of new work processes including through PSCs. A 
related factor of importance is the characteristics of the change or intervention itself,.e.g. that it is 
simple.2 A qualitative study of six US hospitals186 found that a ‘positive’, unified culture focused on 
patient care strengthened attempts to prevent central line-associated bloodstream infections 
(CLABSI); external support (such as collaboratives) may facilitate existing implementations, 
although at risk of diverting attention from other safety issues. In hospitals with weaker readiness 
for change, its was less clear whether collaboratives would produce such changes. 
The published research does suggest team learning as a mechanism by which a stronger safety 
climate can change clinical working practices. Not only does sustaining the hospital or clinic as a 
learning organisation require managers to promote a culture which supports learning at team 
level162; team learning is required for safe patient care, and has weak to moderate association with 
standards of technical and clinical performance.164 (In comparison, teamwork failures figure in 
between 22% and 32% of research studies of adverse incidents and events164.) For example, 
multidisciplinary teams in neonatal intensive care units reduced bacterial infections and oxygen 
supplementation for low-birthweight babies.77 Strong relational coordination within hospital teams 
was associated with quality of care, ALoS, and outcomes for pain and functioning.187 Some aspects 
of teamwork and participation in specific collaborative activities enhanced short-term success, 
especially if teams remain intact and continue to gather data.82 Team agreement about the value of 
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the WHO surgery checklist led to the intended safety improvements.24 In general, strong leadership 
in work-place teams predicted the success of QI initiatives.126 Conversely, failures of 
communication within teams are a strong predictor of surgical error.164 Team composition, including
relevant expertise, is a major contributor to QI activity generally130, including by implication 
activity which collaboratives stimulate. Team learning appears more effective than individual 
learning about complex technologies (and the same appears to apply to relational coordination127) 
but even then its effect depends on how team leaders implement it.188
Ways in which team members collectively learn to change their clinical practice include: 
1. Rapid testing of small changes16 in particular by using Plan-Do-Study-Act cycles17,30, which 
are the kernel of clinical audit generally. Additional, recurrent PDSA cycles result in a 
gradual long-term accretion of a body of knowledge.94 Learning to test changes made it 
more likely that teams would apply these methods to additional settings.82 
2. Learning to use discretion in decision-making because of the often unforeseen complexity of
patients’ care needs or circumstances.189 
3. Understanding the mental models they themselves use, and to appreciate those which others 
use190,191, so as to promote and exploit divergent, plural modes of thinking; but also to make 
it easier for team members to ‘back up’ (assist) each other’s work.192 Nevertheless, a shared 
mental model of teamwork appears necessary for team effectiveness.164,192 In anaesthesia 
teams, standardised work-processes can rely on implicit coordination and less explicit 
leadership; less structured, familiar or critical situations require the opposite.164,193 
4. Making decisions collaboratively, using research findings and adapting to innovations 
quickly. 
Learning also occurs when clinical teams formalise the tacit knowledge that production teams 
apply194 across professions and across multiple teams. Such learning requires collaborative 
communication skills and mutual support124 so that team members stimulate each other’s practical 
ideas and motivation to change working practice66, but the intensity of interaction in a team does not
appear to affect its success in improving care82, nor can it be taken for granted that different 
professions always share knowledge and information.195 Changes of team leader is often a precursor
to a team leaving a collaborative.66 Quality and safety of care do however appear to be associated 
with trust and relational coordination within surgical and intensive care teams.164 
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It is a short step from recognising the necessity (for collaboratives) of team learning to assuming 
that staff training will help clinical teams update their working practices192, and there is evidence11 
to support that view (some of it from outside healthcare122). However, the IHI soon found that uni-
professional didactic methods were ineffective for the purpose. Rather, it was necessary to select 
and train ‘day-to-day leaders’, making clinical content more prominent than improvement methods, 
while still structuring training around a team’s topic selection, improvement and dissemination 
work.17 Training in interpersonal skills is necessary, and selecting (recruiting) staff with those 
skills.122 
The predominant view of learning organisations196 regards team organisational learning as 
homologous with individual learning197–199 but on a larger scale, as in the Kolb200 learning cycle (on 
which PDSA is based). Normative works argue that through practical learning at work,201 
individuals in a learning organisation acquire ‘personal mastery’ of work-related knowledge190 and a
propensity for ‘lifelong learning’.87 Normalisation Process Theory sees the connection between 
individual and team adoption of new working practices (in general, not only in collaboratives) as 
follows. The four stages of adoption are124,188: 
1. Sense-making by the individuals and organisations involved (‘coherence’)
2. Enrolling individuals to engage with the new work process (‘cognitive participation’)
3. ‘Collective action’ that enacts the new practice; and 
4. ‘Reflective monitoring’ of its advantages and disadvantages. 
Of two systematic reviews in 2010, one52 did and another126 did not find an association between 
training programmes and positive outcomes in QI projects (in general, not only for collaboratives) 
but each review found only weak evidence (especially regarding the circumstances in which the 
training occurred) that the rather disparate training activities studied tended to improve teams' non-
technical skills. Successful QI activity required both subject expertise202 and knowledge of how to 
organise and measure QI work.130 Informal training can in practice supplement formal training.202 
Russ182 found that training facilitated implementation of the WHO surgery checklist. A US study11 
found that learning activities within the participating organisations added to, not moderated, the 
effect of inter-organisational learning activities, although an organisation’s human resource 
practices (rewards, training) did multiply the performance benefit of inter-organisational learning. 
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Conversely, in the absence of training health-workers sometimes devise workarounds to improve 
their working practices.93 Individual-level intervention such as training requires identifying barriers 
to adoption of (in the present case) quality and safety improvements, selecting interventions to 
address these barriers (including, for instance, by applying relevant psychological theory, and 
consulting those at whom the intervention was targeted203).
Hospitals participating in the Michigan ICU Collaborative were explicitly required to implement 
high levels of 'intensivist' medical staffing.43 At least four of the earliest collaboratives there had 
substantial funding from the main private insurer.83 Conversely, heavy workloads and a perception 
of lacking support weakened NHS hospital staff motivation and morale to participate in quality 
improvement programmes.107 Workload pressure has also been reported to be associated with 
‘disruptive’ clinician behaviour in US (Maryland) hospitals, some of it leading to patient harm.204 
High levels of staff burn-out205 and turnover130, including turnover among the leaders of a 
collaborative8, also inhibit QI work. More generally, Collaboratives’ activities that did not require 
'substantial' additional resources (irrespective of their source) were more likely to succeed than 
those which did.92 A degree of organisational slack is necessary, it has been argued, to enable 
organisations to learn.206–208 A point in favour of the PDSA approach in Wales appeared to be that it 
did not place a high demand on resources.2 
Kaplan’s systematic review found that sufficient resourcing – which should not (as an English 
study209 corroborates) necessarily be equated simplistically with extra funding – was associated with
the success of QI projects.126 Relevant resources include skills, expertise, information and 
‘connectivity to target populations’109 (p.37); and (in Singer’s review127) judicious selection of staff. 
Length of time engaging with QI initiatives was also predictive of their ‘success’.126 However the 
independent (admitting rights) status of many hospital doctors restricted the uptake of the JOINTS 
project for surgical site infection (SSI) prevention.112 In US hospitals where resources were scarce, 
technology-based solutions to patient safety problems were sometimes favoured as cheaper, easier 
alternatives to behavioural changes (such as those which PSCs promote).186 We found only one 
published study83 reporting cost savings (US$20m annually) from a Collaborative. 
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3.d.vi.  Mechanism 6: Networks of clinical teams help teams within providers to change clinical 
working practices
Spreading learning between providers is a justification of the network approach that BST 
Collaboratives17 adopt and some studies10,131,175 suggest it helps clinical teams learn new working 
practices. Evidence conflicts as to whether networks of clinical teams help teams within providers 
to change clinical working practices. There is some evidence that external support makes clinical 
teams more likely to implement changes in working practices.135 In the Netherlands, external 
support helped clinical teams within hospitals change working activities, leading to perceived and 
actual ‘successes’ of the collaborative, particularly in waiting-list, medication safety and process 
redesign projects (and least in operating theatre and dissemination projects).135,172 Factors that 
appeared to promote these changes included external ‘change agent’ support, team leaders being 
‘positive’, and teams’ perception they had been successful due to external support and the team’s 
own [self-]organisation.10 In a US cancer screening collaborative, the external network was a source
of expertise and facilitators who led regular ‘reflective adaptive process’ meetings for each primary 
care team.131 It proved necessary to use a mixture of content and media (formal presentations, group
discussions, patients’ own stories, a skit – but locally-developed rather than PSC-distributed 
materials) to communicate the value of practice changes.131 Ongoing communication of teams 
across sites helped support the collaborative implementation of new methods of post-operative care 
in Canadian hospitals.124 An English stroke collaborative produced ‘modest’ increases in 
practitioners’ compliance with two ‘bundles’ of evidence-based work practices for early hours care 
of stroke and post-stroke rehabilitation.210 In Wales, cross-site exchanges of information advice 
assisted infection control activities.2 An evaluation of the Welsh PSC reported instances of increased
compliance with World Health Organisation Safe Childbirth Checklist (WHOSCC) working 
practices. Praise for staff efforts (even unsuccessful ones202) was a strong motivator and reinforcer.2 
A systematic review82 , however, found that on balance providing expert ideas and support to 
clinical teams did not help them improve their working practices. 
Despite collaboratives’ inter-organisational character, care processes still had to be redesigned 
specifically for, and the external support and evidence made relevant to, each problem and team, 
which impedes the standardised, comparable cross-team approach that PSCs require.181 PSCs may 
therefore have greater effect on work processes which are already standardised across providers.127 
When one work process is closely linked in a chain with others it is difficult to change that process 
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in isolation using PSC-like methods.181 For example, in a US primary care collaborative, 
overcoming doctors’ defensiveness and resistance took many weeks.131 
3.d.vii.  Mechanism 7: Cross-organisational measurement systems help change clinical working 
practices 
Comparisons among providers create ‘”natural experiments” for identifying what works and what 
doesn’t’83 (p.631). The effect of measurement upon collaboratives’ attempts to change working 
practices appears to depend upon who does it, and why, something that may explain why Hulscher’s
systematic review82 reached no definite conclusion about this mechanism. Dixon-Woods and 
colleagues contrast ‘problem-sensing’ and ‘comfort-seeking’ data gathering, the former being 
necessary to expose areas in which it was necessary to support and strengthen clinical teams’ 
quality improvement work. The corresponding methods included supplementing routine 
administrative data with qualitative data obtained by (e.g.) ‘mystery shopping’, other observational 
methods107 and new disease registers.91 Early collaboratives in Michigan used ‘regression-based 
time-series analysis’83(p.638) to assess hospitals’ progress. Making favourable comparisons between
the work and outcomes of the team(s) who did participate in a collaborative and those who did not 
helped, in Canadian hospitals, to legitimate and sustain a Collaborative’s work.124 In NHS 
collaboratives poorly-designed, fragmented IT systems were an obstacle to improving working 
practices107 and hospital teams in a Dutch collaborative found the same when they tried to run 
PDSA cycles.181 However, strong external monitoring appears to inhibit organisational learning.138 
In collaboratives, learning occurs above all from making practical small-scale changes, not from 
prior data collection and analysis.16 Rather, cross-organisational measurement systems function as a 
means both to motivate competition between different clinical teams (see above) and to stimulate 
team learning (see above). In the Welsh collaborative, external audit of services helped promote 
change by validating ‘appropriate’ standards of care and identifying service failings.2 In general, 
clinical decision support systems for prescribing appeared more effective in institutional settings (in
which professional behaviours and attitudes were more closely controlled) than in community 
settings.211 
Using measurement to change clinical working practice assumes that the chosen measures are 
sensitive to quality of services, patient safety or the organisational factors mentioned above; and 
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that there are easily measurable outcomes, or clear links between clinical acts and outcomes.202 The 
relationship between Hospital Standardisd Mortality Ratio (HSMR), Summary Hospital Mortality 
Indicator (SHMI) and risk-adjusted mortality ratio (RAMI) and the actual quality and safety212 of 
hospital care is complex and contested114,213–215, as is the relationship between these indicators 
organisational factors (including learning and PSCs).216 Any association between such measures and
patient safety is more likely to occur at department than at whole-hospital level.114 Process audits 
may be a more valid measure, fairer and more informative about what interventions are needed.114 
The use of WHOSCC checklists as a central performance measure in Wales resulted in 
discrepancies between the data returns and actual practice in the operating theatres.2 Comparison 
with other organisations requires linkage between informational systems external and internal to a 
given organisation.91,126 Kilo17 recommends focussing on just two or three main outcomes at a time, 
and parsimonious, focussed data collection and presentation (‘”just enough” data [as] are sufficient 
to determine if a change is an improvement’ (p.8)). The work-processes to be changed have 
sufficient patients to ensure quick measurement and feedback181, but it is also important that patients
do not pass so swiftly through a care process that data collection is impossible.202 
3.d.viii.  Mechanism 8: Changed clinical working practices improve quality and patient safety
The evidence that at least some collaboratives have improved the quality and safety of patient care 
has been described as 'positive but limited'217; it might also be called complex and equivocal. An 
early review of research on Collaboratives argued that of health providers involved in them, around 
30% substantially improved patient safety, 40% achieved little improvement and 30% dropped 
out66, although a later review110 reported less than 20% drop-out. Hulscher's systematic review16 
found eight studies evidencing collaboratives' positive effects on some of their intended outcomes. 
Two showed no effect. On balance, Hulscher16 concluded, collaboratives up to 2008 appear to have 
had 'modest effects on outcomes at best' (p.28). Wells’ more recent systematic review110 found that 
about a third of the studies included reported collaboratives’ impacts on clinical processes, a third 
their impacts on outcomes, and a third reported impacts on both. The reported absolute differences 
in these impacts ‘ranged from modest to very impressive, with a median of 12% improvement 
(range 4%–61%)’ (p.233).110 Using the stricter of the two criteria applied in Wells’ review, 73% of 
the primary studies reported positive effects on the intended primary outcome. 
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As evidence that collaboratives changed working practices in ways that improved patient outcomes,
initial studies on the implementation of the checklists from which the WHO Surgical Safety 
Checklist was derived showed improvements in team climate and in adherence to evidence-based 
catheter infection prevention184, glucose maintenance and ulcer prophylaxis methods.42 There are 
reports of US collaboratives reducing neo-natal infection rates for coagulase-negative 
staphylococcus77, surgical site infections218, and postoperative respiratory failure.219 The Michigan 
Surgical Quality Collaborative reduced risk-adjusted morbidity in a quarter of the participating 
hospitals (elsewhere these rates remained stable), and reduced 30-day mortality for bariatric 
surgery, serious complications for percutaneous coronary interventions, and (on a composite 
measure) the quality of coronary artery by-pass graft (CABG) surgery.83 An NHS attempt to 
replicate the Michigan project reduced reported central venous catheter blood-stream infection) 
(CVC-BSI) rates by 60%, from an already lower starting point.24 Adaptive team leadership, 
including explicit task coordination, supported effective resuscitation (trauma, cardiac arrest 
teams).164 
Various studies give evidence as to whether Collaboratives improved outcomes, but not about 
which specific intermediate mechanisms were responsible. The critical contexts may include the 
presence of formal risk management systems149,167 and the intensity of pressures for high 
production.167,168 
83% of the studies included in Wells’110 systematic review on collaboratives reported that one or 
more primary effect measures for each study improved. The included studies covered settings which
included hospitals, ambulatory, nursing home and ambulance services. In the 'Michigan Keystone 
project' 72 Michigan hospitals (containing 99 ICUs), collaboratives reduced catheter associated 
bloodstream infections42,43,220 and reported reductions in adverse drug events.66 A Collaborative in 
Tennessee reduced the rates of superficial surgical site infections, ventilator usage for longer than 
48 hours, graft/prosthesis/flap failure, acute renal failure, and wound disruption.221 Across 179 US 
hospitals222 moderately large correlations were found between the (US) Agency for Healthcare 
Research and Quality (AHRQ) survey's patient safety culture variables and reduced rates of adverse
events and in-hospital complications. Collaboratives in South Carolina, Maine and Canada are all 
reported223 to have contributed to falls in cardiovascular mortality, and in California to reduced 
hospitalisations for cardiovascular disease (CVD). An Australian primary care collaborative 
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obtained around a 50% improvement in mean percentage of patients at target for glycaemic control, 
blood pressure and cholesterol targets.91 
Nadeem’s systematic review111 reported mixed results with respect to patient experiences, as did a 
study of a collaborative among medical groups (of primary care doctors) in Minnesota.224 A UK 
study225 of the Health Foundation’s Safer Patients Initiative and a study of the Michigan hospitals 
which participated in a ‘Keystone’ collaborative113 argued that it was unclear whether safety 
improvements were due to secular changes in (e.g.) working practices independent of 
collaboratives. Even successful collaboratives may face trade-offs. Work practices that increase 
safety may also cause ‘defensive’ care; for example isolating patients in order to reduce risk of falls 
and of infection also reduced their mobility and social contact with other patients and staff.226 
Two studies of asthma collaboratives227,228 found that for asthma care QICs produced no significant 
improvements in care management or outcomes, although Schonlau227 found that patients did 
participate more in education groups. The Michigan Collaborative’s positive outcomes were not 
replicated in Ontario229 nor even, subsequently, in Michigan.113 An early HIV collaborative increased
the proportions of patients with suppressed viral load, screening tests and prophylaxis, but not 
significantly.230 A study of Swiss hospitals231 found no correlation between patient safety climate 
and seven patient outcomes. 'Implicit rationing' (meaning shortage of nursing time rather than 
nurse:patient ratios per se or skill mix) was associated with four outcomes (patient satisfaction; 
nurse-reported medication errors; bloodstream infections; pneumonia).231 A recent study232 also 
showed an association between better patient experience and improvement in some clinical 
outcomes (central line-associated bloodstream infection, postsurgical DVT, joint replacement 
complications, and ‘a composite measure for all serious complications’) for all Medicare patients, 
irrespective of whether their care providers participated in collaboratives. 
An explanation that reconciles these discrepant findings is that the effect of Collaboratives is 
heavily contingent on their context.130,233 Published research reports a wide range of possible 
determinants (or co-determinants) of success for Collaboratives.16 Their effects were greater for 
interventions with a stronger supporting evidence base and when the interventions supported were 
simple and practicable.110 Collaboratives’ effects were greater in larger hospitals40 or in complex, 
highly acute care (ICU, ED, operating theatres) than in general medical or surgical wards.231 The 
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collaborative across 71 Michigan ICUs had a greater impact on catheter-related bloodstream 
infections and 'ventilator-associated pneumonia intervention' in smaller and in religious hospitals.43 
A PSC in California reduced CVD hospitalisations even though the doctors and organisations 
involved were, in theory, market competitors.223 The English ‘Advancing Quality’ programme 
included standardised measurements, data feedback to hospitals, quality improvements within 
hospitals (e.g. use of specialist nurses) and between hospitals (staff from different hospitals meeting
each other) and paying tariff bonuses to hospitals with mortality reductions in the top quartile. It 
reduced risk of death for patients with acute myocardial infarction, heart failure, and pneumonia. 
The improvements were greatest for small hospitals that the CQC rated ‘good’ or ‘excellent’ before 
the programme began.234
Quality initiatives may raise service quality through mechanisms other than influencing safety culture. One 
study235 reported significantly reduced catheter associated urinary tract infections but during the 
intervention period there was no change in safety culture. Conversely, another study showed that the
implementation of the safe surgery checklist did not affect mortality and morbidity but did improve 
safety culture scores.236 These findings raise the possibility that the relationship between safety 
culture and changed working practices is reciprocal, even a ‘virtuous circle’: quality improvement 
work strengthens safety climate, which then stimulates further quality improvement work. 
As noted, many studies report associations, or their absence, between a certain element in the PSC 
logic model and clinical outcomes. Both sides of the argument may however be setting an 
irrelevantly high bar to proving collaboratives’ effect or value. Existing studies do not necessarily 
consider or report any intermediate outcomes or mechanisms linking one such element (e.g. 
training, data-sharing) and outcomes. Evidence based practice (selecting the ‘right thing to do’) and 
quality improvement (‘doing [those] things right’) are distinct but complementary. Process criteria 
may therefore be more relevant than outcomes for evaluating the ‘success’ of QI activities, which 
may be capable of being tested in terms of process even when testing their ultimate clinical 
outcomes is less (or not) practicable.237 It is reasonable to assume that when working practices 
become more strongly evidence-based, patient outcomes will improve as a result. 
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3.e.  Collaboratives: overview of existing research 
Various gaps and ambiguities thus remain in research about collaboratives including: 
1. Whether support provided by the network coordinating body was related to the ‘success’ of 
collaboratives, and ‘success’ at what. 
2. What the contribution of inter-organisational networks of teams was to making working 
practices safer. 
3. How resources are used in collaboratives, and the costs of collaboratives, both monetary 
and in kind. 
4. What is the optimal number or range of safety issues for a collaborative to focus on. 
5. What is the optimal number of participating clinical teams. 
6. What tensions arise, and with what consequences, between PSCs’ role as an implementation
structure for national policy and their character as a voluntary forum for collaboration. 
7. What tensions arise, and with what consequences, between standardisation and transferable 
learning (on one hand) and local adaptation of PSC activities (on the other). 
8. How collaboratives help healthcare providers become learning organisations. 
9. What senior managers’ support at provider level contributes to collaboratives’ effects. 
10. What collaboratives contribute towards quality improvement in practice, i.e. towards 
making working practices safer, and how Collaboratives interact with (reinforce or weaken)
any other concurrent QI initiatives. 
11.  The uses and contribution of team training. 
12. What effect resource pressures have upon collaboratives’ and clinical teams’ selections of 
foci of intervention, for instance upon their choices between technical and organisational 
methods for increasing patient safety. 
13. What specific approaches to measurement help, or impede, collaboratives’ work. Hence, 
what kinds of IT infrastructures help, or impede, collaboratives’ work. 
14. What other specific contexts help, or impede, collaboratives’ work. 
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Most studies of collaboratives’ effects have been uncontrolled and rely on self-reported outcomes.238
The research has been fragmented across a range of collaboratives’ activities and target outcomes, 
and few studies report clearly how their collaborative carried its work out, making it hard to identify
what the ‘active ingredient’ in collaboratives is.111 Hence; 
‘future studies need more detailed information about … the dosage of individual QIC 
components; teaching strategies and approaches to fostering cross-site collaboration; use of 
data to guide QI processes; fidelity to the QIC model; degree of engagement among 
participating sites; and sustainability of QI activities. To date [2013], there are very few … 
evidence-based descriptions of the most effective ways to conduct a collaborative’.111(p.386)
In general, studies of Collaboratives have used very disparate, often self-reported measures of 
outcome or ‘success’. Few contained any quantitative evidence about the determinants of ‘success’ 
(as opposed to abundant hypotheses and conjectures).82 Considering the frequency with which a 
safety culture is asserted to enhance patient safety, there is across the research literature as a whole a
noticeable divergence of evidence about whether such a link exists. It also remains unknown 
whether some working practices (e.g. bounded unified processes entirely under clinicians’ control 
rather than more complex care181) may be more susceptible than others to improvement by 
collaborative methods.210 An Iranian study147 found that total quality management (TQM) methods 
(which partly overlap with collaboratives’ methods) had more impact on process management than 
performance results, strategic planning or the supply chain. Finally collaboratives in hospitals are 
more widely reported than those in other settings143 though patients may take a more active role in 
primary than secondary care collaboratives.239 
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Chapter 4:  Methods 
4.a.  Research design  
To understand the complex and diverse mechanisms used to implement Patient Safety 
Collaboratives (PSC) and their Quality Improvement (QI) work, what effects they produced, how, 
for whom and in what contexts, required a mixed-methods realistic evaluation, a research design 
framed specifically to examine such questions.240 This research design would allow us to 
empirically test the programme theory, i.e. the causal assumptions, both explicit and tacit, built into 
the policy of constructing PSCs and outlined in Chapter 2. In that sense, the study design was 
theory-driven. 
Since the PSC programme was already running at the start of this study, the strongest feasible 
research design was observational comparison of PSC mechanisms, contexts and outcomes. The 
comparison used three methods, each broadly corresponding to one of the successive stages of the 
PSC implementation: 
1. Implementation study  : a mainly qualitative investigation of how PSCs were set up by 
AHSNs at a regional, network level, and how NHS managers and clinicians then interpreted 
the guidance and actually set up the PSCs. The implementation study explored what 
mechanisms PSCs used for influencing clinical practice and models of care, especially for 
the purposes of monitoring and improving clinical quality and safety. 
2. Patient safety culture surveys  : this element compared the findings of surveys of patient 
safety climate in providers participating in PSC activities, since Francis and subsequent 
policy statements (see Chapter 2) emphasised strengthening patient safety culture as a 
mechanism for making clinical practice safer. 
3. Analysis of routine administrative data  : changes to patient services and outcomes were the 
expected consequences of changes in safety culture and climate. To assess how far such 
changes had occurred we carried out quantitative analyses of routinely collected 
administrative data relevant to the policy outcomes intended for PSCs. 
Ideally each of these methods would cover the range of care group settings found across the NHS: 
general practice, community health services, mental health services and hospitals but in practice 
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(see Chapters 5-8). PSCs were developed and implemented more (but not exclusively) in acute 
hospitals and general practices. 
Table 1 shows how the three methods map onto our research questions and the mechanisms 
(programme theory) of PSCs outlined in Chapter 2. 
Table 1: Research Questions, Methods and PSC Mechanisms
Research question Method(s) PSC Mechanisms
RQ1. How have the PSCs been implemented in each 
of the 15 Academic Health Science Network (AHSN) 
regions? 
Implementation study 1,2,3,5,6 
Safety culture survey 4
Analysis of routine 
administrative data 
4.5,7
RQ2: What organisational changes have providers 
made? 
(a) How have they done this? 
(b) What have they learned from the PSCs? 
Implementation study 4,5
(a) 1,4,5
(b) 1,2,3,5,7
RQ3: How were resources used for PSC’s 
implementation activities? What are the costs of 
participation and implementation? 
Implementation study 1,2,3,5
RQ4: Have the PSCs made a detectable difference on 
rates of harm and adverse events involving patients as
measured using routine data? 
Analysis of routine 
administrative data
5,8
RQ5: Has change in practice taken place on the front-
line of services? 
Implementation study 5,6,7
Analysis of routine 
administrative data
5,7
RQ6: What generalisable knowledge can be shared 
about this? 
Contextualisation of 
the above findings. 
All 
‘Contextualisation’ means that for each mechanism, we attempted to identify local factors (e.g. the 
past history of QI work; how much workload and financial pressure each provider was under at the 
time of this study) that constrained or multiplied the ways in which a PSC and its QI work could be 
carried out in that network, organisation, or clinical team, or which constrained or amplified its 
effects. Using secondary evidence we then considered whether these contextual barriers and 
facilitators were likely to be typical of other NHS providers of the relevant kinds.
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This study design confronted four methodological issues: 
 1. PSC activity was intended to reduce avoidable harm to patients resulting from system 
failures and human (individual) error. This means the measurement problem in an evaluation
is to measure an outcome which consists in the non-occurrence, hence non-observation, of 
specific events - that is, to identify the counterfactual (hypothetical absence of PSCs) against
which to compare PSCs. Since PSCs were introduced simultaneously across England the 
most appropriate analyses were: 
(a) Analyses of outcome measures over time, including pre- and post intervention (PSCs) 
periods. 
and
(b) Narrative comparisons, for the implementation study. 
 2. For obvious reasons self-reports about how a given innovation (here, PSCs) was introduced 
and about its effects may err towards over-stating the effects and successes92 or towards 
claiming that the initiative in question (here, PSCs) produced activities or outcomes whose 
origins lie also, or entirely, elsewhere. Furthermore, ‘This [risk of bias] also applies to QIC 
researchers who use perceived successes as proxy variables for actual performance.10 To 
minimise this bias we supplemented and triangulated such self-reports with: 
(a) Informed non-participants’ descriptions of the same activities. 
(b) Analyses of routine administrative data. 
(c) SCORE survey data. 
(d) Empirical findings from other studies of Collaboratives (e.g. Hulscher's checklist16 for 
probable conditions for success). 
 3. Our study involved a potential conflict of interest since it involved AHSN members 
potentially evaluating the work of their own AHSN and PSC. To obviate this conflict of 
interest we separated the conduct of: 
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(a) Data collection, which required access to AHSN and PSC staff, documents and 
routinely-collected data (including financial data). This work was partly carried out by 
AHSN staff.
(b) Qualitative data analysis and synthesis of all the data were carried out separately in 
'clean room' fashion solely by researchers (ND, MF, IL, RS) not otherwise involved in 
the AHSN and PSC, hence having no personal interest in reaching particular findings 
and conclusions.
 4. Attributing activities or outcomes to one given policy initiative (here, PSCs) is problematic 
in contexts when other policies simultaneously impact upon the same activities and 
outcomes. To minimise attribution errors we: 
(a) Collected data about PSC implementation in a sequence which began with PSC-level 
activities and followed them through to provider management and then clinical team so 
that activities could be linked with any consequences, through to any resulting change in
working practices. 
(b) Triangulated data as described for (2). 
(c) Included in our analyses data about other QI activities in parallel with PSCs and about 
other policy initiatives that might be expected to impact upon PSC and QI activities. 
(d) Deliberately checked for counter-explanations and additional explanations of activities 
and outcomes that informants had also attributed to PSCs, i.e. what other actors, besides 
the PSCs, may either have potentiated or countervailed the PSCs' activities and their 
effects. 
(e) Inducted patterns from the qualitative data in addition to using a framework analysis (see
below). 
In reporting the study we adhere to the Standards for Quality Improvement Reporting Excellence 
(SQUIRE) guidelines241; these are itemised in Appendix 1. 
73
4.b.  Implementation study  
The implementation study was a multiphase qualitative analysis of PSCs’ impacts on organisational 
culture and climates, staff attitudes, behaviours and teamwork, and any consequences for patients in
terms of delivering safe, effective and compassionate care. It also covered the budget allocations of 
PSCs. 
4.b.i.  Sample 
We made a purposive, qualitative sample of study sites and informants so that data collection 
followed the sequence of PSC implementation (including the flows of knowledge, information, and 
finance) as it cascaded ‘downwards’ through the following three levels:
Level 1:  Regional network level  , i.e. the PSC within its host AHSN, and their interactions 
with the other provider organisations that participated in each PSC. We collected data from 
all PSC leads (n=16, including a pilot interview) across 15 AHSNs. To study in greater 
detail the relationships between PSCs and their member-organisations (providers) we 
selected three PSC regions (which we have pseudonymised ‘Alpha’, ‘Beta’ and ‘Gamma’) 
as a maximum-variation sample that contrasted apparently early and late adopters of the 
PSC model and associated QI activities, with correspondingly contrasting degrees of 
development, elaboration, and local embeddedness of their PSC activity; and also contrasted
city and rural settings. Our purpose in doing so was to identify contexts that appeared to 
facilitate PSC implementation as well as those that didn’t. Interviews with all PSC leads 
across 15 AHSN regions took place between December 2015 and July 2016. Of the PSC 
lead participants twelve were female and four were male, with an age range at interview of 
42 to 62 years.
Level 2:   Provider management level, i.e. the senior managers (medical and non-medical) 
responsible for leading PSC activity (and often QI activity in general) at provider level 
across the three regions mentioned above. Within these PSCs we again sampled for 
maximum variation. We included provider organisations which covered the range of services
participating in the PSC in that region, which in each PSC included acute hospitals, general 
practices, and community mental health services. We also included CCGs, as (inter alia) 
local care coordinating bodies. In general, our rationale was to identify any differences in 
PSC implementation and its consequences that arose from working in different types of 
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service. We interviewed the patient safety leads (n=14) within provider organisations. These 
interviews took place between September 2016 and August 2017. Ten of these informants 
were female and four were male, with an age range at interview of 27 to 58 years.
Level 3:  Clinical team level  , i.e. the work-groups of clinicians and other health workers 
directly providing patient care at department or general practice level, and whose working 
practices PSC activity (perhaps combined with other QI activity) aimed to make safer and 
higher-quality. Informants at this level were front-line staff (n=31) across the same three 
regions. These interviews took place between March and November 2017. 22 of these 
informants were female and nine were male, and the age range at time of interview was 25 
to 63 years.
Table 2 summarises the characteristics of the sample of study sites. 
Table 2: Study site sample 
Level 1 (PSC networks) Levels 2 (provider organisations) and 3 (front-line
clinical teams) 
PSC Alpha (early adopter) Hospital A 
Hospital B 
Mental health trust C 
General practice D 
PSC Beta (middle adopter) Hospital E 
Mental health trust F 
General practice G 
General practice H 
PSC Gamma (later adopter) Hospital I 
Hospital J 
Hospital K 
Hospital L 
Hospital M 
Hospital N 
Community health services O 
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Community health services P 
The key informants’ ages ranged from 25 to 63. 44 were female, 17 male. Appendix 2 lists their job 
titles. 
4.b.ii.  Data collection 
Following the national launch of the PSCs we began fieldwork in the form of collecting interview 
data in December 2015. For each study site at each level we first reviewed any available websites 
and ‘grey’ publications about it, then carried out semi structured in-depth interviews of the key 
informants described above.  By 61 interviews we attained data saturation and therefore ceased 
recruiting informants (a standard data collection method in qualitative research242). As we analysed 
the data it become clear that patients had no direct experience (perceptions) of what the PSCs were 
doing i.e. trying to change clinical working practices. It was health-workers rather than patients who
had first-hand knowledge of whether or how clinical practice had changed. Patients did of course 
experience the services upon which the PSCs worked, but as the findings and discussion chapters 
below explain, PSCs’ impacts on those services were heavily diluted because PSCs concentrated on 
improving specific, often narrow, parts of the whole care process, and tended to concentrate on 
preventing adverse events rather than supplementing or changing the events that did occur. 
Furthermore, few patients could from their own experience compare a pre-PSC with the same 
service post-PSC. So PSC impacts were by their nature invisible to patients. We therefore decided 
that, for these reasons beyond the control of the research team and contrary to our original 
expectations (stated in the research protocol), interviews with patients would be uninformative 
about what impacts PSCs were having, even upon patients themselves. 
The interview schedules (see Appendix 4) were designed as a semi-structured guide to the topic 
area. It was devised by a multi-disciplinary research team based upon a review of the research 
literature and previous research experience. It was piloted in an interview with an AHSN lead, 
slightly revised, and used as modified for subsequent interviews. Following audio quality check, the
first two transcripts were independently coded and the coding checked for inconsistencies by three 
members of the research team (ND, SC, RS), who then agreed explicit criteria for coding these 
topics. 
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All interviewees received information sheets explaining the purpose of the research and what their 
participation would involve. All returned completed and signed consent forms (see Appendix 3) 
before being contacted by follow-up phone call to take part in the study. Interviews were carried out
by telephone and lasted between 25 and 110 minutes. They were audio recorded, transcribed 
verbatim, audio quality checked and anonymised. We kept fieldwork notes in order to contextualise 
the data and detailed summaries of each interview were produced.
Different components of the interview schedule were emphasised for each level of study 
participants/informants as described above. PSC leads were asked about their experience of setting 
up the PSCs and specifically about: 
• The main aims of the Patient Safety Collaborative (PSC). 
• How the PSC was established and what the process of implementation involved. 
• To what extent they followed pre-existing activities or introduced new ones (infra-structure; 
AHSN). 
• What they hoped to achieve. 
• Experience in practice: what are the barriers and facilitators and lessons learnt.
• Reflexivity measures (inputs/output measures/ process measures).
• Sharing best practice. 
• Budget allocations. 
• Overall perceptions and experience. 
The semi-structured nature of the interview meant that participants determined the order, as well as 
the extent to which any predefined themes were discussed.
Participants were asked at interview if they would like to receive a copy of their interview transcript
to pre-approve prior to inclusion in the study. Out of 61 participants, 45 requested to pre-approve 
their interview transcripts. All were returned unchanged and fully approved.
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Together, our various data sources were intended to highlight differing perspectives and allow 
exploration of areas of contradiction or agreement in participants’ accounts; to help identify any 
barriers or difficulties encountered in PSC implementation, and possible unintended consequences 
(both positive and adverse); to discover what the incentives for taking part in the PSCs are and what
action the providers feel they need to take to be part of them. At level 3 we sought data on what had 
actually been done to make clinical work safer: that is, we elicited narratives about the changes that 
occurred in working practices related to QI and patient safety, and whether this was due to PSC 
activity or occurred for other reasons. We also included the free-text responses to the Safety, 
Communication, Operational Reliability and Engagement (SCORE) surveys described below. 
We considered information provided in the PSC websites and from the interviews with PSC leads to
identify the flows of expenditure from the PSCs to quality and safety activities as well as the 
outcomes affected by these new financial injections. We also used qualitative data from the 
interviews with PSC leads to estimate any opportunity costs relating to activities, both clinical and 
managerial, that were not undertaken as a result of PSC activity within provider organisations. We 
requested from both NHS Improvement and the individual PSCs their direct budget allocations.
Financial management data apart, we collected data until we reached theoretical saturation, i.e. 
additional data were ceasing to add any new explanations about how PSCs did, or did not, work and
in which contexts. 
4.b.iii.  Data analysis 
All interview data were analysed inductively using thematic analysis techniques243 to generate 
descriptions of themes both within and across the data. The analysis began with coding, followed by
identification and clustering of themes and sub themes before comparing themes across the dataset. 
Team members then discussed and agreed the inductive analysis, and how it overlapped or 
contrasted with the a priori analytic framework (outlined in Chapter 2). This method ensured that 
the analytical quality and interpretative aspect of the analyses were well justified244,245, after which 
the themes and sub themes were grouped in order to construct a more descriptive and interpretative 
summary of recurrent key themes (Appendix 5 is an example) illustrated with verbatim quotes. 
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Because it was the intended endpoint of PSC activity we took the clinical team as the basic unit of 
analysis.2 
The analysis was therefore informed by interpretive phenomenology derived from 
hermeneutics246,247 an approach that gives primacy to “insider knowledge” and the “lived 
experiences” of study participants by emphasising the meanings they attach to key phenomena in a 
given context so as to provide a detailed description and explanation of how they understood, 
experienced and used PSCs. Through these inductive methods we established the patterns reported 
in Chapters 5-7. 
4.c.  Safety culture survey  
The Francis Report, subsequent policy statements, and the underlying programme theory of 
Collaboratives178,222,248,249 each assumed safety culture to be a critical factor in improving patient 
safety. For all practical research purposes safety culture or climate are defined by scores on safety 
culture surveys. The culture survey was initially intended solely to measure changes in safety 
climate although in the event, and as the findings chapters (Chapters 5-8) report more fully, the 
feedback debriefing also became an intervention in its own right for changing both working 
practices and culture. Implementing the culture survey involved the following steps: 
1. Site selection. 
2. A first survey administered by staff in each site in collaboration with Safe and Reliable 
Healthcare (USA). 
3. First de-briefing. Site by site, Safe and Reliable Healthcare (USA) summarised the 
responses to the first survey in a report which formed the basis of a debriefing session with 
the staff in that site (both responders and non-responders to the first round survey). 
4. Second survey at least six months later (time-scales reported below and in Chapter 7). 
5. Optionally, further de-briefing followed by further survey cycle(s). 
As for the implementation study, the unit of analysis was the front-line clinical team within a 
hospital or general practice (level 3) because that was the group whose safety culture was, the 
programme theory of PSCs assumed, critical for patient safety (see Chapter 2). 
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4.c.i.  Measure: SCORE instrument 
Building upon questionnaire surveys initially developed in aviation, Sexton developed the first 
safety culture surveys used in healthcare over 21 years ago. The two most widely used survey 
instruments for measuring safety climate, the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality 
(AHRQ)250 and the Safety Attitude Questionnaire (SAQ)251,252 questionnaires, were when we began 
this study 10 and 21 years old respectively, and ’not intended for use in today’s healthcare 
environment’. The SCOPE-PC instrument is more recent but designed specifically for primary care 
settings.253 To measure patient safety climate we used the Integrated Safety, Communication, 
Operational Reliability and Engagement (SCORE) Survey instrument for Organisational Learning 
and Improvement (Appendix 6).254 
The SCORE survey consists of seven domains: learning environment, local leadership, burnout 
climate, personal burnout, teamwork, safety climate, and work-life balance. Each domain includes a
number of questions, each with responses on a scale from 1 to 5 (disagree strongly, disagree 
slightly, neutral, agree slightly, agree strongly) for the first six domains (there are some negatively 
worded questions within the teamwork and safety climate domains but all questions within the other
domains are positively worded), and from 1 to 4 (rarely or none of the time, some or a little of the 
time, occasionally or a moderate amount of time, all of the time) for the work-life balance domain 
(negatively worded). The survey also records free-text answers to four questions: what the 
respondent thinks are the greatest risks to patient safety in her workplace; what should be done to 
address those risks; which other topics the survey should have asked about; and any other 
comments about the issues that the survey covers. The teamwork and safety climate measures in 
SCORE derive from SAQ. Although, as noted, SAQ is now rather old it had sound psychometric 
properties in respect of composite scale reliability, factor structure, between-factor correlation, and 
sensitivity to variability; and was ‘associated with clinical outcomes like hand hygiene or 
bloodstream infections’.251 The personal burnout component has acceptable levels of reliability and 
factor intra- and inter-class correlation.255 The burnout (work-life balance) components show 
acceptable reliability and variability256, as does the improvement readiness component.257 The local 
leadership element (which includes learning environment) is also acceptably reliable.257,258   
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4.c.ii.  Sample
Any NHS site – department, ward, general practice or other clinical team - was eligible to volunteer
for the SCORE survey. The sample of sites was therefore self-selected. Within each site the survey 
was a census of individual staff members. A first round of surveys was conducted across 72 sites, 
unevenly distributed across 6 PSCs. 36 sites were general practices, 13 were acute hospital wards 
(including maternity and , paediatrics), and 9 were mental health wards. There were three ICUs, one
emergency department, seven other hospital departments, and one CCG. The numbers of individual 
respondents in each site (more fully reported in Chapter 7) ranged from 9 to 151. Two of these were
also sites in which we conducted qualitative fieldwork for the implementation study. At the time of 
writing only six of the first-round sites had proceeded as far as a second-round (i.e. repeat) SCORE 
survey: three general practices, a mental health trust pharmacy, an emergency department and a 
medical admission unit. Time periods for the first and second SCORE surveys and debriefing 
sessions, in each of the six units, are shown in Table 3. 
4.c.iii.  Survey data collection 
SCORE survey data were collected by Safe and Reliable Health Care, a US company run by the 
inventors of the SCORE survey and commissioned to administer the survey by a number of AHSNs
and the volunteered providers within them. The latter arranged access to the study sites and for the 
surveys to take place. The individual-level SCORE data were anonymous and only available to this 
research team. The surveys were carried out between September 2015 and September 2017, the first
round in 2015-16 followed by a period of between 11 and 18 months between first and second 
surveys.
4.c.iv.  Analysis
Individual person-level domain scores for the SCORE survey, for each of the six domains: learning 
environment, local leadership, burnout climate, personal burnout, teamwork and safety climate, are 
calculated as follows. The response to each question within the domain is converted to 0-100 by 
subtracting 1 from the numeric response and then multiplying by 25 (inverting any negatively 
worded questions in the teamwork and safety climate domains). The person-level domain score is 
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the mean of the 0-100 scaled question responses, based on all of the questions that the individual 
answered within that domain. This means that if an individual has a domain score of 100 they have 
responded agree strongly to all questions that they have answered within that domain; 75 means that
they have responded agree slightly to all questions; 50 means that they have responded neutral to 
all; 25 means that they have responded disagree slightly to all, and 0 means that all responses are 
disagree strongly. Individual-level domain scores for the work-life balance domain are the means of
the numeric responses to each question within the domain. 
For each of the six units in which the repeat SCORE surveys were administered, individual person-
level domain scores are summarised using means and standard deviations, and scores from the first 
and second surveys are compared using two sample t tests. All analyses are carried out using R 
statistical software (version 3.4.1)259 with a declared significance level of p < 0.05. 
We coded the free-text answers into categories emerging from the responses themselves. For the 
reported risks to patient safety these categories included, for example, making mistakes due to 
lacking sufficient time to do the work and lack of monitoring equipment. Under each category we 
recorded the number of responses mentioning that issue. Responses that respondents mentioned in 
more than one category counted as one mention for each category. The counts included both rounds 
of the survey, so that issues which a given respondent mentioned in each were counted a two 
mentions. This means the total number of mentions exceeds the number of respondents. On that 
basis we report (Chapter 7) simple frequencies of the safety issues which SCORE survey 
respondents mentioned. 
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Table 3: Time periods for the first and second SCORE surveys and debriefing sessions, in each of the six units. 
Unit
2015 2016 2017
Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug
General practice C 1st DB 2nd
Hospital D: ED 1st DB 2nd
Hospital D: MAU
1st DB 2nd
Pharmacy E 1st DB 2nd
General practice A 1st DB 2nd
General practice B 
1st DB 2nd
1st – launch date of first survey
DB – date of debrief
2nd – launch date of second survey
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4.d.  Analysis of routine administrative data  
We analysed routinely- collected outcome data, reported at trust level, for acute trusts within all 
AHSNs in England for the years 2013 to 2016 inclusive. This includes data from: annual NHS 
inpatient and staff surveys, monthly classic safety thermometer, six-monthly incident reporting 
(between April 2014 and March 2016), and, from annual Standardised Hospital Mortality Index 
(SHMI) data, the observed numbers of deaths and in-patient spells.
Because PSCs were introduced in October 2014 we used 2014 as the reference year in all analyses, 
estimating differences in outcome measures in 2013, 2015 and 2016, compared to 2014. This gave 
us an indication of any change in measures between a year with no PSCs in place (2013), and the 
year in which they were introduced and so were partly in place (2014) as well as allowing us to 
estimate any changes in outcome measures between two years (2015 and 2016) in which the PSCs 
were largely or wholly in place, compared to 2014. This allows us to assess the stability of measures
across 2013 and 2014; if measures are stable across these years, any differences observed in 2015 
and 2016 can be more confidently attributed to the intervention (PSCs). If there are trends in 
outcomes across all four years, we would have less confidence that any differences seen post 2014 
are due to the PSCs and not just secular trend. 
For all of the outcomes described above, as well as overall analyses across all AHSNs, we focus on 
the three AHSNs in which we undertook the implementation study. 
Time periods for routine outcome measures are shown in Table 4.
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aAnnual NHS inpatient surveys carried out once per year, per trust.
bAnnual NHS staff surveys carried out once per year, in October, per trust.
cFrom annual SHMI data covering each calendar year, per trust.
dUsed as the reference year in data analyses.
Table 4: Time periods for routine data analysed in the PiSCES study.
Routine data 2013 2014 2015 2016
J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D
NHS inpatient surveysa Annual survey for each trust Annual survey for each trustd Annual survey for each trust Annual survey for each trust
NHS staff surveysb Annual survey for each trust Annual survey for each trustd Annual survey for each trust Annual survey for each trust
Classic safety 
thermometer
Monthly  data  for  each  trust,  aggregated  over
year
Monthly  data  for  each  trust,  aggregated  over
yeard
Monthly  data  for  each  trust,  aggregated  over
year
Monthly  data  for  each  trust,  aggregated  over
year
Incident reporting 6-monthly  for  each
trust
6-monthly  for  each
trust
6-monthly  for  each
trust
6-monthly  for  each
trust
Hospital Mortalityc Annual data for each trust Annual data for each trustd Annual data for each trust Annual data for each trust
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All routinely collected data are at trust level. The data structure for analyses is in the form of one 
row for each trust, for each of the years 2013 to 2016 inclusive. Therefore, each trust has four rows 
of data, with a small number of trusts having fewer than four rows if data are unavailable for 
particular years. As noted above the year 2014, in which PSCs were introduced, is used as the 
reference year. Analyses provide estimates of the change in outcome measures between the year 
2013, when there were no PSCs, and 2014, as well as the change in measures between each of the 
years 2015 and 2016, when the PSCs were in place, and 2014. For each of the outcome measures 
from the NHS inpatient survey, NHS staff survey, classic safety thermometer and hospital mortality 
(SHMI) data, the main analysis is based on those trusts that have data reported for all four years. 
Sensitivity analysis uses all available data across all years, where some trusts have data reported for 
some but not all years. All analyses were carried out using R statistical software (version 3.4.1).259
4.d.i.  NHS inpatient surveys
Analyses of NHS inpatient surveys focussed on a single question about the inpatient’s overall 
satisfaction:
‘Overall…
‘I had a very poor experience [0]’….to… ‘I had a very good experience [10].’
Possible scores for this question are from 0 to 10 in 1 point increments. This is question number 68 
in the 2013 and 2014 surveys, question 72 in the 2015 survey and question number 74 in the 2016 
survey.
Data are reported as the average score for each trust, for each year. Trust scores are summarised in 
terms of means and standard deviation. We fitted random effects linear regression models to the 
trust scores, with the fixed effect of year and random effects of trust. This allows for correlation 
between observations within the same trust. We report the mean difference between the average 
scores in 2014 (reference category) and each of the other three years; 2013, 2015 and 2016. Ninety-
five percent confidence intervals and p-values are reported for the mean difference. Further analyses
focus on each of the three AHSNs. In each case, we based the main analysis on those trusts that 
have data reported for all four years. We conducted sensitivity analysis using all available data 
across all years, where some trusts have data reported for some but not all years.
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4.d.ii.  NHS staff surveys
Some questions in the NHS staff survey are similar to questions in the SCORE survey. Our analyses
of NHS staff surveys focussed on the published key findings, for each trust, for each of the years 
2013 to 2016 inclusive, relating to:
 Improvement: staff feeling that they are able to contribute towards improvements in their 
area of work – reported as the percentage of staff who feel that they are able to do this, 
defined as those answering either ‘agree’ or ‘strongly agree’ across three questions from the 
‘your job’ domain.
 Managers: support from immediate managers – reported as the mean score across five 
questions from the ‘your managers’ domain and one question, from the ‘your job’ domain, 
each scored on a 1 (very dissatisfied or strongly disagree) to 5 (very satisfied or strongly 
agree) with higher scores indicating that staff feel they have more support from their 
immediate managers.
 Errors: fairness and effectiveness of procedures for reporting errors, near misses and 
incidents – reported as the mean score across four questions from the ‘your health, well-
being and safety at work’ domain, each scored on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly 
agree) with higher scores indicating a greater belief that procedures are fair and effective. 
 Recommendation: staff recommendation of the organisation as a place to work or receive 
treatment – reported as the mean score across three questions from the ‘your organisation’ 
domain, each scored on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) point scale, so that 
higher scores indicate a greater likelihood of recommendation. 
To compare the key findings across the years we used random effects linear regression models fitted
to the trust-level data, with the fixed effect of year and random effects of trust. This allows for 
correlation between observations within the same trust. We report the means and standard 
deviations of the outcomes (key findings) for each year and the mean difference between the 
outcomes in 2014 (reference category) and each of the other three years: 2013, 2015 and 2016. 
Ninety-five percent confidence intervals and p-values are reported for the mean difference. The 
main analysis is based on those trusts that have data reported for all years. Sensitivity analyses 
include all available data across all trusts within all AHSNs, where some trusts have data reported 
for some but not all years. Further analyses include trusts within each of the three focal AHSNs, 
with sensitivity analyses if there are any trusts within these AHSNs that do not report for all years. 
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4.d.iii.  Classic safety thermometer
The Classic Safety Thermometer focuses on the four most commonly occurring harms in 
healthcare: pressure ulcers, falls, urinary tract infection (UTI) (in patients with a catheter) and 
VTEs. Data consist of the number of new harm events and the total number of patients, for each 
trust, for a single day of each month between January 2013 and December 2016 inclusive. There is 
a recommended day for each month, on which trusts should report on the safety thermometer but it 
is unclear whether this recommendation is followed and it is possible that data for different trusts 
will correspond to different days of the week, and possibly different weeks, within each month. For 
each trust, the numbers of new harm events and denominators were totalled across months within 
each calendar year, to give an annual total number of events and total denominator. The rate of new 
harm events per 100 person-days is reported for each year. This provides an estimate of the number 
of new harm events that would be expected to occur among 100 patients observed for a single day. 
To compare rates of new harm events across the years we used random effects Poisson regression 
models, fitted to the reported number of events, with the fixed effect of year and random effects of 
trust. We report the estimated rate ratio for each of the years 2013, 2015 and 2016, relative to 2014. 
Ninety-five percent confidence intervals and p-values are reported for the rate ratio. The main 
analysis is based on those trusts that have data reported for all years. Sensitivity analysis includes 
all available data across all trusts within all AHSNs, where some trusts have data reported for some 
but not all years. Further analyses include all trusts within each of the three focal AHSNs. 
4.d.iv.  Incident reporting
Trust level data on reported incidents within six-month periods, from April 2014 to March 2016 
(categorised according to level of harm: none; low; moderate; severe or death), are summarised in 
terms of the percentage of all incidents reported that were either severe incidents or deaths. 
4.d.v.  Hospital mortality
Comparisons of hospital mortality rates over years use trust level published SHMI data for the years
2013 to 2016 inclusive. From these data we used: 
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1. The total number of finished spells for a trust, where a spell is a continuous period of time 
spent as a patient within a single trust. A spell may be composed of more than one episode (a
single period of care under one consultant) and ends when the patient is discharged or dies;
2. The total number of observed deaths for a trust, which includes deaths in hospital or within 
30 days of discharge. 
The mortality rate per 100 spells is reported for each year. This provides an estimate of the number 
of deaths in hospital or within 30 days of discharge that would be expected to occur among 100 
spells. To compare hospital mortality rates across the years we used random effects Poisson 
regression models, fitted to the total number of observed deaths, with the fixed effect of year and 
random effects of trust. We report the estimated rate ratio for each of the years 2013, 2015 and 
2016, relative to 2014. Ninety-five percent confidence intervals and p-values are reported for the 
rate ratio. The main analysis is based on those trusts that have data reported for all years. Sensitivity
analysis includes all available data across all trusts within all AHSNs, where some trusts have data 
reported for some but not all years. Further analyses include all trusts within each of the three 
AHSNs (PSCs) selected for fuller study, with sensitivity analyses if there are any trusts within these 
AHSNs that do not report for all years. 
4.e.  Synthesising the findings  
Table 5 summarises the data we collected across the evaluation as a whole. 
Table 5: Data collected
Interviews Other material 
Implementation study: level 1 16 28 documents, 22 media reports, 364 free-text 
SCORE responses, 15 PSC websites (for the 
activities receiving resources) and the documents
available in them. 
Implementation study: level 2 14
Implementation study: level 3 31
SCORE survey data (both first None 376 respondents, 6 sites.
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and second round) 
Routine administrative data N/A NHS Digital datasets for: NHS Inpatient Survey; 
NHS Staff Survey; Classic Safety Thermometer; 
Incident Reporting; Hospital Mortality. 
Secondary data N/A 232 published papers, 18 research reports
Figures for the implementation study include the financial aspect. 
To synthesise the findings from the three methods we used we carried out two framework 
analyses260,261, reported in the Discussion (Chapter 9) below. The first framework analysis was 
conceptually equivalent to a tabulation in which each row was one of the research question and each
column one of the three study methods described above. Table 1 shows which methods were 
relevant to which research questions. Each cell summarised the respective findings, and by collating
them row by row (so to speak) we synthesised answers to all the research questions except one: 
what generalisable lessons might be drawn from our findings? To answer that question, we used a 
second framework analysis to compare the set of context-mechanism-outcome (C-M-O) 
assumptions for each mechanism in the policy-makers’ programme theory for PSCs (see Chapter 2) 
with the combined data from all three methods outlined above. This framework analysis was 
conceptually equivalent to a tabulation in which each row was one of the eight mechanisms (and 
where specified, its context(s)) in the programme theory; see Table 6. 
Table 6: Data Synthesis by PSC Mechanism
Mechanism Context(s) Findings from 
1. Regional coordinating body 
and network make providers 
become more ‘learning’ 
organisations, assuming as 
context 
1a. Central policy and 
organisations continue to 
support PSCs and their 
activities.
Implementation study
2. Each regional coordinating 
body establishes (a) cross-
organisational network(s) of 
clinical teams
[None specified in 
programme theory]
Implementation study
3. Each regional coordinating 
body and network establishes 
cross-organisational 
3a. Central policy and 
organisations continue to 
support PSCs and their 
Implementation study
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measurement systems activities.
4. The providers which have 
become learning organisations 
develop an organisational 
culture and climate more 
conducive to patient safety and
quality improvement
4a. Staff training works [in 
changing workplace attitudes 
and skills] 
Implementation study
SCORE survey 
5. Changed safety culture and 
climate help clinical working 
practices to change
[None specified in 
programme theory]
Implementation study
SCORE survey 
Analysis of routine administrative 
data. 
5a. Staff training helps create 
or strengthen new working 
practices 
Implementation study
5b. The provider has 
sufficient staff 
Implementation study
5c. Contractual incentives 
align with the new working 
practices 
Implementation study
6. The cross-organisational 
network(s) of clinical teams 
help clinical working practices
to change 
[None specified in 
programme theory]
Implementation study 
7. The cross-organisation 
measurement systems help 
clinical working practices to 
change 
[None specified in 
programme theory]
Implementation study
8. The changed working 
practices result in the 
outcomes of increased patient 
safety and quality 
improvement. 
[None specified in 
programme theory]
Analysis of routine administrative 
data. 
Our attempts to populate these frameworks exposed to us where data were missing, ambiguous or 
seemingly contradictory, prompting further data collection. This also exposed any dis-confirming 
evidence and counter-explanations for the programme theory outlined in Chapter 2. To minimise the
risk of availability (of our own and each other’s preconceptions) colouring the general findings and 
conclusions that we drew from this material, the two PIs first formulated their own conclusions 
separately, then compared and merged them. (In the event, their sets of conclusions were very 
similar.) 
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A potential limitation in such an approach to integrating qualitative and quantitative data by this 
method is that the analytic frameworks – which originated as much from policy as from scientific 
sources – might omit important contexts and co-determinants (‘confounders’) of PSCs’ QI work and
its outcomes, might include extraneous contexts and co-determinants, or might do both. To 
minimise the likelihood of these errors we: 
1. Supplemented the original (programme theory) analytic framework with further context-
mechanism-outcome configurations derived inductively from our data, especially from the 
implementation study (see above). 
2. Modified, or even removed from, the original (programme theory) analytic framework, 
those mechanism-outcome configurations for which our data gave only qualified evidential 
support, or none. 
Furthermore, the routinely available administrative data were incomplete and in some cases 
questionable (see above) proxy measures for some of the intended PSC outcomes, or (for some 
variables including the SCORE survey, taken as a proxy for likely levels of harm to patients) for the
processes by which policy makers expected PSCs to produce those outcomes. We have noted 
(Discussion, Chapter 9) how this limits the interpretation and conclusiveness of our findings. 
4.e.i.  Drawing general policy lessons 
If the policy assumptions underlying policy makers’ programme theory of PSCs were valid we 
would expect to observe that: 
1. The main elements of the PSC programme, i.e. its main mechanisms (see Chapter 2, Figure
1), were all established essentially as the policy intended, and; 
2. Once established, these mechanisms each had their intended effects in triggering and 
reinforcing each other, thereby producing the intended effects (outcomes) of each 
mechanism and, together, of the PSC programme as a whole. 
The latter observation, if it occurs, is what yields generalisable (‘shared’) ‘lessons’. The 
‘mechanisms’ on which realist evaluation focuses are, by nature, of a general character and so are 
the contexts that moderate their effects. Findings about them are therefore generalisable, although 
(indeed, for that very reason) being corrigible in light of further research. Our method262 for 
deriving lessons that might support improvement elsewhere was to compare our synthesised 
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empirical findings (Chapters 5-8) with the assumptions of the policy-makers’ original programme 
theory for PSCs (Chapter 2). We used these comparisons as a method for qualitative, falsificationist 
testing263 of the policy-makers’ initial assumptions about what the mechanisms and contexts are, 
through which PSC improve service quality and safety. Chapter 9 (Policy Relevance) reports these 
comparisons. 
In light of these comparisons we then removed from the original PSC programme theory the 
assumed mechanisms for which our synthesised findings gave no supporting evidence for, or gave 
evidence against. For mechanisms or contexts that had only partial support in our synthesised 
evidence, we removed the un-evidenced elements. To the resulting truncated but more strongly 
evidence-based programme theory we then added statements, based on our synthesised findings, 
about: 
1. Relevant causal links we found in this evaluation but which the policy-makers’ initial 
programme theory of PSCs did not include. 
2. Contexts which qualify (strengthen, weaken or mediate) the mechanisms for which we 
found evidence but which the policy-makers’ initial programme theory of PSCs did not 
include. 
In these ways we converted the initial programme theory into a revised, more strongly evidence-
based logic model. These changes together constitute the general policy lessons drawn from this 
evaluation. We itemise these in Chapter 11. 
4.f.  Patient and public involvement  
Patient involvement in this project ensured we dealt with questions that make sense to patients and 
members of the public; and helped us maximise the project’s impact by guiding dissemination and 
translation of our findings. We sought and received expert PPI advice from our NIHR CLAHR 
partners (CLAHRC for the South West Peninsula (PenCLAHRC); which is regarded as a national 
trailblazer in relation to PPI) It began at the preparatory stage for this study. Two expert patients 
(Rosamund Snow and Anya de Longa) were involved in the preparation of the research protocol. 
Rosamund Snow has extensive experience both as a patient and a PhD researcher in user focussed 
research. Another patient representative, Sarah Ross, joined as a member of the PiSCES steering 
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committee. By chance one of our research team was also undergoing orthopaedic treatment for all 
except the last four months of the study period. As fieldwork progressed it became evident that few 
if any effects of PSC activity would be immediately experienced by patients. First, as Chapters 5 
and 7 report, it would take time (at least 18 months) for PSCs to start to influence working practices
at clinical team level, and even longer to produce changes in patients’ safety. Then, as Chapter 9 
explains, these effects would probably be diluted by the lack of effects on services that had not yet 
engaged with QI and safety activity instigated by the PSCs. Lastly, safety work largely aims at 
(tertiary) prevention. To a large extent the intended outcomes (at the level of patient experience) 
were events that did not happen i.e. iatrogenic harm. From a research point of view there seemed 
little point in seeking patients’ views about experiences which did not occur. We therefore changed 
the focus of PPI activity to focus on the dissemination phase of the project, as described in Chapter 
12. 
4.g.  Equality and diversity  
At PSC network level we studied all of England and were able to discover whether, and if so which,
PSCs’ strategies and activities deliberately and explicitly focussed on equality and diversity, and 
whether their strategies and activities differed in ways that reflected their regions’ distinct socio-
economic and ethnic profiles. 
4.h.  Ethics and research governance  
The NHS Research Ethics Committee system approved the study (reference 15-NI-0235) subject to 
obtaining research governance approval from each NHS organisation involved, which we did, and 
maintaining informant anonymity. Accordingly all informants and study sites are pseudonymised in 
the following chapters, including (for consistency) those who waived their right to anonymity. The 
routine administrative data that we have analysed are all publicly available. The study was funded 
by the Department of Health (England) Policy Research Programme (see Acknowledgements). 
After the initial open and peer-reviewed competitive commissioning process the funder has until the
time of writing (March 2018) played no further part in the study design, implementation, 
interpretation and publication. 
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Chapter 5:  Key findings (1): PSCs as managed regional networks of providers 
We present our findings by following the implementation ‘down’ the health system from the 
national level to the level of PSCs as managed regional networks of provider (this chapter) to the 
level of whole provider organisations (Chapter 6) and then to clinical team level (Chapter 7). This 
order corresponds to the sequence of events anticipated in the policy-makers’ PSCs programme 
theory (see Figure 1, Chapter 2). This chapter reports our findings on how the PSCs have been 
implemented in each of the 15 Academic Health Science Network (AHSN) regions (RQ1); how 
implementation varied across the PSCs (RQ6); and how resources were used for the PSC’s 
implementation activities (RQ3). Of our informants, network level PSC leads are labelled ‘PSCL’, 
organisational-level leads ‘PSCOL’ and front-line clinical team members ‘PSCFL’ (followed in each
case by the relevant individual number). 
5.a.  Setting up the PSC coordinating body  
In October 2014, PSCs were launched as a five-year national programme to support individuals, 
teams and organisations to build the necessary skills and knowledge to enhance patient safety and 
quality improvement in order to reduce the numbers of avoidable harm cases across England. PSCs 
had an estimated budget of £12 million per annum, although some was retained for national-level 
management and measurement activities, leaving £7 million for the regional PSC network 
coordinating bodies. PSCs were to be organised and delivered locally by 15 Academic Health 
Science Networks (AHSNs) in order to respond to local variation and need. 
During the Collaboratives’ setup phase, PSC leads suggested that they needed more developed 
national structures to help support their local work; more local flexibility to respond to need, and 
more co-ordination of work across AHSNs so that "we don't reinvent the wheel" (PSCL7). Many 
PSC leads anticipated that their work would be challenging because of the “policy uncertainty and 
regulatory changes” (PSCL10) they were witnessing. They likened the impact of “organisational 
turbulence” and “ongoing churn in the system” to "tectonic plate shifts" (PSCL15) and felt these 
added to the already growing complexity of NHS funding streams, care pathways and methods of 
referral. They expressed concern as to how receptive provider organisations and their staff would be
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to the launch of a new initiative in a system already buckling under operational pressures including 
workload, funding cuts, staffing pressures, and rising patient demand:
“The pressure in the system is just enormous and the pressure in the system is always there” 
(PSCL11). 
Amidst these systemic pressures PSC leads needed to define, even justify, their new role and to 
determine their projected impact and output measures.
“I think there is always when you are a non-patient delivering organisation you know, a 
certain amount of cynicism about the value you know-is it a quango? Is it-what are you 
going to deliver? And because some of the stuff is not a tangible measurement you know, 
that’s quite challenging” (PSCL7). 
PSCs were intended to be ‘working in partnership’264 with the ‘Sign up to Safety campaign’. 
Although we specifically asked about Sign up to Safety in our interviews, in our fieldwork we 
hardly came across it. Only one of the PSC leads we interviewed gave it much attention, as a 
parallel and fore-runner of something that PSCs do. 
From the outset, a number of PSC leads were unsure about the branding of the new initiative. Some 
leads were adverse to the name “patient safety” collaborative, preferring the name “improvement” 
collaborative, as they felt member organisations may become: “Instantly wary of you. Instantly 
nervous, because the reality is there is a blame culture” (PSCL1). Indeed prior to their launch, some 
patient safety collaborative leads shared this concern:
“My slight concern was that the patient safety collaboratives were going to be a sort of a re-
branded or a disguised version of Monitor and the TDA [Trust Development Authority], you
know coming at it from a safety and quality initiative, but just sort of going in and trying to 
strong arm people into doing particular pieces of work.” (PSCL6). 
In response to such concerns PSCs took steps to ensure their communication strategy, including 
their launch events, attempted not only to gain visibility, but to clarify their role. 
Some PSC leads expressed an initial concern that PSCs might become “a cosy talking shop” with 
“not much delivery:” 
96
"The planning phase was really important […] because I think there is a danger with these 
types of projects that they just become a very cosy talking shop and there's not much 
delivery […] because you're not necessarily as a regional improvement body, directly 
delivering improvement. You are assisting others to improve. So we were very careful about 
how we looked at implementation" (PSCL6). 
Because senior endorsement and support were recognised as a vital and necessary prerequisite for 
any improvement to become fully embedded in the healthcare system, PSC time and resources were
allocated to training key leaders and ‘champions’ of the Collaborative approach. By holding design 
days and engagement events in their local regions PSCs were able to engage with their member 
organisations during the setup phase of the Collaboratives rather than impose or be seen to be 
imposing a top down approach, and PSC leads reported how their facilitative role was a much-
needed link in the system. 
5.b.  Variations between PSCs  
PSCs varied in terms of their respective geographies, population size, quality of pre-existing network links, 
funding received, and improvement infrastructures. This let to three main types of variation in their 
dependency (‘path dependency’) on the history of QI in that region; their relationship to their host 
AHSN, and in the balance of implementation strategies that different PSCs adopted. 
5.b.i.  Path dependency
PSC differed in the extent to which QI activities within providers, inter-provider QI networks and 
other safety activities already existed. Due to this variation at regional and provider levels the PSCs 
were at different starting points when we commenced our evaluation. 
“Unlike some of the other AHSNs who didn’t have good improvement sort of access in their
footprints, we are very fortunate, we’ve got AQuA and HALO and [region] Leadership 
Academy. So unlike some AHSNs we haven’t set up ourselves as an improvement kind of 
body ourselves, it’s already out there. We’d only end up competing with them which would 
be silly. It’s about using the assets in the system” (PSCL15). 
While some regions already benefited from having a whole quality improvement faculty within 
their AHSN other regions had to build a network and collaborative links from scratch. 
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“The [region] infrastructure was very, very light, non-existent so many of the other AHSNs 
had an existing quality improvement infrastructure largely a legacy of the Strategic Health 
Authorities [...] We had NONE of that. Absolutely none so the [region] as well as having 
currently a large number of challenged organisations, it had no infrastructure to enable those
organisations to ask for help” (PSCL11, original emphasis). 
As a result of this local variation the PSCs were at different starting points when we commenced 
our evaluation. Staff turnover delayed the setup phase for some PSCs and some experienced the loss
of key leaders who had been advocates and champions of a more collaborative approach to 
improvement: 
“I would have wished to have moved the programme plan for the PSC forward more 
quickly, but with a turnover of four MDs [medical directors]! You know you have to expect 
that any programme will fall behind its anticipated milestones if you have senior leadership 
changes. […]We’ve lost several Chief Execs because of either CQC feedback or 
performance and pressures. You know some have been removed. Some have chosen to fall 
on their sword, but many of them were individuals that were also passionate advocates for 
our [improvement] work” (PSCL11). 
When we went into the field some PSCs were at the early stages of building an improvement 
infrastructure and experiencing the challenges of trying to engage struggling and/or defensive 
organisations, or of managing what they termed “inherited reputational damage” (PSCL4). Others 
were at a more developmental stage, confronting challenges in gaining senior leadership support 
either within the AHSNs or within local NHS Trusts as they endeavoured to secure NHS Trust 
board representation and forge necessary links with member organisations. Most were at varying 
stages in setting up design days and holding engagement events to determine which work-streams to
focus on from the national wall of priorities and balancing these with local variation and need. A 
few were at the delivery stage, already reporting a considerable amount of success with their 
learning events and levels of engagement, as well as through their infrastructure with good 
leadership and full NHS Trust board representation. 
Some PSCs experienced setbacks during their launch due to the junior doctors’ strikes265 and this 
resulted in having to cancel scheduled learning and engagement events. 
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5.b.ii.  Variable relationships between PSC and AHSN
The extent to which the PSCs were embedded in the AHSNs varied widely:
“It's amazing how some of them [PSCs] have set themselves up as quite autonomous 
[…] ours is fully integrated, the health and implementation team adopted and includes 
patient safety Collaboratives, there isn't a separate work-stream” (PSCL15). 
For most PSC leads, being fully embedded within their regional AHSN was seen as highly 
beneficial, particularly in regions where this brought strong network links:
“Working within the AHSN is incredibly useful and very productive” (PSCL7). 
“The AHSN was a very effective and useful place for it [PSCs] to be hosted” (PSCL6). 
In contrast some PSC leads described encountering leadership challenges within their AHSN:
“Most of my challenge is internal within the AHSN. [...] Because the AHSNs weren’t 
originally set up to run Patient Safety Collaboratives, our original senior leadership 
team, they just didn’t get it at all and didn’t have any interest in it and now we have a 
different leadership team and they also don’t get it! So I spend a lot of my time 
justifying, explaining […] I don’t think that people working in the AHSN recognise the 
size and complexity of this programme of work ” (PSCL1). 
This particular PSC lead expressed concern that by being embedded within their AHSN, the PSC 
was inheriting “reputational damage” and therefore set at a disadvantage:
“I’ve got people in different places who have said “they’re a waste of space – that 
AHSNs are a waste of space!” You know, I’ve heard people say that. Now, they may 
well see patient safety as AHSN so therefore a waste of space...” (PSCL4). 
In such cases the PSC needed more time to clarify and define its role within their AHSN and build 
better working relationships. 
"I think initially some of our challenges were around understanding what the AHSN did. 
Let’s start right back at the basics, then understanding what the PSC is” (PSCL7). 
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5.b.iii.  Strategy: hybrids and tensions 
Collectively the PSCs used three main strategies to establishing and directing QI work. Adapting 
the PSCs’ own terminologies, we label them the facilitative, the educative, and the ‘national 
priorities’ strategies. All PSCs used all three but as the differences reported above might lead one to 
expect, the balance of emphasis differed substantially between PSCs. 
The facilitative strategy was for PSCs to support and develop existing patient safety activity. 
Absorbing existing activities produced rhetoric of ‘not duplicate’ but ‘align [with providers’ existing
activities]’. PSC leads expressed from the outset that they did not want to “re-invent the wheel”. 
This approach enabled re-badging of existing activities, at the cost of reducing the scope for 
attributing any successes to the PSCs and brought an emphasis on correcting system faults. One 
complication in the facilitative strategy was how to encourage local responsibility for improving 
service safety without at the same time reinforcing a ‘blame culture’. 
An essential element of this strategy was therefore to develop an infrastructure through which to use
existing local (provider-level) projects: 
“We see ourselves as facilitating networks, facilitating communities of practice, bringing 
collaborative groups of people together to work across boundaries to look at safety issues 
and being a bit of an honest broker […] around some quite tough kind of challenging safety 
areas, bringing some people together […] to look at things from multiple different lenses” 
(PSCL16). 
To varying extents all PSCs did this. In regions with “less mature” improvement infrastructures, 
PSCs used their resources to directly fund bids for quality improvement initiatives. What varied at 
provider level was the providers’ capacity to fully utilise improvement skills and effectively 
implement them in clinical practice, The form and extent of existing QI and safety activities and 
networks (see above) constrained the scope for adopting the facilitative strategy. A more general 
problem with facilitative strategy was that it muddied the branding of PSC work and their ability to 
attribute its development to (in part) the PSC/AHSN’s own activity. 
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The educative strategy was to train and develop individual ‘change agents’ to introduce or 
implement changed working practices at clinic level, for example by training staff in QI methods. 
Wilson et al.192 list the varieties of relevant training. Some PSC leads described to us a transition 
from ‘Blame culture’ to ‘Just Culture’ to ‘Learning Culture’ to ‘Trusting Culture’ (see Chapter 7). 
“I think there is a level of focus on patient safety that is having an influence […] I think 
there is a culture change going on and I think the patient safety collaboratives definitely part 
of that and gives some support towards you know the direction of travel for that culture 
change" (PSCL10). 
PSC informants tended to think that PSCs could contribute especially at the stage of developing a 
learning culture (Figure 2). 
Figure 2: Culture changes and PSC role
An educative strategy had as its main elements: 
1. Training: Some PSCs cited numbers trained as an outcome measure of success. For example
one PSC lead reported having trained one hundred people in human factors in their first year
with the aim and resources to train a further 2,500 people in the next 18 months in areas 
such as handover; communication; and team working. 
2. Backfilling posts to enable training. Some PSCs offered backfill as well as paying for 
training - for example one PSC offered free human factor training from an external provider 
in order to help develop ‘Safety Champions’ for member organisations in their region. In 
other regions much innovation, drive and enthusiasm for quality improvement work was 
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already happening in pockets, due to passionate and enthusiastic people lending their time 
for free. In regions where sectors such as primary care were under represented or noticeably 
absent in terms of board representation, PSCs sought to fund backfill for staff to attend their 
learning events. However in some cases, workload and patient demand meant that despite 
financial support and incentives, many general practitioners (GP) were still unable to attend.
3. Advocating and facilitating the new appointments at provider level reported in Chapter 6. 
PSCs facilitating the recruitment of new roles and the more rapid recruitment of new roles 
for example through the score survey. 
Typically, though not exclusively, both network and providers relied on training to produce the 
relevant ‘learning’. This represented a narrower conception of ‘learning organisation’ than the PSC 
policy model (see Chapter 2) or the original models of how Collaboratives work (see Chapter 3) 
assumed. This approach tacitly assumed that training people to do QI work would lead to them 
implementing it, and in that way (not least, through the PDSA methods built into that QI work) 
providers would become more like learning organisations. 
The ‘National Priorities’ or ‘Work-streams’ Strategy was for the PSC to focus on activities or care 
groups selected from the ‘wall’ of national priorities as work-streams to focus on and to try to 
balance these choices with local variations in services and healthcare needs. The PSCs tended to 
support new QI projects that had arisen from: 
1. local attempts to implement national policy priorities (e.g. those in the Commissioning for 
Quality and Innovation (CQUIN) framework), and 
2. National policy priorities to develop capacity, leadership and infrastructures at local level, 
including implementation of the new models of care.266 
As a consequence of this national influence similar work streams (e.g. sepsis) developed across 
several PSCs. The PSC ‘Guiding Principles’60 had anticipated a division of labour among PSCs, 
with groups (not all) PSCs specialising on particular safety topics. When it became apparent that 
they were working on the same subject areas, such as sepsis, the PSCs formed ‘clusters’264 to enable
sharing of work and experiences. However NHSI did not see the five clusters as the most effective 
way to do this, and there was no collective understanding of what they were meant to do or achieve.
The clusters were disbanded when NHSI promulgated its three national ‘work-streams’ for PSCs, 
doing so in order to be able to show that the PSCs had impact as a national programme. 
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PSC leads perceived a tension between the three strategies listed above, as NHS England had 
‘tasked’ them with the challenge of balancing national priorities with more local needs:
“We were given quite a lot of width on selecting our local topic areas, but were given very 
strong guidance as to the under – you know the cross-cutting and under-pinning themes like 
capability, culture and leadership and measurement” (PSCL6). 
Organisational leads and front-line staff perceived the same tension:
"That would be like a stick of rock running through my career […]. There is definitely a 
tension there's always been a tension, although I've seen perhaps a little bit of change to that 
[performance driven culture] in the last two years” (PSCFL22). 
One way in which PSC leads did not vary was in being clear from the outset that they wanted to 
shift from a performance-managed “command and control" culture, to a more facilitative educative 
approach:
“We've tried to definitively step away from anything that looks remotely like performance 
management. We think in terms of the role of PSCs and the value that PSCs can add, people 
are performance managed up to the eyeballs really and if performance management was the 
way forward to really deliver higher levels of safety, then we would probably be the safest 
healthcare system in the world” (PSCL16). 
This tension and mixture of pressures also gave PSCs some leeway to develop different balances 
between the three strategies in response to their varying initial background conditions. Across 
England, however, we did not find any PSC whose strategies and activities deliberately and 
explicitly focussed on equality and diversity. The patterns of strategy variation reported above most 
of all reflected their inherited QI and safety activity, but those differences did not in any obvious 
way reflect or correspond to their regions’ distinct socio-economic and ethnic profiles. 
5.c.  Use of resources in PSC activities  
As mentioned before the PSC programme had, an estimated budget of £12 million per annum of 
which some was retained for management and measurement at national level, with £7m going to the
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regional PSC network coordinating bodies. In order to analyse the use of resources in PSC 
activities, we requested data from NHSI on budget allocation per PSC to specific activities. At the 
time of the request NHSI were not able to fulfil this request. We also reviewed each PSC website 
and the available annual reports in order to identify budget allocations to specific activities. We 
looked at our interview transcripts in order to identify opportunity costs. We received budget data at
aggregate level from one PSC. From this information we were not able to make any meaningful 
evaluation of costs and, in financial terms, the health benefits for patients. 
The information available in the websites across PSCs, with respect to the use of resources, was 
heterogeneous. For example some described using funds to set up and run network activities 
themselves, others released money to provide bursaries to conduct MScs and other training courses. 
Others have reported broad splits between priority programme activities (60-86% of annual 
budgets) and the remainder going to administration and supporting staff. It was also clear that some 
of the activities received funds from more than one funder. A clear pathway between money 
received, activities funded and outcomes was impossible to discover from publicly available 
sources including websites and annual reports. 
In interviews some of the PSCs leads expressed the importance of having resources available for 
sending individuals to train in quality improvement but they also contrasted that with the fact that 
due to time pressures trained individuals were in some instances unable to put into practice what 
they had learnt. They saw the availability of such funds as an enabler. On the other hand, a PSC lead
also pointed out that ASHNs were not originally established in order to run the collaboratives, and 
that AHSNs lacked understanding of the role of the PSCs, to the extent of seeing them as “cash 
cows”. This informant was also aware that the time required for people to come and participate in 
PSC activity "all costs something doesn’t it?”. This is an example of an opportunity cost and it is 
likely that these costs will be larger than the explicit budgets. 
The level of funding available varied from PSC to PSC and from financial year to financial year. 
The aggregated data from one PSC illustrates the variation in funding showing a 10% increment in 
level of funding from 2015 to 2016 but a decrease of 30% from 2016 to 2017. PSCs received other 
resources that did not directly follow the flow from the central NHS. In one PSC the largest 
expenditure component within this PSC during 2015 to 2017was the IHI Patient Safety Officer 
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Training. This training element was only partially funded by the PSC, the significant other 
proportion came from other, non-central NHS financial sources. Despite the uncertainty on the level
of funding, expenditure on implementation initiatives increased from 28% in 2015 to 42% of the 
overall PSC budget in 2017; reflecting the initial start-up of costs of the collaboratives.. Among 
these activities, mental health received over 40% of the funding for implementation initiatives; 
these activities were already ongoing when the PSCs formed and the funding went directly from the
PSC budgets’ to continue these projects that had previously been funded from other NHS sources. 
5.d.  What did PSCs do to help providers become learning organisations?  
PSCs’ approach to helping providers become learning organisations was above all through the 
educative strategy noted above; and by attempting to shift providers’, and within them clinical 
teams’, safety climates over a ‘long cycle’. But before PSCs could do either they first had to recruit 
providers into such a project. Because providers participated voluntarily, PSCs had actively to 
‘engage’ potential member-organisations. Hence for a number of PSC leads, in order to solidify 
their place as a necessary link in a chain of inter-organisational networks concerned with quality 
improvement and patient safety, their main aim was to direct their resources towards securing high 
levels of engagement from member organisations: 
“I think it’s engage, engage, engage – you spend a lot of time trying to do as much face-to-
face as possible and of course across the region, that’s quite resource intensive” (PSCL9). 
Policy guidance60 had also emphasised the importance of such engagement. 
5.e.  Engaging the providers  
Several PSC leads pointed to the importance of leadership support for the effective implementation 
of PSCs, i.e. that:
“the [Trust] Board supports the approach and the methodologies etc., and their readiness 
to adopt some innovation for example, it’s got to be right through to the leadership” 
(PSCL15). 
However some PSC leads encountered out-and-out resistance from senior NHS trust management in
the early setup phase:
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"One Chief Executive completely didn't support this vision. He literally said: ‘Everyone 
in my organisation knows improvement […]. This is a waste of money, we don't need to 
do it’" (PSCL1). 
PSC leads were also mindful of the importance of securing a balance in their clinical representation:
“Most of the work that has been done to date with the AHSN improvement work […] 
has been very much focussed on the acute trust sector, so trying to get a balance in our 
clinical representation was difficult" (PSCL6). 
Several PSC leads described the challenges they faced in their attempts to make the PSC relevant to
all types of provider and the importance of adapting their approach depending upon which sectors 
there were looking to engage:
“Our approach differs across sectors - so acute, care homes, […] because in primary care
we need different levers to pull people in and we might engage in different ways” 
(PSCL7). 
Their approach also depended upon how developed or underdeveloped their improvement 
infrastructures were, particularly in primary care:
“At our CCG Primary Care they don’t have the infrastructure that the acute providers 
have. So they don’t have organisational development teams who take a strong leadership
role in this area. So there’s a bit of a disparity between primary and acute and their 
provision really that I think maybe that needs some attention” (PSCL15). 
But the operationally-pressurised organisations identified as most likely to benefit from the PSCs 
were for the same reasons struggling to engage during their set up phase:
“The two [organisations] that hadn’t responded were the two that genuinely needed to. 
But they’re just so deep in trouble that they’re drowning and so therefore they don’t 
know how to engage. […] Those stretched services don’t release people to come to our 
events or they don’t allow people who’ve come back from events that we’re doing to 
actually implement their work [...], now that type of thing is hugely de-motivating and 
it’s not uncommon sadly” (PSCL6). 
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Given the de facto historical emphasis of QI work on acute hospitals, a number of PSCs were keen 
to engage more community care organisations and care homes, general practice and mental health 
sectors during their implementation phase (PSCL16).
The fact that PSCs were launched within dynamic local contexts and were coexisting with multiple 
concurrent improvement initiatives, meant it was important to identify what developmental stage 
their member organisations were at and to adapt their implementation strategy accordingly:
“What is interesting is the different range of maturity between organisations. Some are 
very driven by quality improvement say for example [name] are a Trust who have really 
invested heavily in Lean methodology. [Place] have really invested in patient safety 
champions etc., so some were very skilled before they even came in [to the 
collaborative]” (PSCL15). 
PSC leads were mindful of the importance of making PSCs relevant to the needs of their member 
organisations: 
“Offering them [member organisations] the opportunity […] if you think your weakness 
is measurement here’s some modules in measurement. If you think resilience or 
understanding your culture for safety in your organisation is something you’ve never 
explored you can tap into this. So we didn’t presume everybody could be in the 
collaborative and all came in as equals, we made sure there was a range of other 
opportunities to help their developments” (PSCL15). 
Likewise at the level of leads within provider organisations, many of our interviewees emphasised 
the importance of having an iterative and evolving approach to PSC implementation:
“I wouldn’t say that we set aside objectives, what we constantly have to do is be very 
dynamic in our structures and how we support […] the providers” (PSCOL1). 
Although in practice PSCs each inherited very different conditions by being hosted by their regional
AHSNs, most agreed that this structural arrangement meant PSCs were ideally placed to be “set 
apart from the NHS performance infra-structure” (PSCL11), while being supported to fulfil their 
facilitative and educative role. 
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5.f.  Coordinating clinical teams’ QI work across the member-organisations  
The PSCs’ early attempts at self-definition were broad, not focussed specifically on establishing 
cross-organisational network(s) of clinical teams. As described above, PSCs aimed initially to 
recruit providers to their QI and safety work, and then to recruit clinical teams through them rather 
than directly (and this is not inconsistent with practice in some of the original BSTs; see Chapter 3).
Following this PSCs approached the task of coordinating clinical teams’ QI work across providers 
by setting up a cross-provider, PSC-managed network of teams. Among those who had heard of 
PSCs, they acted as a vital focal point linking experts in academia with hospital staff in order to 
assist them in their QI projects with data collection, analysis, writing and publication. One PSC lead
described a shift from organisation partners being:
“Tribalistic and reluctant to potentially share [to] now we are a new kind of team, we are 
developing really good relationships with these partners and accelerating progress” (PSCL4). 
In relation to overcoming organisational barriers to QI work at provider level (see Chapter 7), PSC 
leads spoke about the importance of building trust and improving relationships through more face-
to-face meetings; of site visits between learning events to understand barriers to patient safety and 
improvement work in context and to help provider organisations to identify any systemic barriers; 
of providing a collaborative learning space to share best practice; and of investing time and effort 
on NHS Trust “board development” in order to ensure good clinical representation, and expert 
leadership through training QI experts or “champions” of this approach. 
Although such work tended to be focused on acute hospitals we found some examples of beneficial 
work in other settings. An example involving primary care teams related to prison health services. A
clinical pharmacist working in mental health reported that the PSCs had helped to identify poor care
and delayed care in prison settings and that the PSCs were beginning to facilitate more collaborative
learning not only through providing network links between healthcare professionals, but through 
linking the NHS with academic expertise in the university sector:
“I think it’s more joined up. It’s more peer review so whereas in the past we probably all did 
little bits of project work, we all did our own thing and that may or may not have come to 
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anything. These do feel like there’s more expertise within the actual network. People that 
come and lead the projects are often experts or are usually experts in the field and have a 
huge amount of international knowledge” (PSCOL6). 
Through this collaborative network which linked the PSC, AHSN, university and community 
mental health sector, the clinical pharmacist was able to co-develop a medicines optimisation 
strategy with medicine safety as one of the elements; to complete a project around cardiac harm 
with antipsychotic drugs; and to look at rapid tranquilisation and its impact on physical health, as 
well as lessons learnt around high risk drugs. 
In another region one of our interviewees reported that QI had become more embedded across 
mental health services and that the PSCs are helping to reduce violent incidents through facilitating 
sharing best practice:
“Using patient safety and QI methodology, they [Trust] developed something called the Four
Steps to Safety, which is a care bundle, which is a package of interventions that, if used 
together and proactively, and with the person and their family or carers, can actually lead to 
a reduction in the levels of violence and aggression on inpatient unit wards” (PSCOL14). 
Using the QI method of testing in one ward first before “scale up and spread”, participants used this
care bundle to share the learning from an inner city mental health hospital and test it a different 
organisation (PSCOL14). In this case implementing changes to policy and practice resulted in 
positive measurements for reducing violent incidents; in turn this was found to reduce the negative 
impact upon staff health.
5.g.  Cross-organisational measurement systems  
NHSE, and later NHSI, have recently attempted to establish and use cross-organisational 
measurement systems by ‘procuring’ a central measurement unit rather than developing ways for 
clinical teams to directly exploit existing NHS-wide datasets, including local data-sets, for QI 
purposes. Had the central measurement system materialised during the study period (it did so only 
towards the end) it would have provided an inter-PSC resource; as it was, the delay meant our 
respondents were uncertain how it would work. Some PSC leads described how they faced delays 
during the setup phase of the PSCs as they needed agreement that AHSNs could access Trust data:
109
“Measurements, data we’re still waiting for the central measurement unit to be procured. 
Well it’s expected to be completed and clearly we haven’t waited you know we’ve got on 
and done things, but actually its NHS data! Give me the data! As an AHSN you don’t have 
access to organisational data. I need to have that overview. How else do we work out what 
the priorities are?” (PSCL15). 
In the meantime PSCs had to rely on Trusts for access to the data that PSCs’ work needed. 
Increasingly during the study period PSCs also created or commissioned ad hoc measurement and 
data-sharing systems, developing for example on-line platforms (e.g. Life QI: 
https://www.swahsn.com/improvement/patient-safety-collaborative/collaborate-life-qi/) for sharing 
project data between clinical teams. 
In addition, and as Chapter 7 explains, many of the PSCs’ member-organisations were at the same 
time trying to surmount the technical barrier of how to measure the PSC’s impact on their own 
operations. Because their own safety measurement systems varied widely, trying to measure 
processes or outcomes in the same ways as the other participating clinical teams did was a recurrent
challenge. Another barrier was that many clinical teams perceived measurement and data collection 
as being predominantly about a “performance culture” and took staff away from their primary role 
of caring for patients. In a community mental health setting a clinical pharmacist described how 
confidentiality was a major disabling factor when it came to sharing information across sectors:
“We don’t share information across sectors because there’s always confidentiality and 
difficulties and you know lots of barriers put up. So sometimes it does feel like we’ve got
to get over another hurdle and another hurdle and another hurdle and you need a huge 
amount of drive and enthusiasm to get over all of those” (PSCOL6). 
Others felt that, it was not so much a performance as a blame climate that was at the heart of much 
“organisational defensiveness” when it came to either a reluctance to share data, or an inability to 
effectively appraise or interrogate their own data. For example one PSC lead described how 
“struggling” organisations were seemingly reluctant to interrogate the data that made them “look 
OK or good”, while being quick to question or criticise the data that made them “look bad”:
“Some organisations get very uptight about their data making them look bad. Rather 
than saying ‘oh that’s interesting we’re not as good as everyone else I wonder why that 
is?’ They want to say ‘well that data can’t be right’ […] every single piece of 
information that made them look bad, they would criticise and say ‘oh that can’t be right
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because this or this can’t be right because of that’. And yet every single piece of data that
made them look OK or good, they never said anything about it at all” (PSCL6). 
To overcome some of these provider level barriers PSC leads relied upon 
1. building trust and improving relationships through more face-to-face meetings; 
2. site visits between learning events so PSC staff could understand barriers to patient safety 
and improvement work in context and to help provider organisations to identify any 
systemic barriers; 
3. providing a collaborative learning space to share best practice; 
4. investing time and effort on Trust “board development” in order to ensure good clinical 
representation of Safety/QI work on Trust Boards, 
5. developing expert leadership through training QI experts or “champions” of this approach. 
5.h.  Context  :  C entral policy and organisations’ support.   
The policy makers’ programme theory for the PSCs (see Chapter 2) explicitly stated two contextual 
conditions for PSC successes. One was continued political backing and available funding for the 
PSC initiative, in particular continued recognition through the system of the importance of the 
Berwick Report. During our study period this support (from NHSE then NHSI) did continue, 
although in the policy arena as well as within NHS provider management it was often, indeed 
increasingly, overshadowed by ‘winter pressures’ on demand for services, funding and staffing 
reported widely across the English NHS. 
A second condition was that in the transfer of the patient safety function to NHS Improvement 
consistency of leadership should be maintained. That did appear to happen, though it came at the 
cost of some delay in setting up the measurement system (see above). However, staff turnover in 
AHSNs and NHS organisations more widely also delayed the setting up of some PSCs,
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Our informants identified a third important condition: sufficient time. PSC leads reported that as 
well as the time needed for member organisations and their staff to engage in training and learning 
events where they could collaborate and share best practice, time was needed for providers’ 
organisational climates to shift from competition, defensiveness and blame towards a culture of co-
operation, collaboration and trust. Even when established QI activities were taking place, PSC-level
informants acknowledged that time (18 months; see above) was needed in order for the PSC to gain 
traction: 
"Driven from the bottom and enabled from the top, at a regional level between and across 
organisations, [… but] that's a 10 year vision not a 3.5 year vision" (PSCL6). 
A poor follow-through to PSCs’ work would risk losing the investment already made within the 
NHS towards building an improvement infrastructure, unless a longer-term investment of time and 
resources continued: 
“How do we help to shift the NHS culturally? […] how do you shift the thinking to a little 
bit more investment in the future, rather than this ‘short term-ism’ that is, you know, train 
and wave people goodbye…” (PSCL9). 
According to PSC leads, such a change in thinking would mean recognising the length of 
improvement cycles:
“There’s no point in us doing any of this if organisations in 5 years time, […] aren’t at the 
point of saying actually we’re going to dedicate capacity you know time and effort to doing 
improvement and try and make it part of everybody’s role” (PSCL1). 
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Chapter 6:  Key findings (2): Organisational level activity in providers 
We now report the organisational changes providers made in response to PSC activity (RQ2) and 
how they made them. Within the provider organisations recruited to participate in the Collaboratives
during the study period, PSC activities in our study sites concentrated on the educative strategy 
mentioned in chapter 5, especially recruiting QI/Safety ‘champions’ and attempting culture change. 
6.a.  Obtaining managerial support  
As we reported in Chapter 5 the preliminary step that PSCs had to take at provider level was to 
obtain senior leadership support because otherwise little would happen:
“Unless the Board supports the approach and the methodologies etc., and their readiness to 
adopt some innovation for example, it’s got to be right through to the leadership” (PSCL15).
According to PSC leads the PSCs’ work depended upon trust managers’ legitimation and the 
resources that trust managers controlled: 
“The idea that you come up with the best process and product in the world that might be the 
absolute silver bullet to improving safety and quality and you might have THE best people 
within that organisation to implement it, but the organisation itself doesn’t give it space and 
endorse it to work so therefore it will fail, whereas in another organisation that’s 
UNBELIEVABLY ambitious but doesn’t have anyone there to implement the tool might fail,
but for very different reasons” (PSCL6, original emphasis). 
Senior managers’ support also helped legitimise the PSC’s intended activities: 
“If you’ve got attention from your leaders and the policymakers, then people are more likely
to take notice and think, ‘oh, this isn’t a fad, this isn’t going away, this isn’t just a couple of 
strange people over there that speak a different language that are just on the latest 
bandwagon. This is serious!’” (PSC0L14). 
PSC leads regarded senior managers’ endorsement and support as a prerequisite for any quality 
improvement to become fully embedded in the healthcare system. 
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As we reported in Chapter 5 some senior managers were resistant to PSCs in the early setup phase. 
Even when obtained, endorsement by senior managers did not guarantee middle management 
support: 
“People lack support, I think, from board to floor to implement this and we know the 
middle-layers are often quite difficult to shift their thinking around some of this. You know 
performance culture gets in the way of trying to enable people to take time and use a 
systematic and very rigorous approach to improvement” (PSCL9). 
In some instances, chief executives and senior managers who had attended PSC learning events and 
been initially receptive and enthused by the training, were described as ‘reverting to type’ once they
returned to their day-to-day roles; that is, switching their priorities and those of their staff as they 
again confronted day-to-day operational pressures.
Immediate working environment were seen to play a significant role in the uptake and receptivity of
improvement work: 
“We have this ‘lip service leadership support’ […] The senior leaders engaged really well 
with the quality improvement training for themselves, but when they went back to have 
those conversations with their teams, they reverted to type in terms of ‘I’m an executive why
are you working on this? Does that line up with our organisational priorities?’ […] because 
the TDA are giving me a hard time about it” (PSCL1). 
In some instances staff reported returning from PSC training sessions and being asked by their 
managers to focus on issues that the TDA were aware of rather than on any ottom-up improvement 
initiatives. 
However PSCs also facilitated the appointment of new quality and safety roles within their member 
organisations (levels 2 and 3). The appointment of a “serious incident investigator” was cited in one
case and in another, a “sepsis compliance assistant” role was created, whilst a falls specialist nurse 
described how “falls champions” were introduced in order to maintain momentum on a falls 
specific QI project. Through conducting SCORE surveys (see Chapter 7) PSCs facilitated the rapid 
recruitment of more staff within crowded hospital settings following the survey debriefing sessions. 
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6.b.  Organisational changes  
Our fieldwork lasted two years and during this period policy uncertainty, as well as regulatory and 
organisational changes, continued. In two of our three PSC regions that were our main study sites, 
for example, trust mergers took place over this period. 
6.b.i.  General practice
In another PSC the collapse and subsequent merger of four general practices across five sites 
provided a unique opportunity to rewrite all policy documents and protocols from scratch. Having 
attended a PSC funded “Patient Safety Officers’ course,” the senior practice partner and his 
colleagues used concepts and tools from this training to completely redesign their service:
“It [PSC] has totally rewritten it [practice policy] and again we’re very fortuitous [sic.], in 
the time that we’ve engaged with the patient safety collaborative, is the time that we’ve 
redesigned the service” (PSCOL4). 
This group rewrote 160 practice policies on topics including infection control, prescribing methods, 
patient demand and flow, nursing registrations; appraisals, communication, leadership and 
teamwork. They did this with the PSC model in mind but adapted each policy to meet local needs:
“Every single one of those has been thought through, documented, educated the staff and 
embedded in the way that you work […]The whole principle of building teams and gaining 
efficiencies and communicating between teams, which is at the core of the patient safety 
collaborative, is pretty much embedded in all of the new structures that we’ve created” 
(PSCOL4). 
Nine months earlier the practice had carried out its first SCORE survey, at a time when staff were 
adapting to their new organisation. The initial survey results proved highly effective and timely in 
enabling this GP and colleagues “to identify groups that were in particular need of attention,” as 
well as areas that needed addressing, such as more regular appraisals and self-audit, taking the time 
to listen to staff; ensuring each staff member knew who his or her line manager was, and that they 
felt comfortable in approaching them should any problems arise, and bringing in new measurements
and ensuring staff were confident and fully trained in their use:
“People are still going through that change cycle and some have got there. All the GPs on 
the first survey scored brilliantly because […] they each had a project that they were driving 
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along and they were fully engaged. We’ve slowly brought the rest of the teams along by 
trying to explain why and what we’re doing and they can actually be part of it and what 
would they like to do to make it better. I think the biggest hindering is just the pressure” 
(PSCOL4). 
Following the merger, patient demand and communication across teams, as well as “leadership into 
the team” were identified as the biggest challenges: 
“the only reason it’s really worked is because the core group of 11 GPs are all young. They 
all get on and they have a very clear vision and there’s no, there’s no conflict at the top.” 
(PSCOL4). 
The PSC’s ability to support organisational change in general practice was in this case related to the
timing of the merger, which meant that everything aligned for the successful implementation of the 
PSC model. 
In another general practice (this time in an inner-city setting), staff had taken part in a SCORE 
survey and completed two rounds and debriefs by the time we interviewed them. According to this 
practice partner:
“The staff got a chance to really think about the structure of the team here at [general 
practice], and with the amount of questions that they had to answer […] Looking at the 
results, when they came along, when we did have our two sessions [debriefs] with the teams,
everybody was pleasantly surprised […] It was really nice to really analyse who we are in 
that much detail, and I think by the end of that exercise, it really boosted the morale of the 
team here” (PSCOL12). 
Following the survey this practice implemented a handover booklet to record and date information 
that colleagues could check daily in order to improve communication among the senior team. They 
began recording data more fully and applying a greater depth of analysis to events judged to be 
significant events, either through a written report or a meeting with minutes, and a clear action plan.
Although in this case the overall survey results were positive, the practice partner was nevertheless 
keen to ensure they continued:
“To look for ways to improve and we keep that open level of communication and the no 
blame culture going and the sense of one team going, because I think that is very important 
here, and it makes a huge difference.” (PSCOL12). 
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Of these examples where PSCs influenced general practice organisation, one occurred when the 
conditions were ripe for change (a practice merger), and one in a high- performing practice that was
already embracing innovation and might therefore be viewed as exceptional or exemplary rather 
than representative. According to a practice partner and CCG clinical chair from another region the 
overall impact of PSCs in primary care has yet to be seen: 
“I’m not aware of any changes in outcomes for patients yet which is of course what we 
really want to be seeing, but the safety markers are improving in the right direction and 
patients are more safe in environments which they have to be in hospitals now” (PSCOL8). 
Our CCG informants mostly felt that the Collaborative method might not translate from secondary 
to primary care settings:
“I think it’s had a massive impact on secondary care. I think the problem with primary care 
is that if you try and translate any of that into primary care, it doesn’t read across because all
of the safety issues are not safety issues that they’re familiar with” (PSCOL2). 
We were told that if there was to be significant impact in primary care from the PSCs, the 
operational pressures of rising patient demand and work load had to be surmounted. Despite this, 
our informants felt the will was there:
“One of the things that we need to have and practices would like, is the tools and the 
knowledge and the evidence-base and the facilitators to help them make further strides in 
quality improvement because actually they want to do it, it’s just creating the opportunity in 
the working week to put it into practise” (PSCOL8). 
Provider leads reported that despite needing more time, PSCs were beginning to engage provider 
organisations, facilitate learning through networking groups and affect strategy. For example one 
participant from a CCG described: “seeing organisations willingly deciding to join the patient safety
Collaboratives and embedding the care bundles into the way that they normally work” (PSCOL2). 
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6.b.ii.  Hospitals 
Changes were also reported in hospitals. As an example of changed clinical practice attributable to 
the PSCs one respondent said that “early warning scores to help identify deteriorating patients” 
(PSCOL7) were now being used throughout her hospital:
“The early warning scores and things like that that are all used now throughout the Trust and
have become a big part of our work, I believe that they came from the PSC so yes, I would 
say that they have changed clinical practice. […] From a safety point of view then you know
that’s had quite an impact in terms of identifying these patients early and ultimately that 
saves lives” (PSCOL7). 
We heard reports that “huge inroads” are being made in the collaborative work streams around acute
kidney injury, are around sepsis through the implementation of more standardised procedures 
around diagnosis, treatment and teamwork:
“I’m not seeing from case note review’s deaths from sepsis in the way that I used to […] If I 
look at the work that we’re doing around acute kidney injury, we’re not getting as many 
significant AKI flags as we were. It’s still work in progress. It’s not perfect. It’s not zero yet, 
but you know, we’ve made huge inroads” (PSCOL3). 
6.b.iii.  Community and mental health services
In community mental health services, one quality and safety programme lead was confident that 
PSCs were already changing culture and climates by embedding structured policies and procedures 
for safety and health delivery:
“In all of the work stream areas we’ve seen processes and systems become more reliable. 
We’ve seen changes in culture within organisations going from having no framework and 
quality improvement to it becoming business as usual [...] We’ve seen safety becoming a key
priority of the board [...] we’ve seen reduction in harm in key areas, […] building capability.
You know we’ve got a little army of people that can talk about QI now and a will! A real 
will to keep coming in and learning how to do it.” (PSCOL1). 
Another respondent, who worked as a community mental health manager, thought that PSCs had 
informed their clinical risk strategy but had yet to impact their front-line services. 
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A clinical pharmacist working in mental health reported that the PSCs had helped to identify poor 
care and delayed care in the context of prison settings and that they were beginning to facilitate 
collaborative learning not only by providing more network links between healthcare professionals 
but by linking the NHS with expertise from universities. This collaborative network developed the 
medicines optimisation strategy reported in Chapter 5. 
The perception that the PSCs focus and work streams may not fit all care settings, led some to 
disengage and dismiss the PSCs as irrelevant. Others were keen to take the initiative and seize the 
opportunities which they saw represented in PSCs, adapting them to local need and different care 
settings:
“If you just keep speaking to people and try and harvest their ideas, you can come up with 
new things to do and offer to them and some people will run with it and some people won’t” 
(PSCOL2). 
In one PSC region informants told us that the PSCs are helping to “forge a more holistic approach” 
to care in mental health services, through adapting the learning from the hospitals around the 
“physical health agenda” and applying it to mental health:
“We've been able to take some really tangible learning from the acute setting, but then apply 
it to our patient population and say, just because you happen to have a label that you've got a
mental health condition, doesn't actually exclude the rest of you from suffering the same 
risks and issues as the general population [...] and actually trying to address that real 
inequality, we've got people actually, as I say, dying up to 20 years sooner than your average 
population” (PSCOL14). 
Though it was still early in the period for which PSCs were funded, we were able to see evidence of
PSC implementation and engagement, leading to tangible changes at the organisational level in 
healthcare providers. PSCs were providing a blueprint for organisational change and service 
redesign in general practice; sharing best practice across a number of health care settings leading to 
more standardised streamlined care; helping to facilitate learning and to build network links 
between the NHS and the universities leading to a number of QI projects and publications. PSCs 
were either directly funding improvement initiatives, or funding them indirectly by funding 
organisations to free up staff time to allow implementation, as in the case of the ED checklist. PSCs 
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implementing the SCORE safety culture survey as an intervention tool to help improve safety 
climate at clinical team level (see Chapter 7). 
6.c.  Developing safety culture and climate  
As we described in Chapter 5, the tensions between the three parallel PSC strategies re-appeared 
within providers at both the whole-organisational and the clinical team (front-line staff) levels. 
Many informants saw a ‘performance culture’ as the main barrier to improvement work and as 
being in conflict with the PSC approach. However leads within some provider organisations 
reported that the PSCs had begun to shift things away from a performance driven approach towards 
a facilitative and/or educational approach: 
“Because the focus is around patient safety and improving outcomes and experience for 
people, it's really shifting, I suppose, from that ‘command and control’, everything being 
performance driven, to actually moving to a more kind of shared understanding of what that 
performance data is telling you” (PSCOL14). 
Another description of this change was as a shift from a ‘blame’ to a ‘just’ culture: 
“This whole idea about ‘blame’ versus ‘just culture’ I think is the thing that I’m watching the
shift in. So it’s very difficult to say you’ve got no blame because at the end of the day either 
somebody or some process has gone wrong. So there is somebody to blame. So it might be 
the organisation or an individual that’s been let down by the organisation. But equally if the 
culture isn’t ‘Just’ enough, then sometimes when genuinely an individual has made a 
mistake, they don’t feel that they can step forward and say they’ve done wrong […] the 
whole point is you’ve got to feel confident that you’re going to be treated appropriately 
when you do confess to something.” […] “That’s a Just culture rather than a no-blame 
culture” (PSCL6). 
In community mental health setting, a quality and safety programme lead was confident PSCs were 
already changing culture through embedding more structured policies and procedures for safety and
health delivery (see above). In her account, cultures change was represented by concurrent learning,
changes in working practices, and that people ‘can talk about QI now’. 
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6.d.  Becoming learning organisations?  
Policy statements about PSCs (Chapter 1) invoked the idea of each NHS provider becoming a 
‘learning organisation’, implicitly drawing upon an underlying learning organisation literature 
(Chapter 2). What did this mean in practice? 
6.d.i.  Champions 
PSCs saw QI experts - also referred to as “champions”, or “change agents” - as vital for PSC 
implementation and necessary at every organisational level. Having clinical leaders in that role was 
especially valuable:
“I think champions are key […] the seniors here, of doctors and nurses, helps the positive 
mind-set and culture, this is important work […] having a champion among the HCA tier, a 
champion among the receptionists, among the band 7 nurses and several among the 
consultants and middle grades to permeate through is key” (PSCFL1). 
Champions were important not just to engage, motivate and educate staff, but to help support and 
implement learning post-training. For example one interviewee described being funded to undertake
fund quality and safety improvement training. Initially course participants would meet up 
“once a month or once every 2 months to talk about all the great work we do. But it’s kind of
fizzled out” (PSCFL14). 
By contrast, another respondent described how in her department: 
“champions help keep the momentum going on the projects” (PSCFL12). 
And another acknowledged this need for expert leadership: 
“You need people continually pushing those changes, otherwise people just kind of, 
typically would resort back to the norm” (PSCFL15).
According to PSC leads, a key facilitator for PSC implementation was for QI to become embedded. 
In order to promote grass-roots change, it would be necessary for staff to take ownership of a given 
QI project, and this would mean educating them and engaging them more fully in QI activity. This 
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had been happening in pockets: over the last three years QI has become more formally embedded, 
being incorporated into more foundation year medical curricula: 
“Quality improvement is now embedded into quite a few of the curriculums so trainees […] 
have the experience of projects - both successful and unsuccessful projects […] and it will 
embed itself, so there will be less of a need for a top-down approach” (PSCFL17). 
Although some registrars and consultants are beginning to incorporate quality improvement as part 
of their appraisals and career progression, this is still patchy; a care home practitioner put it to use 
that QI could not be considered “fully embedded” until it was incorporated across more sectors and 
in specialisms such as nursing:
“I don’t think quality improvement is embedded until nurses need it, if that makes sense, but
it's not day-to-day. It's not seen as part of our jobs, unfortunately”(PSCFL23). 
One consistent finding for successfully embedding QI activity was having not just champions at 
every level, but champions with certain qualities of leadership: 
“having really enthusiastic seniors has made a huge influence and created a massive impact”
(PSCFL16). 
Our informants emphasised that having passionate and committed leaders who could enable teams 
to feel valued and empowered to either speak up, or to suggest areas for change, was beneficial for 
QI activity. 
6.d.ii.  Training and its Aftermath
PSCs had aimed to support, facilitate and educate the staff in NHS providers in order to promote a 
more learning culture. PSCs interpreted their educative strategies as involving, above all, PSCs 
taking on an “educative” role of training leaders to become champions, change agents and QI 
experts. But this was not intended to stop with the champions: the PSCs also tended to equate 
‘learning’ with ‘training courses’, or specifically mass training. In the early stages of the PSC 
implementation several PSC leads cited levels of engagement e.g. in learning events, as an 
important measure of their success. 
“I think the success has been the engagement and the traction […], raising awareness of the 
PSC -I think that’s been really good” (PSCL7). 
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Training was being provided but it was unclear what happened afterwards. PSC leads felt strongly 
that to engage member organisations and train staff in QI methodology without any support post 
training, was a "waste of clinical hearts” (PSCL9):
“When we ran our six days, people were so enthusiastic and all that energy, all that 
excitement around patient care and you can just lose it in a blink of an eye if there’s not 
support back in practice, because they go, they train and then they say: ‘this happens every 
time we get sent on things you know to learn new skills and knowledge and then we go back
and there’s nobody to help us do it!’ [...] I think that is shocking for the Health Service” 
(PSCL9). 
Several Patient Safety Collaborative leads emphasised that QI is a “developmental process” and that
failing to understand this leads to a failure to implement:
“We have a lot of people who go onto courses and FAIL to implement because of a lack of 
understanding that it’s a developmental process quality improvement. You learn and learn by
doing it [...] we still have this approach that if you go and train in it and then people can go 
out and do it and that for me is the most disappointing bit and the unintended consequence 
of that is it turns people off quality improvement” (PSCL9). 
Without the necessary support in place post training, several PSC leads voiced their reluctance to 
engage in an “endless role of training:” 
“We can’t just deliver a piece of training to a bunch of people and then send them off into 
the world, we’ve got to continue to provide a framework and a structure” (PSCL1). 
Front-line staff needed support structures but were often hindered in their ability to implement 
improvement initiatives because their workload was too high or because of staff turnover and work 
schedules including the requirements of routine rotations. PSC leads recognised the various factors 
resulting in poor follow-through meant they would risk losing the investment made in the NHS 
towards building an improvement infrastructure. As we noted at the end of Chapter 5, they 
repeatedly voiced the need for a longer-term investment of time and resources (see also Section e.ii 
below). Nevertheless, according to some provider-level leads, the PSCs were beginning to have an 
impact on learning through their online sources as well as social media, in that when a person was 
unable to attend any learning event, they could still access it online, collaborate and share best 
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practice. However most felt it was still early days in terms of the PSCs overall impact, particularly 
in primary care: 
“I mean really it’s [PSCs] an easy resource to tap into and I’m sure these improvement 
facilitators will start to make the difference. But for us [CCG] they only came on line 
probably in post, less than 6 months so you know, you can’t see any particular outcome from
that as yet” (PSCOL8). 
6.e.  Contexts: Obstacles to PSC work at provider level  
6.e.i.  Operational pressures 
Although they aspired to the Berwick vision of a system devoted to continual learning and 
improvement of patient care ‘top to bottom and end to end,’ PSC leads were equally mindful that, 
until such a system was in place, those on the front-line would be inevitably pulled in many 
directions. Informants at all levels in our study made this point: 
“Operational pressures are so intense at the moment within emergency departments 
[…].That really impacts upon our ability to innovate and deliver some of the things that 
we’d really love to be doing. […] The department is constantly crowded, so […] it seems 
like we’re just adding insult to injury by asking people to get involved in more to a degree of
sort of innovative projects” (PSCFL1). 
These operational pressures and time constraints were major disabling factors for PSC 
implementation:
“Whenever we go into a particularly tense or difficult period of time on a performance basis,
so we might slip into these sort of high escalation black alert periods, all of the safety and 
quality meetings […] are cancelled” (PSCL6). 
“Smaller organisations say we’re only allowed to send one person because the organisation’s
under so much pressure and it’s particularly evident if they are under the cosh of NHS 
England for their performance. So I would say that was a barrier” (PSCL5). 
In order to see any significant impact from the PSCs, these pressures would have to be surmounted. 
Nevertheless, our informants felt that staff would be willing to do this:
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“One of the things that we need to have and [general] practices would like, is the tools and 
the knowledge and the evidence-base and the facilitators to help them make further strides in
quality improvement because actually they want to do it, it’s just creating the opportunity in 
the working week to put it into practise” (PSCOL8). 
6.e.ii.  Enough time
Within providers, as well as at inter-provider (PSC network) level, time was required for the 
learning to be put into practice and then to take effect. Our informants contrasted ‘short term-ism’ 
with the time needed for improvement cycles. Even when time was allocated and approved for staff 
to attend a learning event, many staff felt unable to leave their front-line duties:
“We had an event [...] there was a lot of interest and the pressure in the system is so intense 
that people were saying: “I can’t, I can’t come. I want to come. I’ve got approval to come, 
but I can’t do it to my colleagues. I can’t come out when I know there’s no backfill, there’s 
no agency” (PSCL11). 
Indeed the time-stretched organisations identified as most likely to benefit from the PSCs were for 
those very reasons struggling to engage with PSCs initially. The challenge of how to free up staff 
time and capacity for engaging in improvement work was:
“hindered primarily about I think the perception that it’s an add-on, rather than improvement
being you know, your day-to-day work. So we hear a lot of ‘I just have to go back to the day
job’ ” (PSCL9). 
Although PSC leads believed that QI work could in the long term free up capacity by enabling more
efficient, streamlined working, they were equally clear that such a vision would require that QI 
become fully embedded across the health-care system, rather than added to already busy workloads:
“I guess it’s just time. Time for people on the ground to be able to dedicate to it. Time, I 
mean people are doing this sometimes as part of their existing day job and the demands on 
them are quite high” (PSCL12). 
Nevertheless, both hospitals and general practices reported efforts to “ring fence” time for quality 
improvement and safety work: 
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“We’ve ring fenced every nurse which is about 40 people for one whole morning every 6 
weeks - that’s a pattern that we are trying to embed into the way that we work. There’s 
regular appraisals, there’s regular feedback, there’s regular training and properly protected 
training for our staff” (PSCOL4). 
Three different time requirements are implicit in the above accounts: 
1. Allowing individual staff members enough time in their ‘day job’ to accommodate learning 
events and then the subsequent activities (see Chapter 7) necessary to put what they have 
learnt into QI and safety-management practice. 
2. Continuing the Collaboratives long enough firstly for the providers to set themselves up to 
participate, and then for repeated cycles of PDSA and other QI activities to take place at 
clinical team level. 
3. Continuing the Collaboratives long enough to enable them to recruit into their activities both
the ‘early adopter’ parts of the providers who first joined the network, and the ‘late adopter’ 
organisations and services who were slower to. 
6.e.iii.  Staff turnover
Strengthening safety culture and climate was a key linkage in the policy-makers’ programme theory
for PSCs (see chapter 1). Culture and climate, however, are embodied in the individuals working for
an organisation. Staff turnover (‘natural wastage’) would therefore also have an effect on an 
organisation’s safety culture and climate, positive or adverse depending on whether it was resistant 
or supportive of staff who left. For leads within provider organisations, the size of the organisation 
or department, as well as the culture of the organisation – particularly in terms of leadership and 
engagement - were seen as critical in terms of the receptivity for change and the timescale needed 
for effective change to occur: 
“The size of the organisation or department will depend on how quickly you can change. So 
I think the legacy of it [the PSCs] in five years, will depend on how much people have 
engaged and what the organisation was to start with. Because I know for example [hospital 
name], to try and change the culture there, even in one department, I reckon 20 years! 
Because you’re going to have to have certain key people who either move on, or there’s got 
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to be a wholesale change in the way the whole place is managed. A practice like ours, in the 
organisation with 32,000 people and 100 staff, I reckon in 2 years we’ll have it 80% of the 
way to having a really good working environment. So it largely depends on how much 
people buy into it and how big the organisation is and how fruitful the ground is.” 
(PSCOL4). 
These contexts raise the question of what impact are PSCs having at the front-line of services. Next 
we report what changes there were to clinical teams’ working practices. 
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Chapter 7:  Key findings (3): Changed safety climate and working practices
Policy makers’ programme theory for PSCs (Chapter 1) proposed that by becoming learning 
organisations, providers would strengthen the safety climate of clinical teams, and this would lead 
to changes in working practices on the front-line of services (see RQ5). Those changes would then 
make a detectable difference on rates of harm and adverse events involving patients as measured 
using routine data (see RQ4). 
7.a.  Safety culture or climate at clinical team level  
We had three types of evidence available to indicate whether such changes in safety climate at 
clinical team level had occurred: the SCORE survey; secondary data from the NHS patient survey; 
and qualitative data. 
7.a.i.  SCORE survey
A first round of surveys was conducted across 72 sites, unevenly distributed across 6 PSCs. 36 sites 
were general practices, 13 were acute hospital wards (including maternity, paediatrics), and 9 were 
mental health wards. There were three ICUs, one emergency department, seven other hospital 
departments and one CCG. As noted, by the time of writing just six sites had completed a second-
round survey: three general practices, a mental health trust pharmacy, an emergency department and
a medical admission unit. The numbers of individual respondents in each site ranged from 9 to 151. 
On the whole we found little evidence of a difference in safety climate scores between first and 
second SCORE surveys. Site by site there was little change in the learning environment, personal 
burnout, teamwork, safety climate and work-life balance domains; in all sites but one there was no 
significant change in the local leadership and burnout climate scores. The exception to this pattern 
was that in one general practice we found some evidence of a difference in the local leadership 
(table 7) and burnout climate (table 8) scores. In that site average local leadership scores were 
higher, and burnout climate scores lower, in the second survey compared to the first. 
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Table 7: Summary statistics for person-level scores on the local leadership domain of the SCORE 
survey.
LOCAL LEADERSHIP 
DOMAIN
First survey Second survey p-value
Number
completed
Mean (SD)
score
Number
completed
Mean (SD)
score
Hospital A: ED 110 57.5 (26.3) 150 52.3 (28.8) 0.1
Hospital A: MAU 83 59.4 (25.9) 95 59.7 (30.4) 0.9
General practice D 56 54.1 (27.9) 69 62.5 (26.4) 0.1
General practice E 13 65.6 (28.7) 9 78.6 (21.2) 0.2
General practice F 36 45.2 (26.3) 28 63.6 (31.2) 0.01
Pharmacy G 13 87.4 (16.2) 13 74.5 (23.4) 0.1
MAU = Medical Assessment Unit 
Table 8: Summary statistics for person-level scores on the burnout climate domain of the SCORE 
survey.
BURNOUT CLIMATE 
DOMAIN
First survey Second survey p-value
Number
completed
Mean (SD)
score
Number
completed
Mean (SD)
score
Hospital A: ED 113 69.9 (21.7) 151 73.9 (20.3) 0.1
Hospital A: MAU 84 72.7 (19.4) 96 72.1 (20.9) 0.8
General practice D 59 70.8 (19.2) 69 66.0 (20.7) 0.2
General practice E 13 50.6 (26.3) 9 58.9 (21.0) 0.4
General practice F 36 67.1 (21.1) 29 52.2 (23.9) 0.01
Pharmacy G 13 67.3 (16.2) 13 57.3 (19.1) 0.2
Across all the sites and domains, only four of the mean person-level scores were in the first survey 
above eighty percent (see Appendix 7). The fact that most mean scores were below eighty percent 
whilst four were above suggests that it is unlikely that a ‘ceiling effect’ was the reason why scores 
in the second survey were, with the above exceptions, not significantly higher. 
 
7.a.ii.  NHS Staff Survey 
For the period 2013-16 we analysed the four elements in the NHS staff survey relevant to some of 
the aspects of workplace safety climate that the PSCs were trying to influence, specifically: 
1. Improvement: staff feeling able to contribute to improvements in their area of work.
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2. Managers: support from immediate managers.
3. Errors: fairness and effectiveness of procedures for reporting errors, near misses and 
incidents. 
4. Recommendation: staff recommendation of the organisation as a place to work or receive 
treatment. 
Comparison of key findings across years, among all trusts, showed evidence of a small increase in 
mean response in 2015 and 2016, compared to 2014 (Table 9). The mean percentage of staff 
reporting that they felt able to contribute to improvements in their organisation was estimated to 
increase by 2.24% (95% confidence interval (CI) for increase 1.69% to 2.79%) from 2014 to 2016. 
Mean responses on the other key findings showed evidence of small improvements in 2015 and 
2016, compared to 2014. 
Table 9: Comparisons of key findings across years, across all AHSNs.
Outcome Mean (SD)* Mean difference**
estimate 95% CI p-value
Percentage of staff able to contribute 
to improvements
2013 68.30 (3.93) -0.05 -0.60 to 0.50
<0.001
2014 68.35 (4.03)
2015 70.25 (3.69) 1.90 1.36 to 2.45
2016 70.59 (3.65) 2.24 1.69 to 2.79
Mean level of support from immediate 
managers
2013 3.65 (0.09) -0.01 -0.02 to 0.003
<0.001
2014 3.66 (0.10)
2015 3.72 (0.09) 0.06 0.04 to 0.07
2016 3.74 (0.08) 0.08 0.07 to 0.10
Mean level of fairness and 
effectiveness of procedures for 
reporting errors
2013 3.52 (0.09) -0.02 -0.03 to -0.01
<0.001
2014 3.54 (0.09)
2015 3.71 (0.10) 0.17 0.16 to 0.18
2016 3.73 (0.09) 0.19 0.18 to 0.20
Mean level of recommendation as a 
place to work or receive treatment
2013 3.71 (0.24) 0.004 -0.016 to 0.024 <0.001
2014 3.70 (0.24)
2015 3.78 (0.20) 0.08 0.06 to 0.10
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2016 3.79 (0.19) 0.09 0.07 to 0.11
*From raw data.
**Compared to 2014. From model including year of survey.
 Results from sensitivity analyses, which included all trusts that reported for some or all of the four 
years, were very similar (Table 10). In general, from analyses based on trusts within all AHSNs, 
mean responses on key findings remained stable from 2013 to 2014, and then increased in 2015 and
2016. Because the key findings were stable across the first two years, we can be more confident that
improvements in 2015 and 2016, compared to 2014 may be attributed to the PSCs. 
Table 10: Comparisons of key findings across years: sensitivity analysis based on all trusts that 
reported for some or all years, across all AHSNs.
Outcome Mean (SD)* Mean difference**
estimate 95% CI p-value
Percentage of staff able to contribute 
to improvements
2013 68.34 (3.90) -0.11 -0.65 to 0.43
<0.001
2014 68.44 (4.05)
2015 70.26 (3.67) 1.84 1.30 to 2.38
2016 70.59 (3.63) 2.17 1.62 to 2.71
Mean level of support from immediate 
managers
2013 3.65 (0.09) -0.01 -0.02 to 
0.002
<0.0012014 3.66 (0.10)
2015 3.72 (0.09) 0.06 0.04 to 0.07
2016 3.74 (0.08) 0.08 0.07 to 0.09
Mean level of fairness and 
effectiveness of procedures for 
reporting errors
2013 3.52 (0.09) -0.02 -0.03 to -0.01
<0.001
2014 3.54 (0.09)
2015 3.71 (0.10) 0.17 0.16 to 0.18
2016 3.73 (0.09) 0.19 0.18 to 0.20
Mean level of recommendation as a 
place to work or receive treatment
2013 3.70 (0.24) 0.003 -0.02 to 0.02
<0.001
2014 3.70 (0.24)
2015 3.78 (0.20) 0.08 0.06 to 0.10
2016 3.79 (0.19) 0.09 0.07 to 0.11
*From raw data.
**Compared to 2014. From model including year of survey.
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We repeated the analysis specifically for our case-study AHSNs. Comparisons of findings across 
years, among the trusts in AHSN Alpha similarly showed evidence of an increase in mean response 
in the years 2015 and 2016, compared to 2014, and indicated that responses were stable across 2013
and 2014. For example, the percentage of staff who felt able to contribute to improvements in their 
workplace was estimated to be 4.67% (95% CI for increase 2.03% to 7.30%) higher in 2015 and 
5.33% (95% CI for increase 2.70% to 7.97%) higher in 2016, than in 2014 (Table 11). 
Table 11: Comparisons of key findings across years, based on six trusts that reported for all years, 
within AHSN Alpha.
Outcome Mean (SD)* Mean difference**
estimate 95% CI p-value
Percentage of staff able to contribute 
to improvements
2013 66.50 (5.28) 0.33 -2.30 to 2.97
<0.001
2014 66.17 (6.21)
2015 70.83 (4.92) 4.67 2.03 to 7.30
2016 71.50 (5.39) 5.33 2.70 to 7.97
Mean level of support from immediate 
managers
2013 3.65 (0.10) -0.01 -0.06 to 0.05
<0.001
2014 3.65 (0.13)
2015 3.75 (0.10) 0.10 0.05 to 0.15
2016 3.80 (0.09) 0.15 0.10 to 0.20
Mean level of fairness and 
effectiveness of procedures for 
reporting errors
2013 3.49 (0.09) 0.01 -0.04 to 0.06
<0.001
2014 3.48 (0.09)
2015 3.65 (0.12) 0.17 0.12 to 0.22
2016 3.68 (0.10) 0.20 0.15 to 0.26
Mean level of recommendation as a 
place to work or receive treatment
2013 3.66 (0.29) 0.06 -0.05 to 0.17
0.03
2014 3.60 (0.35)
2015 3.75 (0.26) 0.15 0.04 to 0.26
2016 3.76 (0.21) 0.15 0.04 to 0.26
*From raw data.
**Compared to 2014. From model including year of survey.
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AHSN Beta showed evidence of a difference in level of fairness and effectiveness of reporting 
errors across years. The mean response to this key finding was stable across 2013 and 2014, and 
was estimated to be 0.17 points higher (95% CI for increase 0.10 to 0.24) in 2015 and 2016, 
compared to 2014. There was some evidence of an increase in 2015 and 2016, compared to 2014, in
the percentage of staff feeling able to contribute to improvements, but little evidence of differences 
in the other two key findings across the years (Table 12). 
Table 12: Comparisons of key findings across years, based on nine trusts that reported for all years,
within AHSN Beta.
Outcome Mean (SD)* Mean difference**
estimate 95% CI p-value
Percentage of staff able to contribute 
to improvements
2013 69.22 (4.06) -0.78 -4.06 to 2.51
0.05
2014 70.00 (3.57)
2015 73.67 (3.20) 3.67 0.38 to 6.95
2016 71.44 (4.77) 1.44 -1.84 to 4.73
Mean level of support from immediate 
managers
2013 3.70 (0.10) -0.03 -0.10 to 0.04
0.1
2014 3.73 (0.10)
2015 3.76 (0.11) 0.03 -0.04 to 0.11
2016 3.77 (0.09) 0.05 -0.02 to 0.12
Mean level of fairness and 
effectiveness of procedures for 
reporting errors
2013 3.56 (0.10) -0.02 -0.09 to 0.05
<0.001
2014 3.58 (0.08)
2015 3.75 (0.11) 0.17 0.10 to 0.24
2016 3.75 (0.11) 0.17 0.10 to 0.24
Mean level of recommendation as a 
place to work or receive treatment
2013 3.78 (0.29) -0.02 -0.14 to 0.10
0.8
2014 3.80 (0.26)
2015 3.84 (0.21) 0.04 -0.08 to 0.16
2016 3.81 (0.22) 0.02 -0.10 to 0.14
*From raw data.
**Compared to 2014. From model including year of survey.
In AHSN Gamma there was evidence of an increase in level of support from immediate managers, 
fairness and effectiveness of procedures for reporting errors and recommendation as a place to work
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or receive treatment, in 2015 and 2016, compared to 2014. These outcomes were stable across 2013
and 2014 (Table 13). 
Table 13: Comparisons of key findings across years, based on 10 trusts that reported for all years, 
in AHSN Gamma.
Outcome Mean (SD)* Mean difference**
estimate 95% CI p-value
Percentage of staff able to contribute 
to improvements
2013 70.00 (3.06) 1.40 -0.67 to 3.47
0.4
2014 68.60 (3.95)
2015 69.70 (2.63) 1.10 -0.97 to 3.17
2016 70.10 (3.45) 1.50 -0.57 to 3.57
Mean level of support from immediate 
managers
2013 3.62 (0.11) 0.005 -0.05 to 0.06
0.004
2014 3.62 (0.09)
2015 3.69 (0.06) 0.08 0.02 to 0.13
2016 3.70 (0.08) 0.08 0.03 to 0.14
Mean level of fairness and 
effectiveness of procedures for 
reporting errors
2013 3.53 (0.10) -0.003 -0.05 to 0.05
<0.001
2014 3.53 (0.10)
2015 3.73 (0.06) 0.20 0.15 to 0.25
2016 3.73 (0.07) 0.19 0.15 to 0.24
Mean level of recommendation as a 
place to work or receive treatment
2013 3.73 (0.24) 0.04 -0.04 to 0.12
0.001
2014 3.70 (0.25)
2015 3.86 (0.18) 0.16 0.08 to 0.24
2016 3.82 (0.16) 0.13 0.04 to 0.21
*From raw data.
**Compared to 2014. From model including year of survey.
Results from sensitivity analyses of findings within each of these three AHSNs, which included 
trusts that reported for some or all of the four years, were very similar (Tables 14 to 16). Although 
our analyses based on trusts within all AHSNs show mean responses remaining stable from 2013 to 
2014 and then increasing in 2015 and 2016, our qualitative data on the time needed to implement 
changes at clinical team level suggest it is unlikely that these changes can be attributed to PSCs. 
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Table 14: Comparisons of key findings across years: sensitivity analyses based on all trusts that 
reported for some or all years, within AHSN Alpha.
Outcome Mean (SD)* Mean difference**
estimate 95% CI p-value
Percentage of staff able to contribute 
to improvements
2013 66.86 (4.91) 0.30 -2.19 to 2.79
<0.001
2014 66.17 (6.21)
2015 70.83 (4.92) 4.67 2.13 to 7.21
2016 72.00 (5.10) 5.44 2.95 to 7.93
Mean level of support from immediate 
managers
2013 3.65 (0.09) -0.01 -0.05 to 0.04
<0.001
2014 3.65 (0.13)
2015 3.75 (0.10) 0.10 0.05 to 0.15
2016 3.81 (0.08) 0.15 0.11 to 0.20
Mean level of fairness and 
effectiveness of procedures for 
reporting errors
2013 3.49 (0.08) 0.004 -0.05 to 0.06
<0.001
2014 3.48 (0.09)
2015 3.65 (0.12) 0.17 0.11 to 0.23
2016 3.70 (0.10) 0.21 0.16 to 0.27
Mean level of recommendation as a 
place to work or receive treatment
2013 3.68 (0.27) 0.05 -0.05 to 0.16
0.01
2014 3.60 (0.35)
2015 3.75 (0.26) 0.15 0.04 to 0.26
2016 3.79 (0.21) 0.16 0.06 to 0.27
*From raw data.
**Compared to 2014. From model including year of survey.
Table 15: Comparisons of key findings across years: sensitivity analyses based on all trusts that 
reported for some or all years, within AHSN Beta.
Outcome Mean (SD)* Mean difference**
estimate 95% CI p-value
Percentage of staff able to contribute 
to improvements
2013 69.36 (3.75) -0.95 -3.86 to 1.96
0.05
2014 70.30 (3.50)
2015 73.40 (3.13) 3.12 0.13 to 6.11
2016 71.55 (4.27) 1.23 -1.67 to 4.14
Mean level of support from immediate 
managers
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2013 3.70 (0.09) -0.03 -0.09 to 0.03
0.05
2014 3.73 (0.09)
2015 3.76 (0.10) 0.03 -0.03 to 0.10
2016 3.78 (0.08) 0.05 -0.01 to 0.11
Mean level of fairness and 
effectiveness of procedures for 
reporting errors
2013 3.56 (0.09) -0.03 -0.09 to 0.03
<0.001
2014 3.59 (0.08)
2015 3.75 (0.10) 0.17 0.10 to 0.23
2016 3.77 (0.11) 0.18 0.12 to 0.25
Mean level of recommendation as a 
place to work or receive treatment
2013 3.73 (0.29) -0.05 -0.16 to 0.06
0.3
2014 3.78 (0.25)
2015 3.83 (0.19) 0.05 -0.07 to 0.16
2016 3.82 (0.20) 0.04 -0.07 to 0.15
*From raw data.
**Compared to 2014. From model including year of survey.
Table 16: Comparisons of key findings across years: sensitivity analyses based on all trusts that 
reported for some or all years, within AHSN Gamma.
Outcome Mean (SD)* Mean difference**
estimate 95% CI p-value
Percentage of staff able to contribute 
to improvements
2013 69.64 (3.14) 0.97 -1.24 to 3.18
0.4
2014 68.60 (3.95)
2015 69.91 (2.59) 1.24 -0.97 to 3.45
2016 70.55 (3.59) 1.88 -0.33 to 4.09
Mean level of support from immediate 
managers
2013 3.62 (0.10) 0.002 -0.05 to 0.05
0.001
2014 3.62 (0.09)
2015 3.69 (0.06) 0.08 0.02 to 0.13
2016 3.70 (0.08) 0.09 0.03 to 0.14
Mean level of fairness and 
effectiveness of procedures for 
reporting errors
2013 3.53 (0.09) -0.002 -0.05 to 0.04
<0.001
2014 3.53 (0.10)
2015 3.73 (0.06) 0.20 0.15 to 0.25
2016 3.72 (0.07) 0.19 0.14 to 0.24
Mean level of recommendation as a 
place to work or receive treatment
2013 3.73 (0.23) 0.04 -0.04 to 0.12 <0.001
2014 3.70 (0.25)
136
2015 3.85 (0.17) 0.15 0.08 to 0.23
2016 3.82 (0.16) 0.13 0.05 to 0.20
*From raw data.
**Compared to 2014. From model including year of survey.
Responses across 2013 and 2014 were stable, followed by increases in 2015 and 2016, at the level 
of these AHSNs. However, our qualitative data on the time needed for PSCs to implement changes 
at clinical team level again suggest that it is unlikely that the observed changes were due to PSC 
activities. 
7.a.iii.  Qualitative accounts
Qualitative findings about safety climate concerned: clinical teams’ existing safety climate; patches 
of changes in that climate; and PSCs’ contribution to those changes.  
Some front-line staff informants thought that their hospital’s existing safety climate was already 
‘blame free’:
“I've always worked in a hospital which has always been fairly blame free… So, I don't 
think we've changed because I don't think we were bad before” (PSCFL28). 
Similarly in a general practice setting we were also told that there existed a “no blame,” “open” and 
“learning culture”:
“When we come across complaints for example,[…] I don’t see that as a negative thing, I 
see that as an external source looking in and saying, ‘this can be improved’, so then we try 
our best to improve it. And same with any significant events or adverse events that may have
happened in the practice, […] I see that as a learning exercise and so does everyone else in 
the practice. We very much have a no blame culture here, so if anything does go wrong […] 
we have an open discussion about it and we move forward and we see how we can improve 
it and make it better for the future” (PSCOL12).
Responses elsewhere were more mixed, with some hospital informants describing efforts to move 
away from a blame culture:
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“I think we’ve made a lot of effort in ensuring that the blame culture, sort of, you know is 
reduced markedly, I think. […] I approached everybody when things went wrong to come 
and talk about it. And some people were very willing. Some people were absolutely not 
willing. When people were willing, I ensured that the focus was on the positive and not on 
the negative” (PSCFL29). 
Nevertheless individuals could still come away from safety incidents feeling a sense of blame:
“People are more accepting of the fact that we have to look into these incidents and I think 
people recognise the importance of it. I don’t think it stops people from feeling that they 
might be under scrutiny or, that there might be a sense of blame somehow” (PSCFL27). 
One indication of a change of safety climate was when informants reported that a more open 
“learning culture” had made team members more confident about the value of incident reporting. In 
some hospital settings that we accessed, informants were confident that this shift away from a 
blame culture towards a more learning culture had become more evident in the last eighteen 
months: 
“I think definitely within the organisation I work, there is definitely a lot more of a safety 
culture and we definitely feel that we are going away from a blame culture to a, what can we
improve[…] I would say within the last year to 18 months there seems like there's a change”
(PSCFL31). 
Some informants however initially interpreted such a shift toward a more learning culture as a new 
form of micro-management. Thus some consultants expressed a preference for a workplace shift 
towards a more “trusting culture” whereby they could be relied upon i.e. trusted to be more 
autonomous, less “micro managed,” and able to exercise their own professional judgement based on
their technical knowledge and experiential learning and expertise:
“I think we also need actually to trust clinicians to try and…let them to do things,[…]most 
clinicians I talk to feel micro-managed and I think it's actually clinical empowerment 
probably would be more helpful and get rid of a lot of the red tape. We're addicted to rules 
and I think actually we just have to trust people and let them get on with it” (PSCFL28). 
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Although clinical teams’ safety climate was reported to be changing in pockets, it was not 
happening in a clear linear fashion but dynamically, at times with different expressions of climate 
co-existing in different organisational layers, or with the safety climate changing in either direction 
at the level of organisation, team or individual agents (a similar pattern to that reported at network 
level: see Chapter 5 and Figure 2). On balance, more of our informants said that such changes were 
taking place than the opposite:
“I think there is a level of focus on patient safety that is having an influence […] I think 
there is a culture change going on and I think the patient safety collaboratives definitely part 
of that and gives some support towards you know the direction of travel for that culture 
change" (PSCL10). 
However some thought it was still early days and that more needed to be done nationally across the 
NHS to change workplace safety climate:
“I think to some extent there has been an improvement in the culture […] You know, again, I
don't think the NHS, as a huge organisation, has really done much to really walk the walk in 
terms of moving from a blame culture” (PSCFL30). 
Another indication for a change of safety climate was when junior staff felt able to actively engage 
in or lead quality improvement initiatives. As one consultant commented:
“I think you really measure the ability of a department to innovate and embrace change and 
have that sort of positive culture when you look at the junior nurses and the junior doctors 
and see what they’re doing. If they’re involved in stuff, then that’s pretty progressive” 
(PSCFL1). 
This was reflected elsewhere, many junior doctors reported feeling more “empowered” when it 
came to initiating and carrying out improvement and safety work: 
“I think that it [QI]’s empowering people to make changes, I think the days where people 
feel like they have to ask for permission to do small projects, has largely gone. […] I know 
in our Trust, they’re very happy for you to trial change without seeking approval first of all, 
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and then if it’s a successful change, bringing that to the attention of the senior management” 
(PSCFL17). 
A clinical pharmacist commented that the learning around QI methods had become more apparent, 
particularly among younger staff: 
“People are becoming more aware of how to change stuff properly, rather than just making 
change for change sake. [...] So I think it is…culturally, people are a little bit more willing to
try little changes, yeah, which is exactly what QI and PDSA cycles are all about, making a 
little change and observe the effect. There's definitely been a little bit of a shift. Early days 
still, I would argue, with some of our dinosaurs” (PSCFL14).
A care home practitioner described implementing an “urgent call communication tool” through the 
patient safety work they were doing on monitoring unplanned admissions and reported that:
“From the perspective of quality improvement within care homes, […] there’s been a 
significant shift in information people would share, in the collaborative working and the 
openness of what people want to do, definitely” (PSCFL25). 
Similarly a matron in an emergency assessment unit reflected that quality improvement: “is 
changing the culture, because people are embracing and getting involved and feeling motivated” 
(PSCFL24). 
Successful practical experiences of QI work reinforced such changes in clinical teams’  safety 
climate. Where a new initiative or change process could be seen to improve efficiency and/or 
enhance patient care, then attitudes were more likely to change, even in those instances where 
morale had previously been low: 
“There was quite low morale in staff […] I think falls was quite low on their agenda and it’s 
almost as if well, there’s nothing we can do, you know ‘old people will fall’ [but through] 
doing workshops, talking and being proactive on the wards [they were] changing their [staff]
mindset […], over the last 3 years we’ve seen a reduction of 200 falls” (PSCFL12). 
In some cases the PSCs were contributing to this change through introducing champions or QI 
experts to lead on quality and safety:
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“I think the new people they've brought into our quality and safety team are very much 
leading from that point of view, so that it is open and transparent and people have the 
confidence to speak up. […] the staff that they've brought in to start leading the quality and 
safety teams, they're very much...very passionate […] they're very keen to spread the word 
and do various teaching sessions and everything to go through with people all about change 
and learning from things and changing what we do, as opposed to just sacking somebody or 
blaming somebody” (PSCFL31). 
In our informants’ ideational transition from blame culture to a just, learning and eventually trusting
culture (or rather, climates), PSC intervention was especially relevant to reaching and developing 
the learning culture stage, as matched the PSC lead views described in Chapter 5. 
One indication that PSCs were reaching different levels of the NHS was a subtle change in language
use. For example when interviewing front-line staff we found some were using terms particular to 
the Institute of Health Improvement (IHI) model of improvement, such as using the term 
“champions” when describing leadership. In some instances, interview participants reported using 
QI methods such as Break Through Series (BTS) and Plan Do Study Act (PDSA) cycles, as well as 
applying small tests of change, while saying they had not heard of PSCs (see below); to us this 
implies that whether participants were directly aware of PSCs or not, by aligning with QI activity 
PSCs are reaching different levels of NHS activity. At the same time matters are confused by the 
fact that on the one hand adopting QI improvement methodology and engaging in QI activity may 
indicate that PSCs are becoming more embedded, but on the other hand QI activity was perceived 
by some as a parallel initiative that preceded the PSCs. In such instances, a distinction was made 
between “quality improvement” and “PSC quality improvement” (PSCOL5) and this raises the 
question of attribution, which we consider below. 
7.b.  Did changes in safety climate lead to changed clinical working practices?  
We were able to trace several changes in practice. In acute hospitals we were told that the PSCs had 
facilitated a number of changes in the way people worked. One was a shift away from a laissez-
faire attitude towards falls in older patients - “old people will fall” - towards active preventive 
measures. By using QI methods and carrying out “small tests of change,” staff were able to 
introduce more low-rise beds and red slipper socks to reduce the risk of falls. After studying fall 
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trends they altered the shift patterns of their staff and were able to achieve a reduction of 200 falls 
over a three-year period. Additionally staff were now “more open and more willing to report falls” 
(a change in safety climate) and the PSC had helped the team to work in a more multidisciplinary 
way: 
“Over my time I've seen a very much more streamlined, efficient and patient… I think we 
are relying much more now on pathways and protocols to follow, with good effect. And I 
think people are being educated well and I see it through the junior doctors who come 
through. So I can tell that implementation of change has been widespread.” (PSCFL4). 
In another hospital, morning “safety briefs” were introduced on the wards to review 
“Things that are going well, things that could have gone better, whether there are any things 
that we need to highlight like safety alerts” (PSCFL2). 
Staff reported changed attitudes towards breaches of admission times standards in the ED, breaches 
previously seen as “unavoidable”:
“Because it got so bad, people kind of desensitised to how long that patients been here and 
whether they are going to breach and if they breach, they breach! It’s because you were 
busy. But now we realise yes we are busy, but we do know that we can avoid these breaches 
and we can do something about it” (PSCFL2). 
In addition to the “inroads” being made in reducing acute kidney injury (see above), we were told of
similar reductions in sepsis through implementing more standardised procedures around diagnosis, 
treatment and teamwork.
Another hospital modified a car industry technique. Should any patient care problem arise staff 
would 
“’Stop the Line’ and get very senior involvement very quickly so that we can resolve patient 
issues” (PSCFL24). 
A fracture liaison nurse reported that the PSC activity in their organisation included falls and 
pressure sores and that they had introduced “intentional rounding” on their ward, as a pre-emptive 
and preventative approach to patient care:
“Every patient is checked on every hour to make sure A) would they like a drink, B) would 
they like to go to the loo and C) have they got any problems?” (PSCFL11). 
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Other hospital-based informants described how PSC-instigated QI work had yielded changes to 
discharge summaries and in triage, with the recruitment of more staff with new roles such as an ED 
“navigator”, which assisted patient flow. A head of nursing described how implementing new 
software for incident reporting had improved patient care: 
“We moved to [software A] from something called [software B] and this gave us the ability 
to respond better to trends, to interrogate the data better” (PSCFL10). 
In the general practices that we accessed, staff told us that within the preceding six months, more 
time has been built into the working week for regular meetings (PSCFL8) and one afternoon a 
month has been set aside to specifically discuss patient safety and quality improvement (PSCFL6). 
A receptionist told us:
“We had quite a lot of training about triaging calls [how to] prioritise workload and prioritise
which patients need to be seen, it's just more managed now and patients are generally 
happier as a result, in my view anyway" (PSCFL7). 
A respondent from a community mental health site reported that, due to the PSC, they were now 
using patient experiences more to evaluate their patient care qualitatively: 
“We’ve done a huge amount of work at all levels, […] including patients leading on the sort 
of shared decision making co-production agenda, we’ve done a huge amount on board 
development […] we have patient stories at the beginning of each board meeting, again, to 
just ground people, to remind people why they’re there” (PSCFL22). 
An important consideration for many was how to normalise QI work. In some regions our 
informants expressed the view that QI was yet to be incorporated fully into daily work across many 
sectors and specialisms such as nursing:
“I don’t think quality improvement is embedded until nurses need it, if that makes sense, but
it's not day-to-day. It's not seen as part of our jobs, unfortunately”(PSCFL23). 
Some registrars and consultants were beginning to incorporate quality improvement as part of their 
appraisals and career progression, but implementation of this remained patchy: 
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“Quality improvement is now embedded into quite a few of the curriculums so trainees […] 
have the experience of projects - both successful and unsuccessful projects […] and it will 
embed itself, so there will be less of a need for a top-down approach” (PSCFL17). 
Three front line members of staff also told us that they had implemented safety initiatives either 
without training and/or by using ad hoc methods. Such initiatives must therefore be attributed to 
origins partly or wholly separate to any PSC. 
7.b.i.  SCORE surveys as a PSC intervention 
Answers to the free text SCORE questions showed that clinical team members in those study sites 
more often reported the risks to patient safety shown in Table 17. (We have omitted risks mentioned
fewer than ten times.) As previously explained some respondents mentioned risks in more than one 
category and the numbers in Table 17 include both surveys across all six sites. 
Table 17: SCORE survey: Frequency of mentions of risks to patient safety
Safety Risk Mentions
Overload: number of patients, over-crowding, not enough capacity 165
Understaffed (any category of staff) 165
Over-demands for work upon staff (tired, overloaded) 39
Pressure to move (or keep) patients inappropriately regardless of clinical context 30
Communication lacking 27
Handover / transfer poor or lacking 17
Appointments – too few, too late 17
Documentation (including electronic) - poor, late, laborious to complete 14
Tired or overworked staff make mistakes, cut corners 12
Prescribing errors / risks 11
Have to work when unwell or tired 11
Turnover, sickness, non-retention of staff 10
Lack of beds 10
A striking feature of Table 17 is that across workplaces, clinical team members who responded to 
this survey mentioned predominantly organisational rather than clinical risks to patient safety. In 
response to an open question, work overload (demand) and understaffing both received more than 
four times as many mentions as the next most frequently mentioned risk, ‘demands upon staff’ (and 
in fact this would appear to be a consequence of the first two risks). Handover or transfer, pressure 
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to move (or keep) patients inappropriately regardless of clinical context, and lack of beds applied to 
the three hospitals but not general practices. Appointment availability was mentioned only at two 
general practices. 
An unforeseen finding was that the SCORE surveys themselves did not only measure clinical 
teams’ safety climate but the post-survey de-briefing also motivated teams to review their everyday 
working practices and triggered what were, in effect, cycles of PDSA activity. The SCORE surveys 
were, rather than being a measurement tool, an almost immediately impactful PSC activity. For 
example a SCORE survey showed that one of the main problems in an ED was 
“what a burned out environment we are working in and how close to the edge quite a lot of 
our staff groups were” (PSCFL1). 
Being able to demonstrate this “numerically” and to explore the reasons why it occurred led to 
better communication within teams and between front-line staff and senior management:
“We were able to demonstrate the key issues are staffing, space and flow of patients i.e. you 
know, we have a crowded department […] we were able to use the data and present it up the 
food chain to the executive directors. […] Just having that numeric data available has 
enabled us to get more staff which is helpful. But unfortunately crowding and space is still a 
massive issue.” (PSCFL1). 
In this case hospital staff reportedly felt listened to by senior management. Not only was safety 
information fed “up the food chain” to management, but following the SCORE survey and debrief 
sessions, senior executives were keen to know the results. This in turn led to quicker decision-
making and tangible improvements such as the rapid recruitment of more staff to help with 
overcrowding in the department. The results were also used to inform the content of the hospital’s 
safety days and smaller group work on areas such as “active listening and giving and receiving 
feedback,” (PSCFL1) as well as helping to inform, motivate and empower more staff to engage in 
quality improvement. The survey provided the space and time for staff to reflect upon their own 
attitudes, as well as the perspective of their colleagues:
“It highlighted individuals’ perspectives that we had perhaps never even considered before 
and that [are] possibly very important in terms of delivering safe care to patients. So it 
highlighted the perspective of all different workers from the receptionist, three porters and 
all tiers of doctor and nurse and what they felt was important” (PSCFL1). 
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Given their usual size there is in most general practices little practical difference between the 
organisational and clinical team levels. In Chapter 6 we reported how PSC involvement in the 
merging of four general practices led to the practices rewriting all working policy documents and 
protocols from scratch. We also described the consequences of SCORE surveys for working 
practices in an inner-city general practice in another PSC. Other front-line staff to whom we spoke 
described other improvements including changes in management which facilitated improved 
communications, in particular with line managers; more regular feedback meetings; practice 
partners having an “open door policy” (PSCFL5); and “up-skilling” staff so that they are better able 
to support colleagues where necessary, including the training of receptionists to prioritise the needs 
of patients in order to improve safety. 
In community mental health, the survey showed that some teams were productive and delivering to 
a high standard. Nevertheless there were underlying problems with communication, teamwork and 
burnout, all of which were negatively affecting staff well-being. This team considered the survey to 
have had a positive impact on them because it offered a framework and “safe space” to have 
potentially “difficult conversations” (PSCFL22). 
Staff across community mental health, primary and acute care settings thought that conducting and 
responding to the SCORE survey enhanced multidisciplinary team working because it enabled those
who had taken part in the survey to be involved in acknowledging problems and finding solutions, 
whether at a system or individual level. The survey showed where improvements were needed, for 
example in teamwork and communication, and highlighted the importance of developing a safe 
space for sharing feedback and the need for pre-emptive measures to offset the risk of staff burnout.
Staff feedback on the SCORE survey included recommendations that the survey be relevant to all 
clinical groups; that the debrief sessions were essential but that it was not always possible to include
all participants due to shift rotations and busy work schedules; and that regular email reminders to 
complete the survey were important to ensure a high response rate. A sufficiently large sample size 
was required to ensure confidentiality. Comparison between teams, for example in the community 
mental health sector, was not possible in cases where teams were so small that individual 
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respondents could be identified. Good leadership to facilitate changes post survey was essential as 
were support structures to sustain the proposed changes. 
Although we used the SCORE survey, these findings would appear to apply to any survey 
(irrespective of the instrument) used as a means to assess and stimulate QI work. We were told that 
some AHSNs had used alternative tools (e.g. the Manchester Patient Safety Framework 
(MaPSaF)267,268) for measuring safety climate in a similar way, as an important part of their work 
programme. 
7.b.ii.  Contexts: Operational pressures, pockets of resistance, time required 
Clinical team informants mentioned contexts which strongly moderated, to the extent of creating 
barriers to, implementation of safety improvements, including PSC-instigated ones. Operational 
pressures (i.e. demand overload) meant clinical teams had insufficient time for QI work and this 
tended to strengthen pre-existing pockets of individual resistance. 
Corroborating the SCORE survey participants’ verbal responses, our interviewees repeatedly 
mentioned operational pressures as a substantial barrier to safety climate change and QI work. 
Besides the demands of direct patient care, one consultant commented, 
“We are in a state of guideline and standard fatigue […] There are nearly 200 NICE 
guidelines [...] One of my colleagues told me that a woman who breaks her hip and goes into
hospital and has an operation and then is discharged has over, in some hospitals, 90 
guidelines that apply to her care. […] We have this vast, largely pointless, guideline industry
that generates enormous amounts of standards and all it's doing, I think, is providing rope 
for clinicians to fail against, for them to hang themselves with” (PSCFL28). 
Similarly in primary care, a practice manager commented:
“There seems to be a lot of unrealistic targets set and not all of them seem to feel like they 
have a quality of purpose behind them, and I think that does kind of put people off doing 
them” (PSCOL13). 
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Even when time was allocated and approved for staff to attend a learning event, many staff felt 
unable to leave their front-line duties. Providing direct patient care was the main priority and thus 
the main barrier to improvement work. Lack of time, not lack of motivation or ‘culture’, was for 
many informants the main barrier to engaging in QI work: . 
“I love quality improvement work, but the difficulty is, if you work full time, having the 
time to do it.” (PSCFL17). 
Nevertheless, besides being a practical barrier, operational pressures, workload and therefore lack of
time could provoke expressions of ‘grass-roots’ cynicism:
“Actually so on grass-roots level, the people that deliver care in the emergency department 
are so overwhelmed with the pressure of delivering that care that you often get, you know, 
an eye roll or quite clear cynicism if you suggest that there is a quality improvement thing 
that they might like to be involved with […]. So there are grass-root levels of cynicism” 
(PSCFL1). 
The addition of any new initiative to the mix was in such instances likely to be viewed with 
suspicion and PSCs were no exception. 
As well as time and workload pressures there remained other individual sources of resistance to QI 
programmes. Resistance to change appeared when proposed changes were interpreted as a direct, 
personal criticism of individual practice: 
“A lot of people I've found in health-care are incredibly scared of change […] they don't see 
it that the system could be improved, they see it that they need to be improved […] a lot of 
the greatness of QI work is you can do stuff as a test of change, it's kind of easier to sell it to 
people […] But still there's always a lot of apprehension with some of certainly my older 
colleagues in work, some of the dinosaurs are a bit scared of change” (PSCOL6). 
As a consultant anaesthetist commented: 
“Sceptics abound actually I think in the NHS. I don’t think people are willing to change 
practice. So we have a phrase which we use very commonly, ‘change happens one funeral at 
a time’” (PSCFL29). 
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Hospital staff described encountering resistance when they tried to introduce a change process 
without educating and fully explaining to their colleagues or team why they were introducing a 
change:
“It used to be a little bit hit and miss. You would try to introduce something and it wouldn’t 
work because people didn’t want to get involved and they just thought well, what’s the 
point? It’s not going to make it any better” (PSCFL2). 
Any quality improvement or safety initiative was more likely to fail if those who might be affected 
by the change had not been consulted and engaged. 
Some critics outside the hospital argued that the PSC’s focus and work streams did not fit all care 
settings, leading them to disengage and dismiss the PSCs as irrelevant: 
“I have found others in mental health settings you know in similar roles as myself, have just 
not bothered with the collaboratives and have sort of walked away saying ‘they don’t suit us.
They don’t do what we need’ […] but actually we can use the Collaboratives such as the 
medicines one that we had last year and make it fit for us” (PSCOL6). 
One way to meet these pockets of resistance to change was to educate and train local champions. 
According to PSC leads, another facilitator for PSC implementation was for QI to become 
embedded and in order to promote grass-roots change, it would be necessary for staff to take 
ownership of a given project or change process: which would mean educating them and engaging 
them more fully in QI activity.
Armed with the Berwick vision of a system devoted to continual learning and improvement of 
patient care, ‘top to bottom and end to end,’ PSC leads were mindful that until such a system 
existed, front-line staff would be inevitably pulled in many often opposing directions:
“There’s a capacity issue definitely. Because what happens at the moment is it [QI and safety
work] just gets added to already busy work lives and you know all you end up with is people
who’ve learnt new skills and are desperate to use them and have become frustrated and 
disillusioned with the whole thing” (PSCL1). 
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For other reasons, middle managers were also susceptible to these operational pressures, as noted in
Chapter 6. We noted in Chapter 5 how PSCs gave support outside participating NHS trusts in an 
attempt to address these barriers. 
Not only was time needed to free up individual staff to engage in QI, it was needed at organisational
level to educate and train local champions to meet pockets of resistance to change; to build in the 
necessary support structures for QI to become more fully embedded post training; to carry out the 
necessary “tests of change”, and to build the structures needed to sustain the proposed change: 
“I think sometimes there's a misconception about how much time is required to actually start
making a change to get those PDSA balls rolling. And certainly, with the outside external 
pressures from our clinical commissioning group, from the CQC, from NHSI, it has…
particularly our sepsis work in ED, it has taken us a year to get where we are now!” 
(PSCFL24). 
A hard but necessary task following such changes was to remind clinical team members from time 
to time why they had changed their working routines and why it was important to sustain the 
changes. 
As we described in Chapter 6, organisational or departmental size was another factor determining 
its receptivity to change and the timescale needed for PSC activity to take traction. The ideal 
conditions for PSC implementation included having champions that could maintain momentum on 
projects and help QI become fully embedded across the healthcare system, adapt QI initiatives to 
local need - ideally born out of a grass-roots initiative - and enable clinical teams to take ownership 
of QI project or change process, so as to promote staff engagement and motivation. But even if all 
these factors were in place, unless enough time and resources were built in for QI activity, as well as
the capacity for sufficient staffing relative to workload, any QI initiative would more likely fail. 
PSC leads were clear that QI work could in the long term free up capacity through the establishment
of more efficient, streamlined approaches, but they were equally clear that such a vision would 
require that QI become fully embedded across the health-care system. 
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7.c.  Inter-organisational networks of clinical teams and clinical working practices within providers  
We found instances of inter-organisational network(s) of clinical teams helping clinical working 
practices to change within the providers that participated in the PSC networks. One reason was that 
such meetings stimulated idea-sharing: 
"Going to the collaborative meetings gives you fresh ideas [...] Seeing how other trusts have 
turned things around and using that as an example" (PSCFL12). 
Clinical teams saw PSC activities as providing a "collaborative learning space” and focal point: 
“It’s useful just having a point of contact […] that has its sort of tentacles going out into lots 
of other organisations” (PSCOL7). 
These activities also helped disseminate better practice and boosted clinical team members’ morale 
and confidence: 
“Patient Safety Collaboratives, […] you get such a lot out of it, actually it inspires you, gives
you ideas. And you hope that […] your organisation benefits from you getting exposed to 
that and the energy that it gives you to come on and swim through treacle, as it often feels. 
And so I go because I'm scared if I stop going, I won't feel that energy commitment from 
anywhere else. But […] I'm still not sure I've got enough energy in my own organisation to 
maintain the momentum that we need to see us through this longer journey. And I think the 
Patient Safety Collaboratives give you the energy to keep doing what you know you need to 
do” (PSCFL22). 
7.c.i.  In what ways did collaboration with clinical teams in other providers help the clinical team within 
each provider to change its clinical working practices? 
At various levels of the NHS, those who had heard of PSCs saw them as a legitimising agent with 
national backing that could justify time out from the front-line in order to engage in QI and 
improvement work. PSCs were also seen as a focal point that could provide what respondents 
termed a: “learning space”; “collaborative space”; “enabling space” or “sharing space”; that is, as 
somewhere where thye could network and share ideas and best practice, as well as learning from 
things that may not have worked. Among those who had attended a training or collaborative 
learning event, the feedback was positive as these comments relating to a “sharing best practice 
day” event held by one PSC illustrate: 
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"Patient Safety Collaboratives are all about being that "open learning sharing culture," so 
that if you happen to be near a specialist centre in London and have access to all the great 
evidence based medicine and interventions, [...] if you live in [city], through PSCs, that 
learning and that improvement to patient care should spread wider than just the 20 mile 
radius of your specialist hospital" (PSCFL22). 
By attending these events and learning from the experience of other organisations, respondent 
reported, PSCs were helping to facilitate organisations to shift away from “working in silos”:
“It was useful to hear the successful initiatives that are going on elsewhere and to share 
ideas, but also to share things that have gone perhaps not so well” (PSCFL1). 
Although the majority of our front-line staff informants who had attended learning and training 
events reported feeling highly motivated post training, a few were more sceptical: 
“I think it’s almost like echo chambers. You know, […] you don’t get new people in. It’s the 
same people […] what happens is that you go for a meeting […] you meet some people and 
then everybody goes back and, you know, sort of, gets busy with their work. And it doesn’t 
actually make any progress” (PSCFL29). 
7.d.  Inter-organisational measurement and comparison  
Scope for inter-organisational measurement systems and comparisons to help clinical teams within 
each provider to change their clinical working practices was constrained by the lack of established 
measurement systems at the time of our fieldwork (see chapter 5) and by the inherent difficulties of 
measurement. PSC leads and provider leads alike wondered how to measure their impact:
“I think the measuring bit is the bit that people are struggling with. So there have been some 
discussions about metrics and what do we measure that’s meaningful and from my 
recollection it’s ongoing work and there isn’t an answer – there isn’t a sort of working model
at the moment. And certainly within my organisation as a CCG, what we are looking at are 
outcome measures at the impact of services that we commission. There’s a lot of time goes 
into trying to refine the metrics to measure outcome as opposed to not just process to get an 
outcome and then as you say, it’s a quality outcome not just yes this person left and went 
back to independent living. So more work nationally I think on that” (PSCOL8). 
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At the time of our fieldwork, there remained substantial local variation in measurement systems 
across organisations:
“[measurement] will be variable across organisations because that will vary on how the 
measurement systems are set up in organisations. So, some organisations may be under a 
system where everything is very RAG [red-amber-green] rated so it’s either good or it’s bad 
or it’s improved or it’s fallen, which is very much an old way of thinking about safety, 
whereas some of the more mature organisations that have had a longer history with the 
collaboratives, they are now starting to [...] use their SPC [statistical process control] charts 
in board reporting so think about improvement over time and look for actual significant 
changes in data as opposed to one number’s higher than another therefore someone’s either 
good or bad” (PSCOL1). 
Another barrier some organisational leads were encountering at project level, was the perception 
that measurement and data collection are predominantly about “performance culture” and takes staff
away from their primary role - that of caring for patients:
“On the project teams, we do an awful lot of work around collecting measurement for 
improvement because there’s a real culture around I’m a nurse or I’m a clinician and I don’t 
do the counting [...] that’s what you know, the performance team do.” (PSCOL1). 
7.d.i.  In what ways did PSC-wide measurement, data-sharing and comparisons help change clinical 
practice?
As we noted in Chapter 5, getting trusts to share data was a major challenge in some regions and 
this applied to community mental health as well as hospitals. A clinical pharmacist described how 
confidentiality was a major disabling factor when it came to sharing information across sectors:
“We don’t share information across sectors because there’s always confidentiality and 
difficulties and you know lots of barriers put up. So sometimes it does feel like we’ve got to 
get over another hurdle and another hurdle and another hurdle and you need a huge amount 
of drive and enthusiasm to get over all of those” (PSCOL6). 
Some informants also wondered whether their performance data, if released, might be used more for
performance management than as a learning tool:
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“I think mostly our kind of regulators and people who judge us on whether we're doing a 
good job or not, they are definitely in that framework of information for judgement [rather 
than] performance data, [being] information for improvement, which is kind of where I think
the PSCs are trying to get us to go to culturally” (PSCOL14). 
Until data-sharing occurred, the question of how it affected clinical practice could hardly arise. 
7.e.  Attributing changed working practices to the PSC s  
To ensure maximum variation at organisational and front-line staff levels we studied regions and 
study sites with contrasting contexts of pre-existing improvement infrastructure and network links, 
so we expected PSC activity and visibility would vary. Out of 31 front-line staff that we accessed 
across three regions, 18 had heard of PSCs although their familiarity and involvement with PSCs 
varied; five were unsure or had little knowledge of PSCs and eight had not heard of PSCs though 
they may have been involved in quality improvement and/or safety work, some of which may have 
been linked to PSCs. 
In some regions and healthcare sectors PSCs lacked visibility, particularly in terms of their 
improvement activity. One GP to whom we spoke was aware of PSCs but thought quality 
improvement opportunities and initiatives focussed more on hospitals:
“It [PSC]’s not really impacted at all! I mean I know it’s happening, and we talk about it and
the quality teams know and therefore they’re the sort of conduit into primary care, but in all 
honesty the resource available for making quality improvements in primary care is very 
scarce. It’s all been focussed at the acute sector” (PSCOL8). 
Such local variation was in some cases due to the lack of any improvement infrastructure, as we 
reported in Chapter 5. In other cases poor communications support or branding was a factor. For 
example one consultant when asked if he had heard of patient safety collaboratives, responded:
“No, unless that…unless you're talking about the Academic Health Science Networks?” 
(PSCFL28). 
Consultants elsewhere made similar comments. In one case a junior doctor who had heard of PSCs, 
was less sure about their impact:
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“I’m sure they have things which have been introduced which I now do, I just don’t know 
it’s directly from a Patient Safety Collaborative, if that makes sense? […] Or even if they 
[PSCs] have done something and they say the change is this, I have been told this is the 
change and I do make that, but it doesn’t necessarily mean I know who it has come from” 
(PSCFL15). 
Another felt the PSCs were useful in raising awareness about “issues within the National Health 
Service” but still lacked visibility and impact particularly among junior doctors. 
In community mental healthcare, a clinical pharmacist felt that poor marketing or branding of PSCs 
meant it was difficult to understand how the aims of the AHSN would fit in with existing trust 
policies:
“From an introduction point of view, I’m not sure that they [PSCs] really came with a big 
bang that people would know that it had happened, or that they [PSCs] were something that 
were actually there to support organisations and Trusts to deliver safer services or better 
services or to use evidence more quickly in all the areas that they were initially set out to 
do” (PSCOL6). 
As reported above participants were positive about how PSC learning events generated and shared 
ideas. 
Nonetheless some felt they could not yet comment on the visibility or impact of PSCs and their 
outcomes:
“I think it’s too early. I think we haven’t got enough projects going on that are visible to me 
for me to be able to say that I can see that” (PSCFL10). 
Others reported a more positive impact from the PSCs in that front-line staff are now more aware of
safety issues and more willing to report any incidents, but that any impact is difficult to quantify. 
Informants in the acute hospitals and mental health sectors thought that the PSCs were helping to 
foster more awareness of the patient journey and of staff well-being, with the PSCs helping to 
facilitate a shift in staff attitude and morale. Hence. as one PSC lead described, that their work may 
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be likened to a “party planner”. If the party has gone well, then they have succeeded in their role but
such a role risks going unnoticed or unacknowledged: 
“It’s a bit like being a massive party planner really! We organise the venue, we organise the 
agenda. We get them all together. We make them work really hard when they’re there so 
they don’t just come for a jolly. We provide them with network space when they’re there as 
well so that they can all talk to each other and learn things from each other” (PSCL3).
Whether their involvement was acknowledged or not, PSC leads hoped that their facilitative role 
would enable collaboration to take place that would otherwise not have done:
“You do need something as a focus. And I’d like to think that the Patient Safety 
Collaboratives are creating the focus for those kind of conversations or certainly allow a 
home for some of those conversations. And if they weren’t there would those conversations 
happen on this scale? I’d like to think not, but I suppose really you know, only time will tell 
and then we’ll have to do what all good facilitators do which is stand at the back and allow 
everyone to bathe in their own glory rather than us going ‘yeah that’s all down to us’” 
(PSCL6). 
As mentioned above, one indication that PSCs are reaching different levels of the NHS was clinical 
teams’ subtle changes in language use, even among those who said they had not heard of PSCs. But 
some informants also perceived (with some historical justification) QI improvement and activity as 
a parallel, pre-PSC initiative. 
Despite PSCs needing more time to take traction, some organisational leads reported that PSCs 
were beginning to engage organisations, facilitate learning through networking groups and to affect 
policy level strategy. For example one participant from a CCG described: “seeing organisations 
willingly deciding to join the patient safety Collaboratives and embedding the care bundles into the 
way that they normally work” (PSCOL2), while another participant cited the “early warning scores”
mentioned in Chapter 6 as an example of changed clinical practice attributable to the PSCs. 
156
The general picture therefore was that although not all the front-line staff that we met had heard of 
them, PSCs were becoming more visible to front-line staff involved in QI. 
7.f.  Concurrent non-PSC influences on clinical teams’ working practices  
PSCs were not the only thing driving changes in working practices. Events such as a disappointing 
CQC inspection, being in special measures, or Trusts undergoing mergers each occurred in some 
regions and lay alongside PSCs as potential triggers for a given change process or improvement 
initiative. For example one head of nursing described how a disappointing CQC inspection led to 
the Trust reviewing its systems for incident reporting: 
“We completely restructured the way that we utilise the data that came from incident 
reporting so that we started to understand in some detail the early indicators of something 
starting to go wrong, so that we can actually intervene and improve something prior to a big 
incident or a big event that ended in a patient safety incident” (PSCFL10). 
A number of nursing staff reflected that Mid Staffordshire crises and the reports that followed 
(including but not limited to Berwick’s: see Chapter 2) acted like a “shock tactic” to shift staff 
“complacency” and refocus their minds on quality improvement and safer patient care: 
“I do think it’s palpable through organisations, and I think that it was so shocking to people, 
that everybody got on board with it; and you shouldn’t need a shock tactic, but it certainly 
worked if you did need a shock tactic, and made people recognise that actually you can’t be 
complaisant, it’s too easy for complacency to get in the way. And so I think it refocused 
people’s minds. And definitely I’ve seen people getting on board more since then.” 
(PSCFL10). 
7.f.i.  Front-line clinical team level: Overview
Regarding safety climate in NHS hospitals during the PSC period we found, in summary, that: 
1. Qualitative evidence showing, on balance, safety climate change in the intended direction. 
2. There were changes in the intended direction in the relevant NHS staff survey data domains.
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3. No significant change by early 2018 on most of the SCORE survey domains. 
This paradoxical pattern requires some explanation and interpretation, which we give in Chapter 9. 
We found evidence of changes in working practices, in the sites we studied, across hospital, general 
practice and community and mental services. They had been achieved, in some cases, despite 
difficult circumstances for NHS providers. The changes arose from QI work which PSCs had 
supported, indeed in the case of (at least) the SCORE surveys initiated. 
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Chapter 8:  Key findings (4): Consequences for patient safety 
If we presume the changes in working practice reported in Chapter 7 were based on good evidence, 
we might assume that they would improve the quality and safety of patient care. It was 
impracticable for us to review such a large and disparate body of evidence for this study but we did 
examine whether PSCs (England-wide) appeared to have made a detectable difference to rates of 
harm and adverse events involving patients, as measured using routine administrative data. 
8.a.i.  NHS inpatient surveys
As we explained in Chapter 4 we focussed on the question of where inpatients’ experience scores 
were on the 10-point scale from ‘very poor’ to ‘very good experience’. Analysis of data across all 
AHSNs showed a difference in overall experience scores across the years studied, with a small 
increase in trust scores in 2015 and 2016, compared to 2014 and small reduction in scores in 2013, 
compared to 2014 (see Table 18). This small year-on-year increase in scores, across all four years, 
suggests that the changes observed in 2015 and 2016, compared to 2014, may be due to a secular 
change over time rather than due to the introduction of the PSCs. 
Table 18: Comparisons of trust scores of overall experience across years, across all AHSNs.
Outcome Mean 
(SD)*
Mean difference**
estimate 95% CI p-value
Overall experience 
score
2013 8.03 (0.33) -0.05 -0.08 to -0.02
<0.001
2014 8.08 (0.33)
2015 8.13 (0.29) 0.05 0.02 to 0.09
2016 8.14 (0.30) 0.06 0.03 to 0.09
 *From raw data.
**Compared to 2014. From model including year of survey.
Sensitivity analysis, in which we included data on all trusts reporting for some or all four years were
included, showed similar results (Table 19). 
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Table 19: Comparisons of trust scores of overall experience across years: sensitivity analysis based
on all trusts that reported for all or some years, across all AHSNs.
Outcome Mean 
(SD)*
Mean difference**
estimate 95% CI p-value
Overall experience 
score
2013 8.02 (0.35) -0.05 -0.08 to -0.02
<0.001
2014 8.06 (0.34)
2015 8.13 (0.30) 0.06 0.03 to 0.09
2016 8.14 (0.32) 0.07 0.04 to 0.10
*From raw data.
**Compared to 2014. From model including year of survey.
We repeated the analysis specifically for the trusts in the three AHSNs which were our case study 
sites. Within AHSN Alpha there was little evidence of a difference in overall experience scores 
across the years (Table 20) and this remained the case when a further trust, which only reported for 
two of the years, was included in a sensitivity analysis (Table 21). 
Table 20: Comparisons of trust scores of overall experience across years, based on six trusts that 
reported for all years, within AHSN Alpha.
Outcome Mean 
(SD)*
Mean difference**
estimate 95% CI p-value
Overall experience 
score
2013 8.18 (0.27) 0.02 -0.14 to 0.17
0.8
2014 8.17 (0.22)
2015 8.22 (0.21) 0.05 -0.11 to 0.21
2016 8.23 (0.16) 0.07 -0.09 to 0.22
*From raw data.
**Compared to 2014. From model including year of survey.
Table 21: Comparisons of trust scores of overall experience across years: sensitivity analysis, 
based on all seven trusts that reported for some or all years, within AHSN Alpha.
Outcome Mean 
(SD)*
Mean difference**
estimate 95% CI p-value
Overall experience 
score
2013 8.21 (0.26) 0.01 -0.14 to 0.16 0.6
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2014 8.17 (0.22)
2015 8.22 (0.21) 0.05 -0.10 to 0.20
2016 8.29 (0.20) 0.08 -0.07 to 0.24
*From raw data.
**Compared to 2014. From model including year of survey.
We found little evidence of a difference in scores across the years for AHSN Beta (Tables 22 and
23) and AHSN Gamma (Tables 24 and 25), although there was some suggestion (results 
approaching significance) of an increase in scores in 2015 and 2016, compared to 2014, within 
AHSN Gamma.
Table 22: Comparisons of trust scores of overall experience across years, based on nine trusts that 
reported for all years, within AHSN Beta. 
Outcome Mean (SD)* Mean difference**
estimate 95% CI p-value
Overall experience score
2013 8.08 (0.37) -0.06 -0.20 to 
0.09
0.7
2014 8.13 (0.39)
2015 8.16 (0.33) 0.02 -0.12 to 
0.17
2016 8.12 (0.32) -0.01 -0.16 to 
0.13
*From raw data.
**Compared to 2014. From model including year of survey.
Table 23: Comparisons of trust scores of overall experience across years: sensitivity analysis based
on all 11 trusts that reported for some or all years, within AHSN Beta.
Outcome Mean (SD)* Mean difference**
estimate 95% CI p-value
Overall experience score
2013 8.04 (0.40) -0.07 -0.21 to 
0.07
0.4
2014 8.14 (0.37)
2015 8.14 (0.32) 0.04 -0.10 to 
0.19
2016 8.09 (0.30) -0.02 -0.16 to 
161
0.13
*From raw data.
**Compared to 2014. From model including year of survey.
Table 24: Comparisons of trust scores of overall experience across years, based on 10 trusts that 
reported for all years, within AHSN Gamma. 
Outcome Mean (SD)* Mean difference**
estimate 95% CI p-value
Overall experience score
2013 8.16 (0.34) 0.02 -0.10 to 
0.14
0.062014 8.14 (0.35)
2015 8.27 (0.29) 0.13 0.01 to 0.25
2016 8.27 (0.27) 0.13 0.01 to 0.25
*From raw data.
**Compared to 2014. From model including year of survey.
Table 25: Comparisons of trust scores of overall experience across years: sensitivity analysis based
on all 11 trusts that reported for some or all years, within AHSN Gamma. 
Outcome Mean (SD)* Mean difference**
estimate 95% CI p-value
Overall experience score
2013 8.13 (0.34) 0.03 -0.09 to 
0.15
0.1
2014 8.14 (0.35)
2015 8.21 (0.34) 0.11 -0.01 to 
0.23
2016 8.23 (0.29) 0.13 0.01 to 0.25
*From raw data.
**Compared to 2014. From model including year of survey.
The overall trends we found across England as a whole were not detected in the AHSNs and Trusts 
that we took as case studies. This may be because the effect size was too small to detect at that level
from these data. 
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8.a.ii.  Classic Safety Thermometer
As previously described we concentrated on the four most commonly occurring harms in 
healthcare: pressure ulcers, falls, UTIs (in patients with a catheter) and VTEs. Routinely reported 
data include: number of new harm events and total number of patients, for each trust, for a single 
day each month between January 2013 and December 2016 inclusive. The rate of new harm events 
per 100 person-days gives us an estimate of the number of new harm events expected to occur 
among 100 patients observed for a single day. 
Analysis of safety thermometer data across all AHSNs showed evidence of a reduction in the rate of
new harm events over time. Relative to 2014, we estimated the rate to be 10% lower in 2015 and 
16% lower in 2016. The rate of new harm events we estimated to be 26% higher in 2013, relative to
2014 (Table 26). 
Table 26: Comparisons of rates of new harm events across years, across all AHSNs.
Outcome Rate per 
100 person-
days*
Rate ratio**
estimate 95% CI p-value
New harm events
2013 3.03 1.26 1.24 to 1.28
<0.001
2014 2.40
2015 2.16 0.90 0.88 to 0.91
2016 2.04 0.84 0.83 to 0.0.85
*From raw data. The number of new harm events that would be expected to occur among 
100 patients observed for a single day.
**Relative to 2014. From model including year.
Results from sensitivity analysis, including all trusts that report for all or some of the four years, 
were similar (Table 27). 
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Table 27: Comparisons of rates of new harm events across years: sensitivity analysis based on all 
trusts that reported for all or some years, across all AHSNs.
Outcome Rate per 
100 person-
days*
Rate ratio**
estimate 95% CI p-value
New harm events
2013 3.01 1.26 1.24 to 1.28
<0.001
2014 2.40
2015 2.16 0.89 0.88 to 0.91
2016 2.05 0.84 0.83 to 0.85
*From raw data. The number of new harm events that would be expected to occur among 
100 patients observed for a single day.
**Relative to 2014. From model including year. 
 These year-on-year reductions in rates of new harm events, across all four years, suggest that the 
changes observed in 2015 and 2016, compared to 2014, may relate to a general reduction occurring 
over time, rather than to the introduction of the PSCs. Comparisons of rates of new harm events 
over time, within AHSN Alpha, showed little evidence of a change in rate of events in the years 
2015 and 2016, relative to 2014, but the rate was estimated to be 61% higher in 2013, relative to 
2014 (Table 28). Such an extraordinary decline is in our view more likely to reflect changes in data 
definitions, data collection methods or data analysis than in clinical practice.  
Table 28: Comparisons of rates of new harm events across years, based on all seven trusts within 
AHSN Alpha.
Outcome Rate per 
100 person-
days*
Rate ratio**
estimate 95% CI p-value
New harm events
2013 3.35 1.61 1.50 to 1.73
<0.001
2014 2.08
2015 2.19 1.04 0.96 to 1.12
2016 2.21 1.01 0.93 to 1.09
*From raw data. The number of new harm events that would be expected to occur among 
100 patients observed for a single day.
**Relative to 2014. From model including year. 
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Analyses of the safety thermometer data across trusts within each of the AHSNs Beta and Gamma 
showed evidence of a reduction in the rate of new harm events across the four years (Tables 29 and
30), suggesting that reductions in rates after 2014 may be due to secular trends rather than an effect 
of the PSCs. All trusts within these three AHSNs reported data for all four years, so we did not carry
out any sensitivity analyses in this case. 
Table 29: Comparisons of rates of new harm events across years, based on all 11 trusts within 
AHSN Beta.
Outcome Rate per 
100 person-
days*
Rate ratio**
estimate 95% CI p-value
New harm events
2013 2.51 1.39 1.32 to 1.47
<0.001
2014 1.77
2015 1.74 0.98 0.93 to 1.04
2016 1.64 0.92 0.87 to 0.98
*From raw data. The number of new harm events that would be expected to occur among 
100 patients observed for a single day.
**Relative to 2014. From model including year.
Table 30: Comparisons of rates of new harm events across years, based on all 11 trusts within 
AHSN Gamma.
Outcome Rate per 
100 person-
days*
Rate ratio**
estimate 95% CI p-value
New harm events
2013 2.39 1.10 1.03 to 1.18
<0.001
2014 2.17  
2015 2.09 0.97 0.90 to 1.04
2016 1.86 0.86 0.80 to 0.92
*From raw data. The number of new harm events that would be expected to occur among 
100 patients observed for a single day.
**Relative to 2014. From model including year.
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8.a.iii.  Incident reporting
Table 31 summarises trust level data on reported incidents within six-month periods, from April 
2014 to March 2016 (categorised according to level of harm: none; low; moderate; severe or death) 
in terms of the percentage of all incidents reported that were either severe incidents or deaths.
Table 31: Proportions of severe incidents or deaths among those reported by NHS trusts
Reporting period Number of trusts
reporting
Percentage of all incidents reported that 
were either severe incidents or deaths
Overall Median (lower quartile, 
upper quartile)
April 2014 to September 2014 123 0.48 0.40 (0.27, 0.64)
October 2014 to March 2015 126 0.49 0.37 (0.23, 0.67)
April 2015 to September 2015 122 0.41 0.38 (0.21, 0.56)
October 2015 to March 2016 118 0.41 0.36 (0.21, 0.52)
These findings are ambiguous. A falling percentage of severe or fatal incidents might reflect safer 
care, lower reporting thresholds, more effective data collection or some combination of these and 
we have no means by which to determine which of these applies here. . 
8.a.iv.  Hospital mortality 
Table 32 compares trust-level mortality data for the years 2013 to 2016. These data include for each
trust the total numbers of: 
1. Finished spells, where a spell is a continuous period of time spent as a patient within a single
trust; and 
2. Total number of observed deaths for a trust, including deaths in hospital or within 30 days of
discharge. 
The mortality rate per 100 spells provides an estimate of the number of deaths in hospital or within 
30 days of discharge that would be expected to occur among 100 spells. 
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Comparisons of hospital deaths across all AHSNs showed evidence of a difference in mortality 
between the years. Relative to 2014, we estimated the rate to be 3.4% higher in 2013; 3.8% higher 
in 2015 and 4.1% higher in 2016 (Table 32). 
Table 32: Comparisons of mortality rates across years, across all AHSNs.
Outcome Rate per 100
spells*
Rate ratio**
estimate 95% CI p-value
Hospital 
mortality
2013 3.27 1.034 1.028 to 1.039
<0.001
2014 3.15
2015 3.27 1.038 1.033 to 1.044
2016 3.28 1.041 1.035 to 1.046
* From raw data.
** Relative to 2014. From model including year.
Results are similar when those trusts not reporting for all four years are included in the analysis 
(Table 33). 
Table 33: Comparisons of mortality rates across years: sensitivity analysis based on all trusts that 
reported for some or all years, across all AHSNs
Outcome Rate per 100
spells*
Rate ratio**
estimate 95% CI p-value
Hospital 
mortality
2013 3.25 1.034 1.029 to 1.040
<0.001
2014 3.14
2015 3.26 1.039 1.034 to 1.045
2016 3.27 1.041 1.036 to 1.047
*From raw data.
**Relative to 2014. From model including year.
Analyses of data from each of our three focal AHSNs showed evidence of a difference in mortality 
between the years, with estimated small increases in mortality in 2015 and 2016, relative to 2014 
(Tables 34 to 37). (In these cases, the figure for 2014 was lowest.)
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Table 34: Comparisons of mortality rates across years, using all available data from all seven 
trusts within AHSN Alpha. 
Outcome Rate per 
100 spells*
Rate ratio**
estimate 95% CI p-value
Hospital 
mortality
2013 3.42 1.017 0.991 to 1.043
<0.001
 
2014 3.37
2015 3.56 1.055 1.029 to 1.082
2016 3.50 1.037 1.011 to 1.063
*From raw data.
**Relative to 2014. From model including year.
.
Table 35: Comparisons of mortality rates across years, using all available data from all 10 trusts 
within AHSN Beta.
Outcome Rate per 
100 spells*
Rate ratio**
estimate 95% CI p-value
Hospital mortality
2013 3.01 1.017 0.997 to 1.037
<0.001
2014 2.95
2015 3.10 1.052 1.031 to 1.073
2016 3.13 1.064 1.043 to 1.086
*From raw data.
**Relative to 2014. From model including year.
Table 36: Comparisons of mortality rates across years, within AHSN Gamma. 
Outcome Rate per 
100 spells*
Rate ratio**
estimate 95% CI p-value
Hospital mortality
2013 3.72 1.043 1.022 to 1.065
<0.001
2014 3.56
2015 3.62 1.019 0.998 to 1.040
2016 3.72 1.045 1.024 to 1.066
*From raw data.
**Relative to 2014. From model including year. 
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Table 37: Comparisons of mortality rates across years: sensitivity analysis based on all trusts that 
reported for some or all years, within AHSN Gamma
Outcome Rate per 
100 spells*
Rate ratio**
estimate 95% CI p-value
Hospital mortality
2013 3.72 1.047 1.026 to 1.068
<0.001
2014 3.55
2015 3.61 1.023 1.002 to 1.044
2016 3.72 1.048 1.027 to 1.069
*From raw data.
**Relative to 2014. From model including year.
A more likely explanation than a harmful effect of PSCs is an increasingly complex case mix269, and
we have presented evidence of increased workload pressures, overcrowding (possibly reflecting 
falling hospital bed numbers270) and staff shortages in our study sites. As Chapter 4 noted the 
validity of SHMI as a measure of hospital safety is itself contested. 
In summary the pattern of evidence on the PSC-relevant safety outcomes was that: 
1. Chapter 7 reports qualitative evidence of changed working practices which one would 
expect (on the basis of the relevant supporting evidence) to improve patient safety and 
service quality. 
2. The quantitative analysis of these data sets showed no significant change by early 2018 that 
could plausibly be attributed to PSCs alone. 
3. Despite this, overall changes in the intended direction were occurring. 
This is a second paradoxical pattern requiring explanation and interpretation. 
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Chapter 9:  Discussion 
9.a.  Paradoxical findings   
Our qualitative data (and therefore findings) included participants’ descriptions of ways in which 
PSC activities had changed safety climate at clinical- team level and as well as changing clinical 
teams’ working practices (see Chapter 7). However, the outcomes of SCORE measures of 
workplace safety climate did not change over the study period (see Chapter 7) nor did the available 
relevant quantitative measures of impacts upon service outcomes (see Chapter 8).
To begin with safety culture and climates, we found (Chapter 7) no significant change by early 2018
on most of the SCORE safety survey domains. Over the same period, scores on the relevant NHS 
Staff Survey data domains did change in the intended direction. We also found some qualitative 
evidence suggesting, on balance, positive changes in safety climate. All this presents an interpretive 
challenge: how to reconcile these paradoxical findings? 
We should note at this stage that NHS Staff Survey findings relate to whole trusts rather than 
clinical teams. In our view the most plausible inference from this combination of findings is that 
progress towards the PSCs’ aims of a stronger safety culture aand climates was reinforced by 
secular trends that led NHS hospitals in the same direction. PSCs contributed to that wider 
movement but their contribution was more modest because of the limited scale (at the time of this 
study) of providers’ participation in PSC activities, and the later onset of PSC activities compared to
other activities and policies whose effects were also to strengthen safety climates and clinical 
quality of care. This inference is consistent with two other studies that a reported significant quality 
improvements in services without a corresponding change in safety culture.235,236 We infer that in the
circumstances faced by PSCs the most relevant reinforcing factors included: 
1. At national level the evidence-based medicine movement. PSCs can be seen as a part of and 
a contributor to this, but this movement has also (and for longer) been implemented through 
guidelines and guidance from NICE, financial incentives to providers (e.g. QOF, CQUIN), 
publication of data (down to provider and sometimes consultant level) on the quality and 
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safety of each provider’s services, performance indicators, and clinician and managerial 
training and appraisal. 
2. The concurrent political and media salience of patient safety (including reactions to the 
Francis report itself). 
At clinical team level, staff turnover would adversely affect measures of the safety climate of 
clinical teams and thus reduce PSC impacts. It seems unlikely that departing staff would be replaced
by others from services in which PSCs had been active but we do not have data on this. 
If there were time-lags between initiating culture change activities and observing or measuring their
effects in workplace safety climate, then the later start and small scale of SCORE surveys, and 
especially the repeat surveys, means they would not easily capture change. Other studies94,126,131 (see 
Chapter 3) report that changing workplace ‘culture’ (sc. climate) is a long-term process occurring in
a succession of stages over repeated QI cycles (e.g. PDSA cycles). Another question is whether the 
SCORE survey showed little evidence of safety climate change in the clinical teams because the 
mechanisms for changing that climate were too remote, not just in time but also in terms of 
intermediate causal links, from the variables which SCORE surveys mostly measure. That is, PSC 
attempts to make healthcare providers more like learning organisations may meantime have had 
other intermediate effects that will eventually help change safety climate in clinical teams in ways 
and to the extent that future SCORE surveys will eventually detect; or perhaps have other effects 
that increase patient safety; or both. Chapter 6 Section d and Chapter 7 Section a report what 
intermediate effects we found during the study period but the longer-term effects remain of course 
to be seen.  
Turning to service outcomes (Chapter 8), studies271–273 of policies unrelated to PSCs have reported 
similarly mixed findings, that is qualitative reports of change. There were some significant changes 
in findings from routine administrative data, but they cannot be attributed to PSCs. Such studies 
suggest potential reasons for the pattern of our findings about PSCs’ impacts on service outcomes. 
 1. Dilution of any effects of PSCs upon service outcomes. The available datasets combine data 
about localised activities that PSCs may have influenced with data from other, often larger-
scale, activities which PSCs did not immediately influence. This is typical, for example, of 
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data provided by NHS Digital. This dilution occurs in two ways, each of which assume that 
little or no effect spilled over from PSC activities into services unaffected by PSCs when: 
(a) Data relating to intervention and non-intervention services are combined but the former 
are only a small proportion of the total. 
(b) Within a given service, a PSC’s intervention was implemented for only part of the care 
pathway, in which case the non-intervention stages will dilute any effect of PSC activity.
(This explanation only applies to measures relevant to all stages of the pathway, such as 
infection rates and patient-reported outcomes.) 
In each of these cases, if PSCs had succeeded in delivering some of their intended effects, 
these would be too localised to change the larger data-sets perceptibly. Lilford and 
Provonost114 argue that only small-scale, i.e. localised, datasets are likely to detect any 
change of this type. 
 2. Countervailing mechanisms and/or contexts: these can outweigh the effects of PSCs; those 
reported by our informants were: 
(a) Demand overloads (such as persistent ‘black alerts’ during the winter) that divert staff 
from QI activities. 
(b) The problem of insufficient staffing, which in one general practice, not even additional 
finance could resolve. These conditions also divert staff from QI activities, as other 
studies107,209,231 corroborate (see Chapter 3). 
(c) Staff turnover (again as other studies130,204 corroborate: see Chapter 3): Staff transfers 
may cancel out across the health system as a whole but for an individual clinical team 
they mean the loss of trainees and their knowledge (both formal and tacit), undoing 
attempts at safety climate change and producing discontinuities in QI work. 
(d) Financial constraints preventing initial PSC set-up, training and/or changes of workplace
practice afterwards. 
 3. Time lags: since 2015 there has been time to start implementing PSC’s quality improvement 
work, but not to do so universally (see ‘dilution’ above) and not for long enough to feed 
through to the end of the chain of mechanisms outlined in Chapter 2. In these circumstances 
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we might observe the earlier links in the programme theory being implemented but not (yet) 
the later links. The period when PSC activity began to yield changes in working practices (at
most a year before the end of this study) began too late for routine administrative data 
available within the study period to be able to capture the changes. 
 4. Reductionist measures of safety climate: the absence of significant change on the measures 
available to us leaves open the question of whether a change in safety climate at clinical 
team level might have been observed had other measures been used for measuring or 
recording safety climate. 
 5. Reporting bias: people tend to give exaggerated or inflated reports of their own activity and 
its effects. The greater the proportion of data gained from non-participant observers and 
‘third party’ documents, the more this bias can be dealt with through triangulation. 
 6. If any of the above countervailing mechanisms were at work, observing the effects of the 
PSCs might require using a different counterfactual since the apparently unchanged 
outcomes in the data we analysed would have been worse without PSCs. 
To summarise: PSC activity had the effects reported above (Chapters 5-8) but they were too 
localised and too heavily exposed to and diluted by the confounding contexts (both favourable and 
unfavourable) described above to be measurable in the routinely-reported administrative data. PSCs
have made a difference in how things work but one can only observe this when viewing through the
correct lens, that of localised qualitative enquiry.
9.b.  Limitations and strengths of the findings  
9.b.i.  Implementation study 
At national and regional levels, the implementation study was a census, so had no selection bias nor,
in this study, participation bias. We interviewed PSC leads during the early set up phase of the 
collaboratives and did not repeat the interviews later to determine any subsequent changes in 
activity or attitudes as implementation went on. Therefore our findings capture, among other things,
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what might prove to be early teething problems, especially in relation to how AHSNs hosted the 
PSCs. At provider and clinical team levels, a study of mechanisms had to select sites where the 
mechanisms were present (even if not implemented as policy-makers intended), and informants. 
Our findings suggest PSCs had only pockets of impact. The NHS is a massive system and it is 
extremely unlikely PSCs could influence the whole system in what was effectively a three year 
period. In PiSCES we have, with the exception of the census of PSC leads interviews and the 
routine data, specifically targeted the areas first involved in the PSCs rather than focusing on the 
wider impact of the Collaboratives on sites that began participating later. This means that 
generalisations from our findings may be biased towards overstating the effects of PSCs and under-
reporting implementation deficits and barriers to implementation. A similar study conducted later 
would be able to produce a more complete picture of PSC impact. As for costs, any analysis 
including ours is always context specific and the breadth of analysis is limited by the availability of 
data. In this study the main limitation was the difficulty in obtaining detailed data around PSC 
funding and budgets, and the opportunity costs. As such we were not able to make any meaningful 
comment on the cost effectiveness of the PSC programme. Over time it is likely that the data 
regarding expenditure will become more easily accessible but it would require significant research 
effort and resource to estimate the opportunity costs of both managerial and clinical activity that 
was not undertaken as a result of PSC activity. 
9.b.ii.  SCORE survey 
The sites in our sample had a response rate of more than 60% of staff so they reached the threshold 
declared in advance as the minimum ensuring valid findings. The SCORE study sites were self-
selected (volunteers) and the study relied upon NHS organisations, through their participation in the
PSCs’ QI work, to help implement the survey. Uptake in the first round, and still more the second 
round, was small compared with the study protocol and this is likely to reflect the extent and pace at
which additional QI activities were introduced at clinical team and general practice level during the 
study period. This low uptake places significant limitations on the interpretations we can make in 
the safety culture work package. In addition the six sites were all in one PSC and this introduces 
further potential for bias in that our findings are based on sites advanced in implementing QI 
activity in general (including PSC-initiated activity), and supportive of it. The consequence of this 
bias is likely to be towards presenting a more positive view of PSC activity and impact than would 
be found in NHS organisations more generally. Mental and community health service participation 
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in the SCORE survey was low but use of the SCORE survey appears to be spreading so this is 
likely to change over the remainder of the currently funded PSC activity. More than 40 sites plan to 
have completed their second round of surveys by the end of 2018 and a subsequent evaluation 
would lead to a better understanding of how and why safety climate has changed over this period. 
Although we found no significant observable change in safety climate in the six sites we examined 
it might be premature to conclude that the PSCs were not changing safety climate. It may take 
longer for the survey data to change. A Dutch study172 described successive stages (hence a gradual 
process) of safety climate change and a US study found statistically significant increases in safety 
culture scores over a five year period with the surveys repeated on average three times.274 Finally, 
safety climate change may be a consequence of changed working practices, not (or not only) a prior 
condition for them. 
9.b.iii.  Analysis of routine administrative data
An empirical limitation of our analysis is that NHS routine administrative data are not necessarily 
exhaustive regarding the main aspects of patient safety (e.g. avoidable deaths). Hospital mortality 
data were used but there is little evidence to directly link these data to actual harm events. One 
study published in the BMJ compared standardised mortality ratios (SMR) with case note reviews 
of death and found no evidence of an association. The authors concluded that overall SMR data do 
not reflect the quality of hospital care275, something also found in subsequent studies.212 
In estimating differences in outcome measures in 2013, 2015 and 2016 against a 2014 benchmark 
we used a short post-PSC implementation period (albeit the whole such period for which data were 
available at the time of this study) and a short pre-PSC period. Previous studies assessing the 
implementation of safety Collaboratives have suggested it takes a mean of 17 months from start to 
tangible improvement.66 From a practical perspective the PSCs did not commence activity until the 
start of 2015 and our implementation study suggests it took not less than 18 months for the effects 
to begin to reach clinical teams. In practice we might expect the PSCs to need a longer run-in time 
than previous, less complicated collaboratives before they began producing substantial effects. For 
this reason, and based on the observations of a comparable Dutch study172, it would be surprising for
the PSCs to have had measurable impact before mid-2016. As the majority of the routine data we 
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analysed were from 2016 or earlier, we would be surprised to see any signal within routine data 
even if PSC activity was having an impact. 
We also considered whether any policy events in 2012-13 might have made the 2013 data 
exceptional (off-trend) and therefore bias (under- or over-state) the changes observed in 2015-16. 
We identified no obvious grounds for thinking that the demand pressures facing NHS hospitals in 
2012-13 deviated from the longer-term trend. Within the limitations of the published data we also 
allowed for this possibility by testing (see Chapter 4) how stable the relevant measures were across 
these years. The Health and Social Care Act (2012) led to NHS re-structuring that affected regional 
bodies and commissioning organisations but not provider organisations. During 2016-17 NHS 
providers began to run significant financial deficits that could affect the 2016 data by pushing 
measured activity levels downwards and drowning out any effect of PSCs but we have limited 
qualitative, and no quantitative, data to indicate that this occurred. 
The dilution mentioned above means comparisons of outcomes at NHS trust level, and still more at 
regional or whole system level, are likely to reveal only large, widespread impacts of any policy 
initiative, including those resulting from PSCs. They are not necessarily a test of the policy makers’ 
programme theory about how PSCs would impact upon clinical teams’ working practices. To test 
that would require data specific to the clinical teams that participated in PSC-initiated QI activity 
and in the current NHS those data would have to be collected specifically for this purpose. 
9.b.iv.  Policy lessons
The limitation in the lessons for policy we have drawn reflect the limitations both of our own 
findings and of published research on collaboratives generally (see Chapter 3), since they were the 
sources we used to revise and update the policy-makers’ original programme theory into a more 
evidence-based logic model. 
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9.c.  Generalisability of the findings  
Our findings from the three different work packages have different levels of generalisability which 
will be described in turn below. We think the implementation study has the most useful lessons for 
policy makers (see Chapter 11). The routine data on safety outcomes were not likely to, and did not,
demonstrate any change attributable to the PSCs, although they did demonstrate a gradual 
improvement over time in all of the metrics that we analysed and this finding is certainly relevant to
the outcomes that the PSCs were (also) trying to achieve. As we have noted at length the safety 
climate data were too limited and analysed too early in the PSCs’ life-cycle to yield generalisable 
findings at this stage, but this may change over time. One learning point from this is how long it 
takes to set up safety culture surveys within providers.
1) The implementation study. In this study we looked at the impact of a significant policy change in
a centralised state funded and delivered health service, the English NHS. As such the closest 
comparisons would be the wider NHS in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales, and other health 
systems modelled in part on the NHS (e.g. those of Australia, Greece, Italy, New Zealand or Spain). 
Although there will be some contextual differences the lessons learnt from the study will be 
transferable.
In the English NHS further policy changes within the broader scope of healthcare (i.e. not 
specifically patient safety and quality improvement) are very likely to face the same barriers to 
implementation as was observed in the PSCs. Beyond healthcare, policy changes in state run and 
funded services (such as education in England) are also likely to encounter the same problems if 
they are implemented in a similar manner, that is with interruptions to their leadership (e.g. re-
structuring), unclear timelines and uncertain funding. 
In systems that are not state-managed (and largely state-delivered) the contexts will be sufficiently 
different that many of the findings will have limited use or have to be interpreted with caution. The 
English NHS does not have any effective competition between providers and so any system that 
does have competition would have to implement initiatives such as the Patient Safety 
Collaboratives in a very different way. It is comparatively easy for leaders of healthcare in state-
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delivered systems to mandate policy but less so in systems that rely on private companies and the 
open market. 
2) The analysis of routinely collected administrative data. Due to the timing issues discussed above 
little sign of the effect of PSCs appear in metrics collected routinely and thus there are no real 
lessons to be learned from this. The most interesting finding was the gradual and often statistically 
significant improvement in the metrics collected for this study: staff surveys, patient surveys, 
incident reports and the monthly safety thermometer. This has important implications as it 
demonstrates that the analysis of interventions and initiatives always has to have a control group, in 
the absence of which any effect may be falsely attributed to those interventions when in fact 
improvement would have happened without them. This has also been demonstrated in a large, 
randomised team training study in operating theatres.274 Both the control group and the study group 
showed a significant reduction in the major adverse event rate but no difference between the two 
groups. This awareness should always influence study design and creates significant problems when
analysing data on interventions designed to change whole healthcare systems such as the PSCs.
Because proportionately more acute hospitals than other kinds of provider engaged with the PSCs, 
more caution may be required when generalising from our findings about the effects of PSCs in 
other settings than when generalising our findings about acute hospitals. A more general empirical 
limitation is that our findings about non-GP services only concern NHS providers, not services 
commissioned from non-NHS providers. Among NHS providers, community health services and 
mental health services were under-represented in this study, reflecting the general pattern of PSC 
implementation. 
9.d.  Comparison with other studies   
One other study among those commissioned alongside this one reported during the study period. Of 
relevance to PiSCES, the authors of the study of NHS acute hospital trust boards276 reported that, 
following the Francis report, the NHS trust boards they studied began to prioritise safety and quality
above financial objectives, though they noted this change might have been temporary. In terms of 
the PSC programme theory (Chapter 2), the trusts only temporarily met the prioritisation condition 
for ‘Providers become learning organisations’ and the corresponding activities did not necessarily 
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extend into middle management so the QI activity and safety climates remained very variable. As 
for context, regulation has had a massive negative impact on trusts’ ability to respond to the Francis 
Report. Boards had more idea of what regulators want than of what patients do – ‘the regulators are 
the customers of health care rather than the patients’276. Despite this, the responsibilities of Chief 
Nursing Officers did increase significantly following the Francis Report, and the Duty of Candour 
was broadly fulfilled. 
These findings corroborate our own regarding the variability of QI and safety climate. Indirectly (by
inference from the uneven pattern of PSC and QI implementation at provider and clinical team 
levels) they corroborate our finding that implementation of these activities by middle management 
is inconsistent. 
Kent and Surrey AHSN carried out a realist evaluation277 of its local PSC (which was not one of our
in-depth study sites). They found 
1. Quality of clinical leadership was the most influential factor for strengthening safety climate
in clinical teams. High quality leadership achieves this through enabling teamwork, a shared
direction and values, safety behaviours, and by creating a psychologically safe environment 
and an approach to improvement driven by asking ‘What works?’ Staff members found this 
type of leadership more credible when senior managers practice what they preach. 
2. Observation of practice helps engage staff by recognising success as well as any mismatches
between stated values and actions. 
3. ‘Safety huddles’ of front-line teams promote interdisciplinary collaboration and teamwork, 
and help in adapting QI activity to clinical teams’ settings and needs.
4. Ensuring the engagement and participation of key stakeholders, and making QI activity 
meaningful to them, are the most important activities for promoting learning, improvement 
and service development. Facilitators are an important resource in doing this. 
5. Managerial support for facilitators and clinical teams, and for safety and QI activities, 
generally helped promote a safety climate, as did coordinated, organisation-wide systems for
managing patients, storing records, and holding protocols and standards. 
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6. Climate surveys can be the foundation for practical safety improvement activities, as can 
‘action learning’ (by which the authors meant: ‘Building networks. Learning from others in 
other organisations’277), which the Kent and Surrey PSC facilitated. 
The evaluators found that the value of PSCs more generally was in focusing attention upon and 
developing the activities described. They also reminded managers of the danger of ‘overload’ and 
‘paralysis’ when already-busy staff confront over-ambitious projects. This point, and points 1, 2, 4, 
5 and 6 corroborate our findings. 
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Chapter 10:  Results 
As study results we recapitulate summary answers to the five empirical research questions, RQ1 to 
RQ5. The generalisable lessons from these results, which answer RQ6, are directly relevant to 
policy but are more clearly presented as a separate chapter, which follows this one. 
Overall, the qualitative data (of all kinds, taken together) showed a positive impact of the PSCs. The
quantitative data were more ambiguous. 
10.a.  How PSC implementation varied across the 15 AHSNs (RQ1)  
10.a.i.  Differences
There were significant historical differences in a variety of factors between the AHSN regions. 
Therefore each PSC inherited different geographies, population size and quality of pre-existing 
network links and infrastructure. Several PSCs had a long history of region wide safety and quality 
programmes, whilst others were starting almost from scratch with little or no existing quality and 
safety networks. This inheritance of different starting points, understandably, influenced how the 
PSCs were implemented. Where there were existing programmes and networks the PSCs supported 
these networks rather than creating new structures and programmes. PSCs with little prior 
systematic knowledge of quality and safety had to begin by creating networks by running regional 
events and allowing the creation of emerging collaborations between provider organisations.
The relationship between the hosting AHSNs and the PSCs also varied. Some brought the PSCs ‘in 
house’ and simply combined them with the AHSNs pre-existing quality and safety programmes and 
from a practical perspective merged the budgets. Others kept the PSCs as separate organisations that
they only provided administrative support for. This divergence correlated with the inherited 
conditions. The AHSNs with significant previous QI experience held the PSCs ‘in house’ and vice 
versa. 
Other things varied both within and between PSCs: 
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1) The uptake of the SCORE surveys (at the time of writing, still only by minority of 
providers) was uneven across the PSCs, again linked with previous QI experience.
2) The extent of recognition, at clinical team level, of PSC activity and ‘branding’ (see Chapter
7). Where PSCs supported existing QI and safety work, it became harder to attribute any 
changes in working practices and outcomes unequivocally to PSC activities. 
3) The more rural PSCs faced geographical boundaries and barriers to providers’ participation 
in cross-organisational networking activities. 
4) The effects of junior doctors’ strikes in hindering PSC activity varied considerably between 
our case study PSCs. 
The contextual differences between PSCs demonstrate that the PSCs were perforce all complex 
adaptive systems reacting and responding to the local situations in varied manners. 
10.a.ii.  Similarities
Although the contexts were very different, the three main strategies the PSCs applied for attempting
to improve patient quality and safety at provider level were the same: 
1. A facilitative strategy. This built where possible on existing QI and safety work in healthcare
providers. Existing networks were supported, often financially, and new networks were 
created by running workshops, seminars and conferences. 
2. An educative strategy of educating, training and developing individual ‘change agents’. This
took the form of a variety of small to large scale training programmes in the techniques of 
quality improvement and human factors. These ranged from a half day workshops to full 
weeks of training. 
3. The work-stream approach. This resulted in several PSCs developing similar work-streams, 
which were initially called ‘clusters’; sepsis, deteriorating patients and culture. These 
clusters morphed into three national work-streams; maternity, management of the 
deteriorating patient and culture. 
Because of the ‘national priority’ approach, certain care groups or conditions were prioritised 
among most if not all PSCs. Although all PSCs used facilitative and educative approaches to 
improvement, there were some tensions between the facilitative and the national priority focus, as 
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the latter seemed to our informants closer to a performance management approach which could 
distort the effect of the facilitative strategy with its collaborative approach. If too much emphasis is 
placed on the measures relating to work-streams, these measures become targets and the 
collaborative features of these networks collapses. This effect has been seen before in other safety 
Collaboratives. The mere perception of data being used for performance management, even when it 
is not, distorts behaviour negatively as was seen in the ‘Matching Michigan’ project.24,136 
In general, across and within PSCs, NHS staff appeared to favour a shift from a ‘blame’ culture to 
learning culture focused on service development as the type of culture most conducive to activities 
to improve patient safety. 
We found a common acceptance of, and adherence to, the Collaborative model across all the PSCs. 
Implicitly they all accepted the policy model and programme theory outlined in chapter one. What 
differed was the ways in which different PSCs emphasised different components and elaborated 
some mechanisms rather than others; some, for example, focused heavily on climate or on 
‘huddles’.277 Partly because PSCs were promoted in response to problems in hospital services 
(Francis Report) and partly because, looking internationally, Collaboratives were first devised for 
hospitals, providers’ participation was proportionately greater among acute hospitals than general 
practices. Only a minority of general practices were involved at this stage. Mental and community 
health services participated in at least two PSCs to our knowledge; and probably in others. This 
reflected in part the technical challenges in making the collaborative models relevant to non-
hospital services. General practices apart, we found no instances of non-NHS owned providers 
other than a small number of care homes and pharmacies participating in the PSCs’ work. 
Where they were used (which was increasingly, albeit starting from a small base), the SCORE 
surveys were implemented much the same way everywhere, since their design and use is highly 
formalised and standardised. SCORE had a relatively quick impact upon working practices. 
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10.b.  Organisational changes that providers made and what they learned from the PSCs (RQ2)  
A precondition for any such changes and learning was that the provider’s senior management be 
willing to participate in PSC activity, but as Chapter 5 reported NHS trusts were disparate in that 
respect and when they were willing organisational upheaval, including senior leadership changes, 
made trusts’ engagement harder to sustain. The consequence was lack of engagement or 
‘ownership’ of PSCs’ QI and safety improvement work at senior management (‘whole-
organisation’) level in some NHS trusts. For general practice the senior management was 
synonymous with GP partners. 
In the providers that did participate, the main organisational factors reported to aid PSC 
implementation were: 
• Providing front-line clinical and managerial staff with time in their normal working pattern 
to undertake improvement work. This required initial prior expenditure from the 
organisations which was often lacking. Senior leadership support for improvement activity 
was critical as only the senior leaders can create ‘time’ for this work to be done. Of all the 
factors this creating of ‘capacity’ was most crucial.
• Recruiting trained QI and safety experts or ‘champions’ at all levels in the managerial 
structure, most critically at Board and at clinical team levels. This approach was general 
across our case study sites (and elsewhere), and evidently learnt from the PSCs (see Chapter 
5, Section c and Chapter 6 Section d). 
• Ensuring that these champions had the leadership skills to motivate and empower teams, and
to create psychological safety for staff to either speak up or suggest areas for change. 
• 'Bottom-up' approaches to safety improvement (a facilitative strategy) which promoted 
provider-level engagement and enhanced motivation by adapting fully to local needs the 
activities that PSCs were promoting, and enabled staff to take ownership of a given 
project/or change process 
• Initial prior expenditure for start-up training and the early introduction of measurement 
systems, or alternatively adaptation of existing management information systems to serve 
(also) as a measurement system for clinical teams participating in the PSC. 
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• Build structures and processes, at both whole-organisation and at clinical team levels, to 
promote sustainability when introducing a change to working practices. That is, by making 
sure that QI is fully embedded at all levels and tiers within healthcare providers. 
Two organisational changes that the policy-makers’ programme theory had anticipated (see Chapter 
2) had not yet materialised at the time of our fieldwork. One was the development and use of formal
measurement, hence information, systems to support these activities (see Chapter 5). The planned 
central measurement unit had not started at the end of our fieldwork but by the time of writing was 
beginning work. The initial tendering for it began in 2015 from NHS England; the substantial time 
taken to set this up was partly due to the pace of work of any large bureaucracy, compounded by the
transition from NHSE to NHSI. The other expected but not observed change was in safety climate, 
in particular at clinical team level. Although PSC activity, including the SCORE surveys, had 
impact upon clinical teams’ working practices in the sites we studied (see Chapter 7), these changes 
appear to have occurred in the absence of measurable changes in workplace safety culture and 
climate. In summary, we found: 
1. Qualitative evidence of safety climate change in the intended direction, in particular high 
levels of staff engagement and a shift away from a blame culture towards a more ‘open 
learning culture’. 
2. No significant change safety climate, in our survey sites, by early 2018 on most of the 
SCORE survey domains (and with no reason to suspect a ceiling effect). 
3. Change in the intended direction in the relevant NHS staff survey data domains (some 
questions in the NHS staff survey are similar to questions in the SCORE survey), but the 
trend began before PSCs. 
To suggest that any safety climate changes at clinical team are diluted within much larger data-sets 
might be valid for the NHS Staff Survey but not for the SCORE survey results, which are precisely 
localised to the relevant clinical teams. Another possible explanation is that any culture or climate 
changes are as much the consequence as the cause of changes in working practices, in a virtuous 
circle of mutual reinforcement. In that case, safety climate changes would follow changes that made
clinical work safer by PDSA-like methods. If the SCORE surveys were repeated (i.e. a third round 
of surveys were made) this circle may result in a demonstrable change in safety climate. The 
problem then would be separating this effect from the secular trend as we have observed from the 
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climate questions from the NHS staff survey which have improved over the recent past, before the 
widespread adoption of PSCs and safety culture surveys.
Three main contextual constraints on organisational change and learning in response to PSC activity
were also evident. Sufficient time is required to implement a complex set of activities across all 
levels of the NHS, and needed on three different time-scales. 
1. At least 18 months were needed for the Collaboratives working with the providers to set 
themselves up to participate and then start to change working practices through the 
Collaboratives’ methods. They included allowing individual staff members enough time at 
work for learning events and the subsequent activities putting what they learnt into practice.
2. Continuing the Collaboratives long enough to enable them to recruit ‘late adopter’ providers 
into their work. In our study sites, this would appear to require at least three years and in 
practice much longer to really effect change (‘This is a 10 year vision’ (PSCL6)). 
3. Time for cycles of QI activities to repeat, to become and remain institutionalised; and 
allowing individual staff members enough time at work for putting what they learnt into 
practice
In short the “improvement cycle is a long cycle”, indeed open-ended. Healthcare and the English 
NHS in particular is littered with previous attempts at improvement and safety Collaboratives and 
national programmes that were stopped within a few years before they had a chance to develop real 
traction. Examples include Safer Care South West, the NHS Institute, NHS Improving Quality, the 
Safety Patient Initiative and the National Patient Safety Agency. 
No less constraining were the concurrent operational pressures, creating competing pressures and 
priorities for front-line staff, and the concomitant resource and financial constraints, staff shortages 
and turnover. During the fieldwork we observed safety and quality meetings being cancelled when 
operational pressure increased. At an individual level the barriers included difficulties utilising 
expertise post training due to number of factors including performance culture (i.e. conflicting 
priorities in work place, pulling in opposing directions); lack of time and support within member 
organisations; high staff turnover (and even shift rotations or moves between work locations); and 
individual resistance to change. 
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10.c.  Resource use, costs of participation and implementation   (RQ3) 
Our study PSCs provided broad information how spending on PSCs had been allocated at AHSN level (to 
which programmes, and to broad categories such as allocation to support staff, training etc.). More detailed 
accounts of monetary flows from PSCs to provider level were either unavailable or, at least, not available to 
us. We heard say of one NHS trust attempting to monitor how the availability of these extra resources 
contributed to changes in working practices (and by implication produced, or helped produce, health benefits
for patients), but this was a single instance, news of which came to us at the very end of the research. We 
found no organisation estimating the monetary value of whatever impacts changed working practices had 
upon care outcomes for patients. Any such data would have to be collected specially, a large and complex 
task. 
10.d.  Have the PSCs made a detectable difference to rates of harm and adverse events involving  
patients as measured using routine data? (RQ4) 
For the PSC-relevant safety outcomes which we analysed, we found: 
1. Qualitative evidence of changed working practices which one would expect (given their 
supporting evidence) to improve patient safety and service quality
2. The quantitative analysis of the relevant routinely-collected data sets showed no significant 
change by early 2018 that could plausibly be attributed to PSCs alone. This applies alike to 
the indicator which deteriorated slightly (hospital mortality), the indicator about which the 
findings were ambiguous (incident reporting) and the three which improved slightly (safety 
thermometer, staff survey, patient experience). 
3. Nevertheless longer-term changes in the intended direction were occurring in two, and 
perhaps three, of the four relevant routinely-collected data sets. 
The reasons for this paradoxical pattern of findings appear in our judgement to be: 
 1. Time lag: At the time of our fieldwork, PSCs were about half-way through their initially-
planned life-span. Chapters 5-7 present evidence on the time-scale required for their work to
have any prospect of impact on the intended policy outcomes. Hence the period during 
which the administrative systems could collect any data related to PSC activity data was 
under a year. 
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 2. Dilution: the PSCs’ activity, hence any impact from it, was not universal across the NHS and 
the available datasets combined data about activities in which PSCs were involved with data
about the larger areas in which PSCs were not yet involved. 
 3. Other secular factors: The effects of PSCs could have been outweighed by countervailing 
mechanisms and changing contexts across the NHS: increasing demand; insufficient staffing
relative to demand; staff turnover; and financial constraints. 
We infer that PSC activity had many of the effects intended for it (Chapters 5-7) but they were so 
localised and so diluted by the confounding contexts as to be undetectable in the routinely-reported 
administrative data; not least because they had very little time to impact upon those data. 
10.e.  Change in practice on the front-line of services (RQ5)  
We found evidence of changes in practice in the front-line services (i.e. clinical team level) in our 
case study sites. In organisational terms these were not so much changes in formal accountabilities 
or hierarchies as in the routinisation and standardisation of certain working practices. In practice, 
inter-professional working had been strengthened, the clinical teams had become more like 
multidisciplinary teams, and a more open climate developed that was more focused on patients and 
their care rather than on the hierarchical managerial structures, for example the safety governance 
(assurance) system which appeared to have little effect on the quality and safety of care
Clinical teams developed and were developing skills that allowed them to adapt and improve the 
reliability and therefore safety of patient care. This was mostly achieved by using quality 
improvement methodology; including ‘The Model for Improvement’ and ‘Lean’.278 These processes 
involve setting clear patient orientated goals, locally measuring before testing changes judged 
against the aim and the initial measurement. 
The SCORE survey, and its practical impacts, can be understood as a special case of such activity. 
Chapter 7 reported how SCORE surveys developed into a practical intervention on the part of PSCs.
We emphasise that the post-survey debriefing sessions were the essential step through which data 
(survey findings) triggered practical revisions of working practices and changes in working 
relationships. 
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Changes in working practices were both clinical (e.g. falls reduction) and organisational (e.g. 
pathway and service re-design). At that level, the reported impact of PSCs included, in hospitals: 
new staff roles e.g. within triage; sepsis work; incident reporting; and standards and protocols 
becoming more efficient and streamlined. In general practice they included: more time built into 
working week for regular meetings; setting aside one afternoon a month to discuss patient safety 
and QI; and new prescribing software as well as changes to the way blood results are actioned. The 
SCORE surveys and other PSC activity allowed the development of better care and safety 
management systems and processes but also of improving individual and team resilience. This 
resilience the best defence against rare and infrequent events where the systems and process are not 
realistically standardisable. 
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Chapter 11:  Policy relevance
Our findings are relevant to policy in two ways. First, they suggest revisions to some of the specific 
assumptions underlying the ‘programme theory’ about how Patient Safety Collaboratives would 
work, and with what effects (Chapter 2). These revisions consist of generalisable practical 
knowledge arising from this study and they help answer RQ6 (‘What generalisable knowledge can 
be shared about this?’ - that is, about PSCs). They take the form of a revised, more evidence-based 
logic model for PSCs, based on our key findings (Chapters 5-8). Second, we believe some wider 
policy and managerial implications also follow from our findings. 
11.a.  Generalisable knowledge arising (RQ6): How policy makers’ assumptions compared with our  
findings
As we set out in Chapter 4, the answers to our other research questions yield generalisable (hence 
shareable) knowledge by allowing an evidence-based revision of policy makers’ original 
assumptions (‘programme theory’) about the effects PSCs would produce, how, for whom and in 
what contexts. We revised these original assumptions (Chapter 2) in light of our empirical findings 
(Chapters 5-8) and existing research (Chapter 3), and report the revisions mechanism by 
mechanism, including where applicable any context(s) which moderated (facilitated or obstructed) 
these effects. First, in the remainder of this Section, we review what our findings show about the 
evidential status of policy makers’ original assumptions about how PSCs would work. Then, in 
Section b of this Chapter, we outline the changes to those assumptions that our findings suggest. 
11.a.i.  The regional coordinating body and network make providers become more ‘learning’ 
organisations (Mechanism 1) 
In our study regions (and at least one other277) the PSCs recruited providers to participate in their 
network. The providers that volunteered were more often (but not exclusively) hospitals and general
practices than other services. Community, and especially mental, health services were less 
represented. General practices made up a substantial proportion of providers participating in our 
study PSCs but nationally they represented only a small proportion of general practices as a whole. 
This inclusion of general practice in safety collaboratives is relatively unusual; previous safety 
collaboratives had focussed far more on secondary care, possibly due to the US healthcare system 
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having a very different primary care system. This means that this mechanism was partially 
established in terms of service coverage, but more fully established in terms of its range of 
activities (see below). The PSCs we studied appeared willing and able to expand their coverage in 
the future. 
The PSCs and their participating providers undertook activities intended to enable these providers 
to become more like learning organisations in respect of patient safety. Both network and providers 
often equated ‘learning organisation’ with ‘training courses’ and so they focused more on training in
QI methods and sharing experiences than on double- and triple-loop learning (see Chapters 2-3) 
with their implications for providers’ internal managerial structures and control. These activities 
were more specific than the broad ideal type197, or some67,279 might say managerial fashion, of the 
‘Learning Organisation’. The PSC regional coordinating bodies that we studied did help their 
member-providers become learning organisations in the former, narrower sense. 
Policy documents explicitly assumed (Chapter 2) a context:of central policy and NHS 
organisations, especially national organisations, continuing to support PSCs and their activities. In 
the event, overt policy support for PSCs was consistent, although during the study period 
responsibility for the PSCs transferred from NHSE to NHSI, and the latter attempted to link 
separate PSCs’ activities into national sets of networks. However we also found (Chapters 6-7) that 
other concurrent policies, especially the financial and therefore overload constraints on NHS 
providers, severely limited, and in some instances practically obstructed, providers’ attempts to 
initiate or maintain the QI activities that PSCs were promoting. This meant the assumed context was
only partly present, a conclusion that corroborates other studies’ findings (see Chapter 3) as to 
which kinds of policy contexts support Collaboratives and which are inimical. 
11.a.ii.  Each regional coordinating body establishes cross-organisational networks of clinical teams 
Across their recruited providers, the PSCs that we studied were able to establish this mechanism. 
Clinical teams from the providers that participated in the PSCs’ met and exchanged data, 
experiences, knowledge and lessons learnt. As we reported in Chapter 7 these activities helped 
sustain QI activity by the participating clinical teams in their own workplaces. To that extent, this 
mechanism also had its intended effects. 
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Policy documents did not make explicit what contexts would favour or impede such activities. We 
found that the important contextual factor was the availability of staff to participate, i.e. that the 
providers had sufficient staff relative to their workload to allow individuals to meet others in these 
networks, collect the necessary data, then share and implement what they had learned back in their 
own workplaces. Sufficient staff time was a physical requirement. Financial support was no 
substitute if sufficient, or backfill, staff were simply not to be found. Providers seemed able to free 
staff to attend regional training events but much less able to give staff specific time to undertake QI 
work once they returned to their normal roles. Very often, in such situations, we heard that 
organisational pressures took over and QI and safety work was not prioritised. 
11.a.iii.  Each regional coordinating body and network establishes cross-organisational measurement 
systems (Mechanism 3)
This mechanism was not fully established in our PSC study sites nor indeed nationally because 
NHSE then NHSI were slow to set up the proposed NHS-wide central measurement unit and it was 
not fully operational during the study period. Procurement started at the end of 2015 and took 
around two years. At the time of writing this measurement unit has now formed and early 
impressions are positive about its potential effect. Our study PSCs regarded this hiatus as placing a 
‘planning blight’ on regional or local efforts to develop ways clinical teams could directly exploit 
the existing NHS-wide datasets, or indeed even local data-sets, for QI purposes (see Chapter 5). 
PSCs and clinical teams therefore had to adopt – either make or buy - more localised, ad hoc 
approaches to measurement (e.g. the on-line platforms mentioned in Chapter 5). Such approaches 
may serve the purpose of monitoring QI practices and their impacts within a single workplace (for a
single clinical team). At least one (the Life QI system: see https://www.swahsn.com/
i mprovement/patient-safety-collaborative/collaborate-life-qi/   ) was also designed to give clinical 
teams the capacity to compare themselves with counterparts in other provider organisations. There 
is also an important difference between data for improvement, which are local and used by small 
clinical units and data for assurance, which are used across organisations, in that assurance data 
have the potential to (and in fact often are) used for performance management. 
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Because of its absence during our study period we could not observe whether this mechanism, 
a cross-organisational measuring system, had or would have had its intended effects. 
National policy statements presupposed (see Chapter 2) that a similar context was required for this 
mechanism to work as for mechanism 1, so our conclusions about that context also apply here. 
11.a.iv.  The providers which have become learning organisations develop an organisational culture and 
climate more conducive to patient safety and quality improvement (Mechanism 4) 
The providers we studied did attempt to become more like learning organisations within the 
narrower sense noted above, and in doing so attempted to promote a culture and climate more 
conducive to patient safety and quality improvement. In Chapters 6 and 7 we reported their 
expressions of support for such a culture and how our informants thought it might be strengthened. 
Nevertheless the evidence we gathered about the effects of this effort and support was, we noted, 
hard to interpret. We heard qualitative reports (Chapters 6-7) of instances of changes in safety 
climate at clinical team (although also a few to the contrary) and NHS Staff Surveys showed 
changes in the intended direction but we found little SCORE survey evidence of safety climate 
change. Chapter 9 considered some reasons for these paradoxical findings, including the early stage 
and so far limited geographical spread of PSC-instigated QI activities, the countervailing pressures 
of service overload, and above all the presence of other influences (besides PSCs) co-producing the 
intended changes in workplace safety climate. On balance the evidence from this study for the 
presence of this PSC mechanism is at best equivocal. 
As listed above there are many other explanations for the gradual improvement in routine 
administrative data relating to safety which are likely to outweigh the impact of the PSCs, certainly 
during the early stages. These include: the impact of the Francis Report (separately from the 
establishment of PSCs); the legacy of (25%) budget increases from 2006-2010; increased awareness
of guidelines linking to the evidence based medicine movement; improved research and technology 
and improved training of students and junior staff in quality and safety issues. If anything counts as 
a culture change, then the spread of evidence-based medicine does, involving as it has the 
promulgation of new norms of clinical practice, service evaluation and clinical education; new 
working practices; supporting scientific and knowledge-mobilisation structures; and reinforcement 
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of each of these things with official guidance, regulation, monitoring, rewards and penalties. Taking 
Cochrane’s work280 as foundational, both NHS and external agents have sustained, indeed 
strengthened, these forces for culture change for forty years or more. Pending further findings from 
SCORE or similar surveys, a more evidence-based logic model of PSCs would therefore 
supplement PSC-instigated activities with the evidence-based medicine movement as the stronger 
prime mechanism – or more precisely complex of mechanisms - that strengthened safety climate at 
clinical team level. 
The policy makers’ programme theory of PSCs assumed (Chapter 2) that staff training works in 
changing workplace attitudes and skills. We found some qualitative evidence that this was 
indeed the case, a finding which corroborates the balance of (but not all) previously-published 
studies (see Chapter 2 section e.iii). 
We therefore infer that whilst this assumed context for the operation of mechanism 4 did exist, other
contexts not accounted for in the policy-makers’ original programme theory of PSCs acted against 
it. Our findings (Chapters 6-7) suggested that these countervailing factors were: 
1. Workplace conditions which prevented trained staff from applying what they had learnt. 
Such conditions included service overload (such as black alerts) and staff shortages. 
2. Insufficient ‘organisational’ support from higher management and/or resistance from key 
staff or managers (see Chapter 6). 
3. Policy and guidance overload (over-management). 
In some cases these conditions then led to fatigue and cynicism but it is important to add that we 
nevertheless found no evidence of staff resisting or rejecting the norms of a patient safety 
culture. 
11.a.v.  Changed safety culture and climate help clinical working practices to change (Mechanism 5) 
The uncertainty over whether safety culture changed due to PSC activity in the workplaces we 
studied means we have to be cautious in concluding that any cultural changes caused by PSCs 
motivated and produced the reported changes in clinical work practices. Previous studies (see 
194
Chapter 3) have been equally equivocal about the premise that improving safety culture leads to 
safer care for patients. There is reasonable evidence that safety culture scores are correlated to safer 
care170,281,282 but this is not a consistent finding as other studies have not shown a change.235,283 A 
systematic review in 2015 demonstrated a trend linking culture and outcome, but only a few studies 
found statistically significant correlations.236,284,285 
Clinical team members described to us changes in working practices (Chapter 7), whose 
implementation was accomplished through quality improvement activities including team re-design 
of parts of care pathways. In our study sites the feeding back of climate survey (e.g. SCORE) results
created new links between safety climate change (in this case, the measurement, feed-back and self-
evaluation of that change) and changed working practices. Nevertheless routine administrative data 
showed (Chapter 8) no evidence of resulting changes in in-patients’ overall experience scores, 
occurrence rates for the four most common hospital harms, incident reporting or hospital mortality 
rates per 100 patient spells attributable to PSCs or indeed to any other cause. This may be explained
(see Chapter 9) mostly by the dilution of the effects of local, small-scale work changes when they 
are combined with the (absence of) effects on the greater, unchanged parts of care pathways. 
Policy documents about PSCs assumed that three contexts moderated the culture-safety relationship
(mechanism 5). 
1. Staff training helps create or strengthen new working practices  : As noted above, the 
qualitative evidence that we found lends limited support to this assumption. 
2. The provider has sufficient staff  : We found evidential support for this assumption, or 
more precisely clear evidence for its converse: low staffing levels relative to workload 
(Chapter 7) caused QI work to be postponed at times of high demand on services which by 
2016 were becoming increasingly frequent and prolonged. 
3. Contractual incentives align with the new working practices  . At the time of this study NHS 
providers faced a range of incentives, not limited to contractual cash payments. Although we
asked our informants about them, financial incentives to providers (health resource groups 
(HRG), CQUIN for hospitals and QOF payments for general practices) did not figure much 
in our qualitative evidence (Chapters 6,7) and this suggests that whilst these incentives did 
not positively ‘align’ with the new working practices, they did not inhibit them either. They 
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acted neither as incentives nor as disincentives to the kinds of QI work that PSCs were 
created to promote. Instead, the relevant incentives were those that operated through 
performance targets. Notwithstanding NHS foundation trusts’ nominal organisational 
independence or the inclusion of these targets in service contracts, performance targets 
operated for all practical purposes as line-management-like incentives on senior managers to
meet financial and service access requirements. (An earlier commentator286 described them 
as management by ‘targets and terror’.) As we reported in Chapter 7 these incentives were in
practice often ‘unaligned’ with the QI work that PSCs intended clinical teams to carry out, in
the sense of creating an unaccommodating context for it at clinical team level. 
As we noted in Chapter 3, earlier studies mention additional contextual factors favouring changes in
working practices: that the clinical team be already familiar with ideas and working practices 
similar to the proposed new ones287; and the new working practices be simple2 and compatible (or 
easily made compatible) with the remaining unaltered work practices.124,182,184 
11.a.vi.  The cross-organisational network(s) of clinical teams help clinical working practices to change 
(Mechanism 6) 
In Chapters 5 and 7 we reported that our study PSCs did establish cross-organisational networks of 
clinical teams, at least across providers that participated in the Collaboratives. Where it existed this
inter-organisational collaboration between clinical teams had its intended effects in that some 
clinical teams learnt from one another what changes in working practices were feasible (had been 
achieved elsewhere) and how they had been introduced (see Chapter 7). This finding about PSCs 
therefore corroborates the more sanguine findings of earlier studies into the relationship between 
inter-organisational networks of clinical teams and changes to clinical working practices within the 
networked provider organisations. In many cases (although very variably across the different PSCs) 
these networks already existed and the PSCs chose to support what already existed rather than 
creating new networks. 
11.a.vii.  The cross-organisation measurement systems help clinical working practices to change 
(Mechanism 7) 
As noted, at the time of this study cross-organisational measurement systems of the type foreseen in
policy-makers’ original programme theory of PSCs had not yet been widely established, making it 
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impossible to report yet whether, within PSCs, cross-organisational measurement systems had
(or would have) their intended effect in practice. 
11.a.viii.  The changed working practices result in the outcomes of increased patient safety and quality 
improvement. (Mechanism 8). 
In relation to this mechanism the evidence we gathered (Chapter 8) was again ambiguous. 
Qualitative reports of changed patient outcomes contrasted with the absence of change in routine 
administrative data. Among the possible reasons for this we described, in Chapter 9, the ‘dilution’ of
PSC impacts upon clinical safety and quality. In realist terms, the dilution of the effects of PSC 
activity by services or by parts of a care pathway without that activity is an additional ‘context’, not 
foreseen in policy-makers’ original programme theory for PSCs (see Chapter 2). This means that 
contextual requirement for PSC impact at whole care-group level is for QI activity to take place 
across most of the care pathways for that care group; and the same applies to a whole trust, a whole 
region or a whole health system. 
The changes to working practices were accomplished through quality improvement cycles including
team re-design of parts of care pathways, as we elaborated in Chapter 7. This finding contrasts with 
the policy-makers’ initial programme theory (Chapter 2) but aligns with previously published 
studies (see Chapter 3) in suggesting that two distinct and sequential mechanisms, not just one, 
connect changed safety climate to changed working practices: 
 1. Shifts in organisational culture and climate legitimate and motivate learning by clinical 
teams. Clinical teams learn how to identify, measure, critique and improve the ways in 
which their working practices impact upon patient safety and quality of care. Ways to bring 
about these changes in clinical teams’ skills, knowledge and attitudes to other professions, 
can be taught and learned. 
 2. That learning leads, in turn, to changes in the teams’ everyday working practices. Insofar as 
the teams learn partly through cycles of QI activity, changing their working practices then 
extends and reinforces their learning. 
This means the assumed mechanism, Mechanism 8, unpacks into these two separate mechanisms, 
which implies that clinical team learning could take place without much, or any, change in everyday
working practices. We found evidence (see Chapters 6-7) that because of the clinical teams’ 
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workload and staffing pressures, this separation between learning and changed working practices 
had to some extent happened in our study sites. Our findings also suggest that requirement for 
‘sufficient staff with enough time’ is a context that moderates the link between team learning and 
changed working practices rather than to the link between changed working practices and increased 
safety or clinical quality. A causal separation between clinical team learning and changes in working
practice would also help explain why changed safety climate is sometimes but not always 
associated (in this study and in others, see Chapter 3) with changed working practices and therefore 
with increased safety and quality. 
11.b.  A revised PSC logic model  
Our findings suggest that the programme theory assumptions (Chapter 2, Figure 3) implicit in the 
policy statements of NHS Collaboratives were not fully realised. 
Comparing how PSC implementation occurred with our other findings and with earlier research 
allows us to move towards a more evidence-based logic model for PSCs. Presented graphically it 
would resemble Figure 3 in Chapter 2 but unlike the policy-makers’ original programme theory and 
PSCs as in fact implemented (Chapters 5-8) it would have the following characteristics (presented 
at they appear in the revised logic model, not in order of importance). 
 1. Recognition of the wider, older EBM movement as a safety culture-making mechanism 
predating and underlying the work of PSCs’ network-level coordinating organisations 
(AHSNs). 
 2. In practice local cross-provider measurement systems would suffice for Collaborative 
purposes, i.e. to enable clinical teams in different provider organisations to compare 
activities and learn from another. A national system would obviously enable wider 
comparisons and may have other policy considerations in its favour (e.g. public 
accountability, transparency, assisting research) but has a potential pitfall. The value in 
feeding back SCORE Survey results to clinical teams was that they could use the results 
formatively, as data whose only repercussions were to guide their selection of working 
practices to change and inform their selection of methods for doing so. This is different to 
making SCORE (or any other) measures into obligatory, summative quality measurements, 
in effect another performance indicator (especially one that triggers penalties or rewards). 
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Our informants thought that use of measurements as potential performance indicators was 
difficult to reconcile with using measurements to motivate safer working practices. 
 3. Incorporation of our finding that culture change does not change working practices directly 
but does so through two sequential links: 
(a)  A culture of EBM and ‘learning’ encourages clinical teams to learn QI methods. Then, 
(b)  Team learning of QI methods leads to changes in working practices (SPC, PDSA cycles 
etc.). 
We found instances (Chapter 7) where clinical teams’ experience of making working 
practices safer or of higher quality for patients had a reinforcing effect on safety climate. 
‘Culture’ change may be as much an effect as a cause of QI activity and safer working 
practices, in a ‘virtuous circle’. Team learning only changes working practices provided the 
context – i.e. time, staffing, workload, budgets - allows. This has implications for what kind 
of ‘staff training’ context is required. Its necessary kernel is quality improvement skills, 
especially PDSA and measurement, skills; the wider ‘learning organisation’ aspect (i.e. what
Senge197 and others288 describe as a ‘Learning Organisation’) is elaboration. Clinical teams 
are the critical audience for this training, and were for PSCs’ developmental activities. 
 4. Concomitantly, if provider organisations are to become ‘learning organisations’ for PSC 
purposes, 'bottom-up' approaches to safety management are required. One aspect is for a 
clinical team’s ‘home’ organisation to adapt its managerial structures to allow QI-trained 
staff the discretion and resources to implement what they have learnt. That helps sustain the 
changes in management, climate and work practices that Collaboratives’ activity, especially 
at the level of clinical teams, is intended to produce. Another requirement is that the 
provider’s managers allow clinical teams discretion to adapt QI activities to their local 
needs, and let clinical teams take ownership of a given project or change in work processes 
(our findings suggest this also promotes staff engagement and motivation). We found 
evidence of the necessity, for PSC work, of recruiting expert leadership ‘champions’ at every
level (network, whole-provider, clinical team) and of ensuring that managers and the 
champions normalise, hence fully embed, QI and safety improvement at each of these levels.
 5. Ensuring that provider-level conditions do not severely constrain clinical teams’ ability to 
translate Collaboratives’ activity into practice. That is: 
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(a) Providing sufficient clinical staff relative to workload, enabling staff to undertake QI 
work consistently. 
(b) Doing one or both of two things that have the potential to counteract the dilution of PSC 
impact, i.e. to make PSC impacts more salient: 
 i. Extend the scope of PSC work (hence its resources including projected life-span) so 
that it covers whole services, care groups, even whole NHS trusts or integrated care 
organisations. 
and/or 
 ii. focus PSC activity on specified services, care groups or safety problems, preferably 
along the whole care pathway. 
Either or both of (b)i and (b)ii are also necessary for there to be a prospect of improvements 
in patient safety and quality becoming detectable in changes in the routine administrative 
data sets that we analysed. 
The revised logic model retains the other aspects of the policy makers’ original programme theory 
essentially as they were and is shown in Figure 3 below. Grey lines show missing mechanisms 
which the policy documents anticipated but which at the time of this study PSCs had not set up; and
grey dotted lines indicate the corresponding but in practice inoperative required contexts. The 
mechanisms that were set up but whose effects were compromised by contextual factors are shown 
as hollow lines. Dotted boxes and lines again indicate contexts in the realist sense of moderators i.e.
conditions which strengthen or weaken the causal link. As Chapter 10 explained the wider 
evidence-based medicine movement and institutions (NICE etc.) now appear as an additional 
national-level initiating mechanism, in parallel with PSCs themselves, that contribute to changing 
workplace safety climate. As another context we add non-dilution or, putting it in more positive 
terms, sufficient ‘Salience of QI and safety activity’, meaning how far that activity extends along 
each care pathway. To prevent confusion with the corresponding figure in Chapter 2, Figure 3 below
does not number or re-number the mechanisms. 
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Figure 3: PSC Implementation: A Revised Logic Model
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While (as Figure 3 shows) many of the PSC programme mechanisms were set up, it was (as earlier 
chapters noted) with limited coverage across services. A graphic can show that the mechanisms did 
operate in a temporal sequence, but not how long that took nor how many providers and services 
they influenced. In practice at least 18 months were required for the effects of PSC activity to 
‘trickle down’ to clinical team level. This time-scale applied in PSCs that inherited sophisticated QI 
and safety systems; others needed longer, with some PSC leads citing three and a half years as the 
minimum time needed. Upper-level organisational changes within the NHS during the start-up 
period lengthened the time required by most PSCs. 
11.c.  Wider policy and management relevance  
The findings reported above suggest a number of wider policy and managerial implications that 
would increase the likelihood and extent of PSC impacts on the safety and quality of NHS, and 
NHS-funded, care. Summarise below, these concern giving PSCs sufficient time to produce their 
intended impacts; a context of organisational stability; scope for facilitative rather than 
performance-management strategies; small data; the salience of PSC activity; and ameliorating the 
providers’ circumstances. 
11.c.i.  Giving PSCs sufficient time
In Chapters 5-7 we reported, and in Chapter 10 we analysed, the timescales required for PSCs to 
establish and sustain the clinical team-level safety improvement activities and outcomes that current
policy intends (see Chapter 2). In NHS settings at least, but also elsewhere (see Chapter 3), some 
years are required to: 
1. Set up coordinating networks and ‘engage’ and recruit provider organisations to participate 
(see Chapter 5). 
2. Recruit and prepare the safety ‘champions’ (Chapter 5). 
3. Establish the necessary measurement systems at clinical team and inter-organisational levels
(which has so far taken two years: see Chapter 5). 
4. Enable repeated cycles of improvement (e.g. by means of repeated SCORE or similar 
surveys) to occur. In NHS practice a cycle of survey, debriefing, corrective action and re-
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survey, together with ad hoc outcome measurement and re-measurement, takes at least a 
year (Chapter 7). Repeated cycles are required to sustain and normalise QI and safety work.
5. Overcome the dilution of PSC impact by subsequently adding ‘late adopter’ providers and 
services into QI and safety activity. 
Our informants thought that altogether the above implied a five to ten year timescale, at the level of 
a whole PSC. The requirement for time and continuity incidentally implies that there is sometimes a
sound rationale for 're-badging' existing, still-developing QI and safety activities in order to 
accommodate and continue them within later policy initiatives. 
11.c.ii.  Organisational stability 
In Chapter 5 we reported how the formation and initial work of PSCs were made more difficult by 
organisational instabilities at national and at clinical team levels. At national level, the transition 
from NHSE to NHSI disrupted oversight of the PSC programme. It left leaders of the individual 
PSCs unsure of their position, particularly their financial position: budgets were not confirmed until
well after the PSCs had to start spending money. This resulted in significant inertia, but to different 
extents across different PSCs. Those PSCs that inherited more extensive QI work were prepared to 
take more risks and just get on with their programmes. Those with less experience and inheritance 
practically stalled waiting for more coherent higher authority. Recently an NHSI review of the PSCs
has been mooted. NHS managers have had experience of ‘reviews’ turning into programme 
abolition. A review that creates uncertainty as to how long PSCs will continue would restrict their 
ability to create the conditions to allow providers and front line staff to improve the care of patients 
because as explained above the Collaborative methods have to be applied consistently over a 
medium- or long-term time-scale. The transition from NHSE to NHSI resulted in a degree of 
perceived chaos and managerial inertia, especially in the PSCs which inherited less mature quality 
and safety improvement infrastructures. For that reason and because of the time-scales required to 
produce safer working practices at clinical team level, it would in our view be ill-advised to 
reorganise the PSCs just when some are beginning to achieve practical impacts. 
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11.c.iii.  Facilitative rather than performance management strategies
Our findings also highlighted (Chapter 7) the centrality of clinical teams in PSCs’ (indeed, any) 
safety and QI work. In our view this is an argument in favour of PSCs pursuing the Facilitative 
strategy (see Chapter 5) where possible, building on existing QI and safety activity so that the latter 
becomes, so far as possible, emergent ‘from below’. The value in feeding back SCORE survey 
results to clinical teams was that the teams could use the results formatively to select working 
practices to change and methods for doing so. This is an argument against using the results of such 
surveys summatively as another performance indicator (especially one associated with penalties or 
rewards), which could be expected to reduce the psychological safety of QI work at clinical team 
level, tend to inhibit criticism and revision of existing working practices and relationships, and so 
be counter-productive of the policy objectives set for PSCs (Chapter 2). Whilst the PSCs used the 
SCORE survey to review and revise working practices and relationships (see Chapter 7), any 
equally valid instrument with similar psychometric properties would in our view probably have 
similar impacts if it was used for debriefings in a psychologically safe climate (not for performance 
management) and to trigger cycles of improvement activity. Because the PSCs were complex 
adaptive systems reacting and responding to local situations in varied ways, any attempt to manage 
PSCs uniformly and force them in one particular direction would risk hampering their ability to 
promote and allow the locally-originating work to occur that will ultimately lead to better patient 
care. In our opinion it would be useful for NHSI to study the emergent behaviours of each PSC, 
support positive behaviour, dampen negative behaviour and resist the temptation to apply a ‘one 
size fits all’ managerial approach. Alongside this, if provider organisations are to become ‘learning 
organisations’ for PSC purposes, a 'bottom-up' approach to safety management will be needed. 
By now the cultural influence of EBM may seem well established but it is uneven, EBM is more 
prominent in general medicine for example than in much of mental health. This means start-up 
support for Collaboratives may be especially important in domains where EBM remains less 
developed and embedded. Furthermore, learning by clinical teams is a discrete step linking changes 
in safety climate to changed working practices. This has implications for what kind of training is 
required; the essential core of this must be QI and measurement skills, especially in relation to 
PDSA. Clinical teams are the critical audience for this training and this is reflected in existing PSC 
activity.  
204
11.c.iv.   Small data
NHSI is now addressing the absence of cross-provider measurement systems for PSC purposes (to 
enable clinical teams within different provider organisations to compare activities and learn from 
one another). However the ‘dilution’ of PSCs’ impact within larger data-sets (Chapter 8) 
underlines114 that the measurement systems required for QI work need to collect and compare data 
at the level of the particular clinical team (or other work-group) that is undertaking QI and safety 
work. For psychological safety these local measurement systems should be disconnected from 
systems that reward or penalise individuals. In our view, the development of measurement systems 
to support PSC activity should accommodate, indeed focus upon, this small data as much as on the 
‘big data’ that compare whole NHS trusts. 
11.c.v.  Increasing the salience of QI and safety work
To reduce the dilution of PSCs’ impact sufficiently for that impact to become perceptible in changes
in routine administrative data, it would be necessary to extend the scope of PSC work to cover 
whole services, care groups or provider organisations. Proportionately, PSCs’ work was 
concentrated in acute hospitals. Whilst general practices were strongly represented among the 
providers engaging with PSCs, the number of general practices at large is so much higher that these 
participants still represented only a small minority of general practices overall, including the ‘new 
models’ of ‘at scale’ general practices, multi-speciality community providers and primary and acute 
care systems. Community health services and mental health services were also less represented than
acute hospitals. General practices apart, the non-NHS owned providers which engaged with PSCs 
were few and small (e.g. pharmacies, nursing homes). So far as we are aware, the large corporate 
and non-for-profit private providers did not participate. 
11.c.vi.  Ameliorating providers’ circumstances
We found clear evidence (see Chapters 5-7) that demand overloads, staff shortages and budget 
constraints were the biggest practical obstacle to providers, especially clinical teams, being able to 
do QI and safety work, and therefore to realising the intended impacts of PSC activity. Although 
there seems little immediate prospect of these circumstances improving, the more that policy 
opportunities arise to ameliorate these problems, the greater the likelihood of creating enough of the
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‘organisational slack’ that, according to existing research findings207,289, creates the leeway for 
innovation in general, and in this case to enable clinical teams to undertake safety and QI 
improvements consistently. 
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Chapter 12:  Conclusions and further research
12.a.  Conclusions   
PSCs have had an impact on working practices in some clinical teams in some providers, hospitals 
and general practices among others. They have done so in a challenging context of provider 
overload, shortages of clinical staff, budget constraints and organisational instability. In light of 
these circumstances, of the small scale of PSCs in comparison with the NHS as a whole, and of the 
timescales required to change the working practices that impact upon quality and safety in 
healthcare, it would be unreasonable to expect these impacts to be visible even in the latest 
available relevant routine administrative data-sets, and this is supported by our observations. 
We conclude that changes in safety climate at clinical team level do not necessarily change working
practices directly. Rather, changes in organisational culture legitimate and motivate clinical teams’ 
learning of new working practices, of quality improvement methods, and of safety measurement. 
When they have done this, members of clinical teams then attempt to put what they have learnt into 
practice at work. Whether they can do so depends upon their having the necessary permission to do 
so, as well as sufficient time, staff and other resources. None of this, however, requires safety 
climate at team level to change before working practices can change. Climate is not motivation. 
Working practices can be changed without prior changes in safety climate, and in our study sites 
they were. Our finding that PSC activity did not swiftly change the safety climate in the clinical 
teams for which we had data may tell us more about policy-makers’ and others’ assumptions about 
‘culture change’ in the clinical workplace than about the practical impacts of PSCs. Rather, PSCs 
applied, benefited from and reinforced the background influence of the whole EBM movement, 
which represents culture change on a broader scale than PSCs at their current scale could produce 
alone. Rather than wait for culture change, a strategy more likely to produce organisational learning
at clinical team level is the facilitative one of building, where possible, on existing local QI and 
safety work, and stimulating it in a psychologically safe setting where it does not yet exist. This 
approach is somewhat in tension with approaches that might be taken (or mistaken) for another 
form of performance monitoring and management. It may well then influence measurable safety 
culture positively. 
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An unexpected conclusion is that the SCORE Survey acted as a PSC intervention that proved 
capable of stimulating clinical teams to undertake QI and safety improvement activities, and change
working practices. In effect it gave clinical team members permission to identify, discuss and 
address issues within existing working practices and relationships. The SCORE Survey – and others
of its kind – produce ‘small data’ specific to the clinical team addressing a particular QI project 
which for QI purposes is much more useful than (say) trust-wide datasets. For measurement 
systems the practical question, for QI and safety purposes, is how to combine the small data with 
the larger, comparative cross-site datasets. 
At the time of writing (early 2018) we conclude that a period of stability in which PSCs can sustain 
their work and extended it to further providers and services is more likely to promote changes that 
favour clinical quality and safety than would another re-organisation of their work. 
12.b.  Dissemination plans  
Some dissemination of the PiSCES project‘s work has already occurred: 
1. Presentation of emerging findings to South West AHSN and PSC managing directors, 
Exeter, 18th April 2017. 
2. Invited presentation to Health Services Research UK conference on policy responses to 
Francis Report, Nottingham, 6th July 2017. 
3. Invited presentation to dissemination launch event of study of NHS Boards’ response to the 
Francis report, London, 23rd January 2018. 
4. Presentation of emerging findings to AHSN and PSC directors, London, 25th January 2018. 
5. Presentation of emerging findings to AHSN and PSC directors, London, 20th March 2018. 
6. Presentation of findings to CQC, London, 23rd April 2018. 
7. Presentation of findings to Patient Safety Measurement Unit, London, 14th February 2019. 
8. Paper, International Quality and Safety Forum, Improvement Science and Research 
Symposium, Glasgow, 27th March 2019. 
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Subject to the relevant bodies’ acceptance, our dissemination plans include: 
 1. Consultation with PPI groups about what parts of the findings are likely to be of most 
interest to patients, and the best dissemination channels for that purpose. 
 2. Offering feedback sessions to our study sites, and circulating electronic copies of 
publications from the project (see below) to our informants, to the Department of Health and
to other relevant bodies. 
 3. Submission of journal articles, at least and provisionally one overview paper (for a health 
services research or health policy journal) and another presenting our findings on 
organisational culture and safety climate (for an organisational research journal). 
 4. Further collaboration with AHSNs as SCORE surveys continue, laying the basis for a later 
publication about the findings and uses of such surveys. 
 5. Scientific, academic and professional conferences, probably including the BMJ International
Forum on Quality and Safety in Healthcare, the European Health Management Association, 
and Organisational Behaviour in Health Care. 
We are currently working with PenPIG (SW Peninsula CLAHRC patient involvement group) to 
consult them about which of the project findings are likely to be of most interest to patients, how to 
present and communicate them. 
As a more innovative and ambitious dissemination plan however we propose that greater impact 
from this study would be achieved by combining PiSCES dissemination activity with that of the 
other projects concurrently researching the consequences of and responses to the Francis Report. 
The idea would be to produce materials, combining findings from all the studies and tailored for 
specific audiences (managers, policy-makers, patients, researchers etc.): that is, an extended joint 
dissemination project on similar lines to that of the NIHR Health Service Delivery Research 
programme’s extended dissemination of the research studies it has sponsored on the new models of 
primary care and on the re-structuring of stroke services in London and Manchester. 
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12.c.  Further research  
We list the needs for further research arising from this study in what we judge to be descending 
order of importance. 
1. Policy-makers originally intended PSCs to have a five-year life span, presumably on the 
assumption that five years was and sufficient for PSCs to produce their intended effects. 
That is a prima facie argument for extending, or replicating, the present study to cover the 
PSCs’ full initially-intended life-span; in particular, for continuing (repeating) and widening 
(across more sites) the before-and-after comparisons of SCORE survey results in order to 
obtain more robust findings as to whether the impact of PSC and provider managers’ activity
upon safety climate at clinical team level does indeed take at least three years to materialise 
(perhaps as much a consequence as a cause of safety improvement). 
2. Because the revised logic model is formulated in terms of mechanisms and contexts, it is 
applicable to other settings than our study sites. To apply it in this way would expose it to 
further empirical testing, and no doubt further empirical refinement and correction. One 
such refinement would be to build on our findings about contrasting PSC strategies (Chapter
5) to construct a typology of PSCs, informed by different theories of collaborations and of 
networks.
3. Evaluate the effects of PSCs or PSC-like initiatives more widely across community health 
services, mental health service and residential care, to explore whether these settings, where 
EBM is less developed, require specific adaptations for Collaboratives. 
4. Evaluate and understand more fully any causal relationship between changing safety culture 
(and climate) and changing outcomes. Only a few studies have been conducted. One235 
showed that safety climate did not change during the intervention period of a collaborative, 
but that service safety improved anyway (significantly reducing catheter associated urinary 
tract infections)6. Another236 showed that implementing the safe surgery checklist did not 
affect mortality and morbidity but did improve safety culture scores. More generally, further 
research into the relationships between implementation processes and outcomes in PSCs and
other QI initiatives is still needed even now. 
5. Social network analysis (SNA) based on repeated network mapping of PSCs over time 
would be a methodologically strong way of showing the patterns of engagement, the 
clustering of relationships around different priorities, and the connections between PSCs as 
a network of networks. (The foreseeable difficulty however is data collection: such studies 
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would almost certainly require collecting new primary data, for which high response rates 
(>70%) are required to populate sufficiently the square data matrices which SNA requires.  
Whilst using existing data such as e-mail traffic would be technically simple and give full 
data, getting ethical approval for it is, in our view rightly, not straightforward.) 
6. Explore which forms of measurement system (i.e. the corresponding management 
information systems) are best-adapted for PSCs’ safety and QI purposes, in particular the 
ways in which existing NHS management information systems (e.g. those which NHS 
Digital harvests) might be exploited for those purposes; and what adaptations they would 
consequently require. 
7. Develop and use more localised measurement systems, including new primary data if 
necessary, to evaluate the relationships between clinical team learning, changes to working 
practices and safety/quality outcome changes. Such a study would involve examining the 
mechanisms by which clinical teams use such information, and other sources of information,
for QI and safety purposes. 
8. Evaluate which forms of training, especially for clinical teams, are most practicable and 
effective for PSCs’ safety and QI purposes. 
9. In the current state of PSC financial flows, the lack of PSC-attributable changes in routine 
administrative data, and the absence of detailed financial data it remains unfeasible to 
evaluate (and hence to compare) the resources received by PSCs and the economic 
consequences (value) of their health outcomes for patients. A further, more comprehensive, 
study would be able to estimate the direct and probably larger indirect opportunity costs 
relating to PSC activity; thus allowing policy makers to make more informed financial 
decisions. 
10. Previous research has shown that people in more deprived material circumstances are less 
likely to receive appropriate diagnoses and treatments than people from less deprived 
backgrounds.290 Little is known about whether this pattern also applies to healthcare safety.
Finally, this study examined just one of several policy responses to the Francis Report. A study 
integrating the findings from this study with those from the other concurrent studies would produce 
a more rounded view of what has been done, how, and to what effect to increase the safety of NHS 
services. 
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Appendices
Appendix 1: How the PiSCES study enacted the SQUIRE reporting standards. 
Table 38: Standards for QUality Improvement Reporting Excellence (SQUIRE) items 
SQUIRE Item See report section 
1. Title: Did you provide clear and accurate 
information for finding, indexing, and scanning 
your paper?
Yes, see title page 
(a) Indicates the article concerns the 
improvement of quality (broadly defined to 
include the safety, effectiveness, patient-
centredness, timeliness, efficiency and equity of 
care)
Yes, see title page 
(b) States the specific aim of the intervention Yes, see long form of title
(c) Specifies the study method used (for 
example, ‘‘A qualitative study,’’ or ‘‘A 
randomised cluster trial’’)
Yes, see long form of title
2. Abstract: Summarises precisely all key 
information from various sections of the text 
using the abstract format of the intended 
publication
Abstract 
Introduction: Why did you start? Chapter 1
3. Background knowledge: Provides a brief, 
non-selective summary of current knowledge of 
the care problem being addressed, and 
characteristics of organisations in which it 
occurs 
Chapter 3 
4 Local problem: Describes the nature and 
severity of the specific local problem or system 
dysfunction that was addressed
Chapter 2
5 Intended improvement: 
(a) Describes the specific aim 
(changes/improvements in care processes and 
patient outcomes) of the proposed intervention
(b) Specifies who (champions, supporters) and 
what (events, observations) triggered the 
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(timing) 
Chapter 2
6 Study question: States precisely the primary 
improvement-related question and any 
secondary questions that the study of the 
intervention was designed to answer. 
Chapter 1
228
Methods: What did you do? Chapter 4 
7 Ethical issues: Describes ethical aspects of 
implementing and studying the improvement, 
such as privacy concerns, protection of 
participants’ physical
wellbeing and potential author conflicts of 
interest, and how ethical concerns were 
addressed. 
Chapter 4, section1 (research design) and 
Chapter 4, final section
8 Setting: Specifies how elements of the local 
care environment considered most likely to 
influence change/improvement in the involved 
site or sites
were identified and characterised. 
Chapters 2,3,9,10,11,12 
9 Planning the intervention: 
(a) Describes the intervention and its component
parts in sufficient detail that others could 
reproduce it
(b) Indicates main factors that contributed to 
choice of the specific intervention (for example, 
analysis of causes of dysfunction; matching 
relevant improvement experience of others with 
the local situation)
(c) Outlines initial plans for how the 
intervention was to be implemented—for 
example, what was to be done (initial steps; 
functions to be accomplished by those steps; 
how tests of change would be used to modify 
intervention) and by whom (intended roles, 
qualifications, and training of staff). 
(a) Chapter 2 
(b) Chapter 2
(c) Chapter 2
10 Planning the study of the intervention: 
(a) Outlines plans for assessing how well the 
intervention was implemented (dose or intensity 
of exposure)
(b) Describes mechanisms by which intervention
components were expected to cause changes, 
and plans for testing whether those mechanisms 
were effective
(c) Identifies the study design (for example, 
observational, quasi-experimental, experimental)
chosen for measuring impact of the intervention 
on primary and secondary outcomes, if 
applicable
(d) Explains plans for implementing essential 
aspects of the chosen study design, as described 
in publication guidelines for specific designs, if 
applicable (see, for example, www.equator-
network.org)
(e) Describes aspects of the study design that 
(a) Chapters 5-7
(b) Chapter 2
(c) Chapter 4, section 1. 
(d) Chapter 4, passim. 
(e) Chapter 4, section e. 
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specifically concerned internal validity (integrity
of the data) and external validity 
(generalisability. 
11 Methods of evaluation: 
(a) Describes instruments and procedures 
(qualitative, quantitative or mixed) used to 
assess (i) the effectiveness of implementation, 
(ii) the
contributions of intervention components and 
context factors to effectiveness of the 
intervention and (iii) primary and secondary 
outcomes
(b) Reports efforts to validate and test reliability 
of assessment instruments
(c) Explains methods used to assure data quality 
and adequacy (for example, blinding; repeating 
measurements and data extraction; training in 
data collection; collection of sufficient baseline 
measurements. 
(a) Chapter 4, sections b,c,d and Appendix 3 
(Interview Schedule). 
  (a)(i) Chapter 4, section d. 
  (a)(ii) Chapter 4, sections a,e. 
(b) Chapter 4, sections b,c,d. 
(c) Chapter 4, section d. (Blinding; repeating 
measurements and data extraction; training in 
data collection not relevant to this study design.)
12 Analysis: 
(a) Provides details of qualitative and 
quantitative (statistical) methods used to draw 
inferences from the data
(b) Aligns unit of analysis with level at which 
the intervention was implemented, if applicable 
(c) Specifies degree of variability expected in 
implementation, change expected in primary 
outcome (effect size) and ability of study design 
(including size) to detect such effects.
(d) Describes analytical methods used to 
demonstrate effects of time as a variable (for 
example, statistical process control). 
(a) Chapter 4, sections b,c,d,e. 
(b) Chapter 4, sections b,c,d,
(c) This observational study was designed to 
measure only the effect direction post facto, not 
its expected (predicted) size. 
(d) Chapter 4, sections c,d. 
Results: What did you find? Chapters 5-8,10.
13 Outcomes: 
(a) Nature of setting and improvement 
intervention 
(i) Characterises relevant elements of setting or 
settings (for example, geography, physical 
resources, organisational culture, history of 
change efforts) and structures and patterns of 
care (for example, staffing, leadership) that 
provided context for the intervention 
(ii) Explains the actual course of the intervention
(for example, sequence of steps, events or 
phases; type and number of participants at key 
points), preferably using a time-line diagram or 
flow chart 
(iii) Documents degree of success in 
(a) Chapters 5-8.
  (a)(i)  Chapters 5-8. 
  (a)(ii) Chapters 5-8.
  (a)(iii) Chapter 9 
  (a)(iv) Chapters 5-8. 
(b) Chapters 5-8.
  (b)(i)  Chapters 5-8. 
  (b)(ii)  Chapters 5-8.
  (b)(iii) Chapters 5ff.
  (b)(iv) Chapter 4 section a, Chapters 5-8. 
  (b)(v)  Chapter 9. 
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implementing intervention components 
(iv) Describes how and why the initial plan 
evolved, and the most important lessons learned 
from that evolution, particularly the effects of 
internal feedback from tests of change 
(reflexiveness)
(b) Changes in processes of care and patient 
outcomes associated with the intervention 
(i) Presents data on changes observed in the care
delivery process 
(ii) Presents data on changes observed in 
measures of patient outcome (for example, 
morbidity, mortality, function, patient/staff 
satisfaction, service utilisation, cost, care 
disparities) 
(iii) Considers benefits, harms, unexpected 
results, problems, failures 
(iv) Presents evidence regarding the strength of 
association between observed 
changes/improvements and intervention 
components/context factors
(v) Includes summary of missing data for 
intervention and outcomes. 
Discussion: What do the findings mean? Chapter 9
14 Summary
(a) Summarises the most important successes 
and difficulties in implementing intervention 
components, and main changes observed in care 
delivery and clinical outcomes 
(b) Highlights the study’s particular strengths. 
(a) Chapter 12
(b) Chapter 9
15 Relation to other evidence: Compares and 
contrasts study results with relevant findings of 
others, drawing on broad review of the 
literature; use of a summary table may be 
helpful in building on existing evidence. 
Chapters 3,9. 
16 Limitations: 
(a) Considers possible sources of confounding, 
bias or imprecision in design, measurement, and 
analysis that might have affected study 
outcomes (internal validity)
(b) Explores factors that could affect 
generalisability (external validity)—for 
example, representativeness of participants; 
effectiveness of implementation; dose-response 
effects; features of local care setting 
(c) Addresses likelihood that observed gains 
may weaken over time, and describes plans, if 
any, for monitoring and maintaining 
(a) Chapter 9
(b) Chapter 9
(c) Chapters 5-9 
(d) Chapter 4. 
(e) Chapter 9
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improvement; explicitly states if such planning 
was not done 
(d) Reviews efforts made to minimise and adjust
for study limitations 
(e) Assesses the effect of study limitations on 
interpretation and application of results. 
17 Interpretation: 
(a) Explores possible reasons for differences 
between observed and expected outcomes 
(b) Draws inferences consistent with the strength
of the data about causal mechanisms and size of 
observed changes, paying particular attention to 
components of the intervention and context 
factors that helped determine the intervention’s 
effectiveness (or lack thereof) and types of 
settings in which this intervention is most likely 
to be effective 
(c) Suggests steps that might be modified to 
improve future performance 
(d) Reviews issues of opportunity cost and 
actual financial cost of the intervention. 
(a) Chapter 9
(b) Chapters 9,12 
(c) Chapter 11
(d) Chapters 5-8. 
18 Conclusions: 
(a) Considers overall practical usefulness of the 
intervention 
(b) Suggests implications of this report for 
further studies of improvement interventions. 
(a) Chapters 11-12 
(b) Chapters 11-12 
Other information: Were there other factors 
relevant to the conduct and interpretation of the 
study? 
Chapter 9 
19 Funding: Describes funding sources, if any, 
and role of funding organisation in design, 
implementation, interpretation and publication 
of study. 
Chapter 4, section 4; Acknowledgements 
section. 
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Appendix 2: Informants’ job titles. 
Level 1: PSC network 
1. PSC lead (AHSN1) (AHSN Alpha) 
2. PSC lead (AHSN2) 
3. PSC lead (AHSN3) 
4. PSC lead (AHSN4) 
5. PSC lead (AHSN5) 
6. PSC lead (AHSN6) 
7. PSC lead (AHSN7) 
8. PSC lead (AHSN8) 
9. PSC lead (AHSN9) (AHSN Beta) 
10. PSC lead (AHSN10) 
11. PSC lead (AHSN11) 
12. PSC lead (AHSN12) 
13. PSC lead (AHSN13) (AHSN Gamma)
14. PSC lead (AHSN14) 
15. PSC lead (AHSN15) 
Level 2: Provider management 
1. Acute trust deputy pharmacist 
2. Mental health/community pharmacist 
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3. GP practice manager 
4. Senior Manager Innovation & Research, CCG 
5. Programme Lead, Mental Health Quality and Patient Safety Improvement Collaborative
6. Head of Safety, Risk & Patient Experience (acute hospital) 
7. GP partner 
8. Head of Patient Safety and Governance, CCG 
9. Associate director, medicines optimisation/CD Accountable Officer
10. Patient Safety Collaborative Programme Manager 
11. Chief Nurse and Director of Quality, Strategy and Innovation, CCG
12. Director of Nursing, acute hospital 
13. Patient Safety Manager, acute hospital 
14. GP & CCG Chair 
15. Director of Nursing and Quality, CCG 
Level 3: Front-line clinical teams
1.  Consultant Emergency Medicine
2.  Senior Sister & Lead Practitioner Emergency Department
3.  ACCS Acute Medicine CT1
4.  Senior physiotherapy practitioner
5.  General practice manager 
6.  GP
7.  Lead receptionist GP surgery
8.  Office Supervisor GP surgery
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9.  Receptionist GP surgery (also trained phlebotomist)
10.  Divisional Head of Nursing (Surgery)
11.  Specialist Nurse Practitioner (Osteoporosis)
12.  Specialist Nurse Practitioner (Falls & Fracture)
13.  Healthcare Assistant (previously receptionist)
14.  Clinical pharmacist, intensive care and cardiology
15.  F2 doctor
16.  Quality improvement fellow for surgery 
17.  Core Trainee Year 2B of Anaesthetic Acute Care, (F1, F2, CT1, CT2A, now CT2B)
18.  Registrar (Colorectal surgery)
19.  F2 doctor
20.  SC7 (colorectal surgery)
21. Post CCT Fellow
22. Associate director for medicines optimisation/CD Accountable Officer
23. Care home practitioner
24. Matron for emergency assessment unit/lead nurse for clinical audit and effectiveness
25. Care home practitioner
26. Discharge to assess programme manager
27. Consultant – medicine for elderly
28. Consultant - emergency Department
29. Consultant – anaesthetist
30. Consultant - emergency Department
31. Lead nurse/senior sister ICU
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Appendix 3: Participant information sheet and consent form
 
n.doran@exeter.ac.uk
Invitation to take part in a research study
PROJECT TITLE
PiSCES – The Patient Safety Collaborative Evaluation Study
SUMMARY
Fifteen Patient Safety Collaboratives (PSCs) have been launched across England with
the aim of improving NHS patient safety and quality. The object of this project is to 
understand how best PSCs can achieve that aim.
RESEARCH QUESTION
In this project we will address four research questions: 
 How have Patient Safety Collaboratives been implemented? 
 What are the costs (in terms of staffing, administration, and non-financial 
factors)? 
 What have been the intended and unintended outcomes (including patient 
safety, sharing best practice, and patient/public views)?
 What are the barriers and facilitators and what lessons can we learn (in 
relation to participation, engagement, outcomes, and perceptions)?
BACKGROUND/CONTEXT TO PROJECT
Safe health care is a basic expectation for patients and the public and a core 
responsibility for healthcare organisations, but healthcare systems sometimes fail to 
provide safe care to all patients. The findings of the Francis Report demonstrated that 
the major changes required to reliably deliver safe health care in the NHS have not 
yet taken place. The Government's response to the Francis Report included a policy 
to implement 15 PSCs covering the whole of England. The PSCs are networks of 
NHS service providers, whose role is to help implement central government policy 
for improving patient safety, but whose implementation activities are adapted to 
reflect a local ownership model; each will last for a minimum of five years.
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Our team, made up of people from the South West Academic Health Science Network
(SW AHSN) and the universities of Exeter and Plymouth (through PenCLAHRC), 
has been funded for two years by the Department of Health to evaluate PSCs.
PROJECT AIMS
Our aim in this research project is to evaluate the progress of the 15 PSCs in the first 
two years to determine what difference they are making and how their impact can be 
maximised in the remainder of the programme. We are taking a realist approach; that 
is, we want to find out what parts of the PSCs work, for whom and in what respects, 
to what extent and how? This approach is increasingly used for evaluations of 
complex multifactorial interventions in favour to the blunter but less nuanced 
traditional research question “did it work?”
We will address these questions:-
 How have the PSCs been implemented in each of the 15 Academic Health 
Science Network (AHSN) regions?
 What organizational changes have providers made? How have they done this 
and what have they learned from the PSCs?
 What are the costs of participation and implementation?
 Have the PSCs made a detectable difference on rates of harm and adverse 
events involving patients as measured using routine data?
 Has change in practice taken place on the front-line of services?
 How has implementation varied across PSCs and what generalisable 
knowledge can be shared about this?
CURRENT ACTIVITY
Our mixed methods study has three strands that will run side by side, each addressing
a different aspect of the work of the PSCs.
Implementation study: qualitative methods
We will identify interview subjects based on their involvement in the implementation 
of PSCs at each system level, following the flow of information and finance as it 
cascades through the system. We estimate we will need to conduct up to seventy five 
semi-structured interviews, aiming to reach theoretical saturation. We will carry out 
high-level interviews across all AHSNs and then more detailed interviews within two 
specific AHSN geographies (one largely urban and one largely rural). The 
interviewees will include AHSN Patient Safety Leads, executive and patient safety 
leads within provider organisations, and front-line staff.
Safety culture: specialised survey
Safety-culture surveys will be conducted at the start of the evaluation period and 
repeated at the end. There is a significant body of evidence linking safety culture to 
improved patient safety and many argue that this is one of the most sensitive ways to 
detect improvement in outcomes for patients. We will work with an international 
company, Safe and Reliable Health Care, that has extensive experience of safety 
culture surveys and has successfully administered its survey in 28 healthcare systems 
across North America.
Service and patient outcomes: re-analysis of routine administrative data
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We will triangulate data from available systems (HED database, SHMI, patient and 
staff surveys, ICD10 coding) across all AHSNs 18 months before the implementation 
of PSCs, at baseline, and then again after 24 months. This will enable us to detect any
differences in overall mortality and morbidity resulting from the PSCs
ANTICIPATED OUTPUTS
The expected outcome of this research is a thorough evaluation of the impact of the 
PSCs. The realist approach will demonstrate what parts of this complex social 
intervention work and for whom they work. Potential impacts are expected to 
include:-
 Enabling NHS England to demonstrate the return on investment of PSC 
funding
 Informing the ongoing running of the PSCs, showing what has worked and 
what has not worked so well
 Guiding future central policy in terms of patient safety.
KEY CONTACT(S)
For SW AHSN: Mr Rob Bethune, email rob.bethune@nhs.net
For PenCLAHRC: Prof Rod Sheaff, email R.Sheaff@plymouth.ac.uk or Dr Iain 
Lang, email I.Lang@exeter.ac.uk
For Qualitative Research Dr Natasha Doran, email n.doran@exeter.ac.uk
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CONSENT FORM
Rob Bethune Surgical Consultant, 
Severn Deanery Clinical Advisor 
South West Academic Health Science Network
rob.bethune@nhs.net
Professor Rod Sheaff,
Health and Social Services Research,
School of Government,
University of Plymouth,
9, Portland Villas,
Plymouth,
Devon PL4 8AA
R.Sheaff@plymouth.ac.uk
Dr Natasha Doran Senior Research Fellow
Qualitative Research in health, medical 
education and practice
n.doran@exeter.ac.uk
Title of project: PiSCES – The Patient Safety Collaborative Evaluation Study
Name of researcher(s): Natasha Doran; Sue Child; Iain Lang; Susan Ball; Antonieta Medina-Lara; 
Rod Sheaff; Rob Bethune.
Tick in this
column or
type “yes”
I understand that the interview will be recorded and that 
This information will subsequently be transcribed.
I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I 
am free to withdraw at any time, without giving any reason, without my 
medical care or legal rights being affected.
I would like to have the opportunity to review and agree the transcribed 
interview before it is used in the research. 
(If “yes”, please return the approved transcript within 1 week of receiving 
it.)
I agree to take part in the above qualitative study:
Signature.............................................. Name…........................................Date..........................................…
Name of researcher taking consent: ...........................................…
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Appendix 4: Interview schedules
Semi-Structured Interview Schedule 
1st Level Interviews PSC Leads
Open ended Question Prompts (if not covered by initial response)
Background questions
Age
Current job title(s)
When took up current post
Previous posts
Purpose and intended outcomes of the PSC
What are the main aims of your PSC?
Who selected them? 
What type of safety topics and 
interventions are you focusing on and 
why? 
How does the PSC accommodate local 
initiatives and local practices with the 
national vision?
Probe: Balance between 'guiding principles' and local
aims. 
History/origins of this PSC Prompt
How was this PSC established
Whose aims predominated in it 
implicitly
What are they trying to do/achieve? 
(What are the outcomes that they are 
looking for?) 
Who co-ordinates the PSC? 
Who runs it in practice?
Probe: Role of AHSN vs. CLAHRC, CCGs, others 
(who?) Balance of clinician vs. managerial. 
Process/implementation Prompt
How have you planned to achieve the 
PSCs intended outcomes? 
Have the collaboratives produced or 
changed department-level policies for 
quality management in the participating
hospitals?
To what extent is your PSC following 
pre-existing activities or introducing 
new ones?
How far have your activities been 
achieved by sharing good practice 
between the sites within the PSC?
Who are the main actors in the network 
of organisations in the PSC? 
Probes: How will it influence practitioners? 
How will it influence: 
NHS Foundation Trusts?
General practices? 
Other service providers? 
Probe: Is it a ready-made model or is it one that you 
have come up with? 
Who does what, who has what roles?
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How do you motivate or empower 
various groups within the 
collaborative?
How does your approach to involving 
and motivating actors differ between 
different groups: i.e. managers, QI 
experts, doctors, patients (other 
groups?)
What contextual factors are likely to be 
important in its implementation? /What 
could possibly hinder or stop your 
progress with the implementation 
process
(PROBE what assumptions (critical conditions) do 
the implementation processes depend on?)
Experience in practice Prompt
At the current stage in its 
implementation, how does it work/how 
far has it been made to work? 
(Insofar as it has been implemented, how has this 
worked in practice?) 
What successes have you encountered?
What barriers have you encountered? 
Vested interests/unforeseen consequences - good or 
bad?
Have you had to deal with any 
uncontrollable or initially unforeseen 
factors or constraints? 
Probe Have your activities run up against the so-
called 'Blame culture'? Have you needed to take any 
steps to confront or weaken it?
How has the implementation activity 
evolved as you have developed it?
Probe: Have you modified your implementation 
process in the light of experience? If so how/to what 
extent?
Can you identify any sites where the 
PSC activity is going well or is likely to
go well? 
Probe Why select those sites? (or providers)
Are you able to identify any sites where
you think it is likely to be difficult or 
problematic to implement PSC activity?
Probes Why? What are the perceived problems and 
difficulties? Why do you think they have arisen? 
Do you know what the possible barriers are?
What methods or resources do you 
anticipate having to use in order to 
counter or circumvent or work around 
these problems? (or barriers)
Reflexivity measures
What do (did) you hope to achieve?
What impact or outcomes were you 
expecting? How has this borne out in 
practice so far?
How is the PSC going about identifying
or checking whether it is achieving its 
objectives? 
What measures it is using? 
Are there any new or innovative 
approaches to your data collection 
being introduced for these purposes? 
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In what ways is it trying to share 
learning both within and across other 
PSCs? 
How is the PSC evaluating itself? How well is it doing this?
PSC leads/managers in charge of 
finances
Prompts
Where do the PSC budgets come from? 
Have the PSC's replaced anything?
What was in place before/what resources and 
programmes have you inherited? 
To what extent is it a reworking of earlier activity 
and what activities have been started from scratch?
What help in kind do PSC's get? 
For example do they get consultant time, 
administrative support?
Can and do the PSCs offer any financial
or material incentives to organisations 
or individuals to implement their ideas?
If the PSC was to be closed down 
tomorrow, what would the PSC 
resources be used for instead?
General questions
It is fairly early days, but do you think 
there's any sense of a culture change 
going on with this activity?
Is there anything important we have not
asked about, or you’d like to add?
Semi-Structured Interview Schedule 
2nd level Interviews 
Patient Safety Leads within provider organisations
Open ended Question Prompts (if not covered by initial response)
Background questions:
Age
Current job title(s)
When took up current post
Previous posts
Prior experience of QI and safety 
work
Prior to the patient safety 
collaboratives, what quality 
improvement and safety work were you
Prompt - what sort of safety topics and interventions 
did you focus on and why?
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involved in within your organisation?
Pre-existing networks/infrastructure  Prompt
Prior to PSCs what experience have 
you had of external bodies involving 
you in this type of work?
What experience did you have of other external 
bodies supporting this type of work within this 
organisation? (Check role of earlier clinical 
networks, national professional organisations, other 
local collaborations etc)
Prior to the PSC, what quality 
improvement work did your Strategic 
Health Authority involve you in?
How does this compare or how has this 
changed since the introduction of 
PSCs?
Impact of PSCs Prompt
What aims or objectives is the PSC 
trying to pursue?
What local objectives of your own have
you added (if any)?
Have you set aside any of the PSCs 
objectives?
Prompt: Which objectives? Why did you do (choose) 
that?
What impacts has the PSC had? Has it had much impact?
Has the PSC been useful? 
If so why? Where has it worked?
For whom and in what context
Are you aware of any negative 
impacts?
Why, in what context and for whom?
(If so, ) How has this happened and 
what can be learnt from it?
Can you tell me about any positive 
impacts?
Why do you think it has worked in this context? 
What do you think are the main facilitators?
What more useful things could the 
PSCs do?
Experience of PSC Prompt
Have you attended any networking 
meetings?
Have they been useful?
Has the collaborative produced or 
changed department level policies for 
quality management within your 
organisation?
Which department(s)? Are there any (which one(s)?) 
that you think are important for patient safety but the 
PSC has not affected?
Have the PSCs done anything or are 
they doing anything to change clinical 
practice?
Could you tell me about your views as to what the 
PSCs have done or are doing to change clinical 
practice?
What activities has it led to? Can you give any examples?
To what extent have the PSCs changed 
your ways of measuring and improving 
patient safety?
Who gets to see the measurement data?
QI methods
The national language includes terms 
such as "scale up and spread" with 
pressures to provide results. In your 
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organisation, how does this fit with the 
QI methodology being that of testing in 
a small area first, before building up to 
scale?
Have you encountered pressures to 
prove outcomes of your PSC activity?
Probe: can you tell me a bit about your views and 
experience regarding this - what kinds of pressure? 
From whom? Why are they exerting this pressure? 
Etc
Have staff within your organisation 
been allocated time within their job 
plan to engage in QI activity?
If so, how much time? Whose? If not, why…
Within your organisation, what 
circumstances have helped you in 
carrying out PSC work?
Probes: what contextual factors are likely to be 
important e.g. resources; people - advocates or 
champions; information; facilities; knowledge; other 
conditions
Probes: in terms of motivation what drives PSC 
activity and what tends to hinder momentum?
Within your organisation, what 
circumstances have hindered you in 
carrying out PSC work?
Probes: people - sceptics, rivals or opponents; 
competing priorities and tasks; lack of resources - 
information, facilities, knowledge; other conditions
Have you had to deal with any 
uncontrollable or initially unforeseen 
factors or constraints?
Probe: Have any of your activities run up against the so-called 
'Blame culture'? Have you needed to take any steps to confront 
or weaken it?
Overall perception of PSCs Probes
What are your views on the 
introduction of PSCs?
Do you think they are a useful initiative?
Do you think they should continue?
How do you perceive the PSCs role and
implications for how this organisation 
is managed?
In this organisation, how have the 
patient safety collaboratives been 
connected with the Q initiative and 
Sign up to Safety?
Probe: have these initiatives had much impact? Have 
they been useful?
Have the PSCs connected these two 
initiatives up, or are they still perceived
as three parallel initiatives?
Do they seem to be consistent with each other?
If the PSCs were to be closed down 
tomorrow what impact would this have 
on your organisation? 
How would you feel? What resources would be 
freed, and what do you think would happen to them 
then?
Projecting forward 5 years what do you 
hope their legacy would be?
General questions
It is early days, but do you think there's 
any sense in which this type of activity 
(which you've described to me in 
answering earlier questions) is 
changing the culture in this 
organisation?
What kind(s) of culture change?
Is there anything important we have not
asked about or that you'd like to add?
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Semi-structured interview schedule
3rd Level Interviews Front line staff
Open ended Question Prompts (if not covered by initial response)
Background questions:
Age
Current job title(s)
When took up current post
Previous posts
Prior experience of QI and safety 
work
(Before 2015)
What quality improvement (QI) work 
have you done before?
Prompt
In particular before 2015?
What activities has that work led to?
Prompt 
Can you give any examples?
Because of what or whom?
Whether and what role has the PSC played in this?
Have there been any changes in your 
working practices as a result of that 
activity?
Prompt 
Because of what or whom?
Whether and what role has the PSC played in this?
Has that activity led to any change in 
occupational roles? How were those 
changes borne out in working practice?
Prompt
Because of what or whom?
Whether and what role has the PSC played in this?
Current experience of QI and safety 
work
Have you been allocated time within 
your job plan to engage in QI and safety
work? Or are you doing this as extra-
curricular?
Prompt
Because of what or whom?
Whether and what role has the PSC played in this?
Have you attended any networking 
meetings? In what ways were they 
useful?
Prompt
Because of what or whom?
Whether and what role has the PSC played in this?
Can you identify any factors which may
hinder or have hindered you in carrying
out quality improvement and safety 
work?
Prompt e.g.
People, sceptics, rivals or opponents, competing 
priorities and tasks, time, lack of resources, 
information, facilities, knowledge, other conditions 
What circumstances have helped you to
carry out quality improvement and 
safety work? 
Prompt
Can you identify any factors which may help or have 
helped you? E.g. time, resources, people, advocates 
or champions of this type of work, additional 
information
Impact of PSCs
Have you heard of the patient safety Prompt
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collaboratives (PSCs)?
when were you first aware of the patient safety 
collaboratives and PSC activity?
Have you heard of the Academic Health
Science Network?
Prompt
AHSNs?
Are you aware of ‘Sign Up to Safety’; 
‘Q initiative’; The SCORE patient 
safety culture survey?
Have these initiatives (Sign Up to 
Safety, Q initiative, PSCs) been 
connected up so far as you can tell, or 
are they in practice three parallel 
initiatives?
Have these initiatives had much 
impact?
Prompt 
Have they been useful?
Has the PSC led to any changes in 
clinical/medical practice?
Prompt
What are your and your colleagues’ views about what
the PSC has done/is doing to change clinical 
practice?
Are you aware of any negative impacts 
(from PSC activity)?
Prompt
E.g. increased workload with no perceivable 
benefits?
Have you been to a workshop, taken a day off work 
and found it hasn't been useful or not added anything 
of value to you?
(If so), how has this happened and what
can be learnt?
Prompt
What changes could be made?
Are you aware of any positive impacts 
(from PSC activity)?
Prompt
E.g. within your work role and your area, being able 
to use the learning you have had from the PSC?
Measurement
How do you currently measure patient 
safety and/or patient quality care?
Has PSC activity led to any changes to 
your ways of measuring and improving 
patient safety?
SCORE patient safety culture Survey
Have you taken part in a safety culture 
survey?
Prompt
Who carried out and provided (funded) the survey?
Have you had extra time within your 
job plan to do this work?
What was your overall experience?
How did you find the survey?
Prompt
Was it helpful?
What changes, if any, has it led to?
Prompt
Positive? Negative?
Did these changes result from the 
debriefing?
Prompt
If so, how?
If not, what did produce them?
Could anything be improved with either
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the process or survey content?
Is there anything important we have not
asked about or that you'd like to add?
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Appendix 5: Example inductive thematic interview summary (level 1)
Thematic Summary PSCL15
Page Text Coding: 
Preliminary 
theme/sub-
themes
Notes
2 “They’ve [stakeholders] progressively 
become more involved. I would be honest and
say that in the first instance when we started 
the national launch in October 14 we had a 
business plan that we still needed to deliver 
[…]. We proposed this and got support for it 
rather than listened in the first instance” later 
more locally driven.
Selecting safety 
topics
Contrast with 
other PSC's
2 Medicines optimisation: "I just wanted 
something in the first instance that got [region
name] members in the room together" […] 
“there was a real strong sense of wanting to 
find something that unified all our member 
organisations. Medicine’s is in all their work 
who wouldn’t want to improve their patient 
safety in terms of efficiency and effectiveness
of medicines in what people are taking?”
PSC aims /selection 
criteria
3 "It's amazing how some of them [PSCs] have 
set themselves up as quite autonomous” […] 
“Ours is fully integrated and the health and 
implementation team adopted and includes 
patient safety collaboratives, there isn't a 
separate WorkStream”
PSC fully embedded 
in AHSN
3 “the AHSN has wealth and industry as one, 
research and informatics as a second and the 
third is health and implementation which 
includes the PSC”. 
PSC structure/ 
WorkStreams
4 “We’ve got […] to think about capability 
building so […] skills in measurement, 
human factors, resilience, culture and safety 
[…], but then we ran a one year IHI 
breakthrough series collaborative for our 
member organisations and we had 9 teams 
complete the whole year. And when I say 
teams they were health economy teams.”
Implementation 
process/training
4 “We had an expert group consider where were
the opportunities for improvement in [region 
name] medicine’s safety and that was local, 
national and international experts that did 
Infra-structure/ 
linking into pre-
existing 
networks/collaboratin
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that. We commissioned the quality 
improvement group called HALO which is 
based at [place name] to be our partners to 
deliver this. Unlike some of the other AHSNs 
who didn’t have good improvement sort of 
access in their footprints we’re very fortunate 
we’ve got AQuA and HALO and [Region] 
Leadership Academy. So unlike some AHSNs
we haven’t set up ourselves as an 
improvement kind of body ourselves, it’s 
already out there. We’d only end up 
competing with them which would be silly. 
It’s about using the assets in the system so 
HALO were our partners on this.”
g with other experts
Comparison with 
other AHSNs 
4 “We did a launch and then we did 3 face to 
face learning sessions over the 1 year period 
and shared the learning between the teams 
and as I say out of the 9 teams there’s 
probably about 3 maybe 3-4 which now have 
something that’s ready to go at scale you 
know being mindful about sustainability and 
where they’ve made significant changes in 
either service specifications, workforce or 
models of care”
Implementation 
process/scale-up/imp
act
4 & 5 “things have as a result changed and of course
we capture the measurement throughout the 
whole programme. If I don’t do myself a dis-
service we saw a 42% increase in the bundle 
of measures for medicines safety that they 
capture the data on over the year. […] I have 
to be honest though, we did start at quite a 
low point [laughs] so it sounds like we’ve had
great improvement but I think we started at 
something like 23% in the bundle of 
measures, but one of the things we said at the 
end if we had that overall driver statement 
that we wanted to make [city] the safest place 
to take medicine’s and on the last day I said 
so do you think you know looking at the run 
charts etc. have we made [city] the safest 
place to take medicines? And the answer was 
no! But what we all agreed was we had made 
it A safer place to take medicines.”
Impact/measurement
5 “We were doing the ramping up of the PDSAs
and sharing the learning as it happened.”
Sharing best practice
5 & 6 “We had patients on our expert panel. We had 
patients at EVERY learning event taking part 
in the presenting programme and every group 
had a patient rep in their team. One group 
took it so far she was so integrated in their 
PPI/patient 
involvement/ 
representation
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team that she actually participated in the 
collection of data. She made some telephone 
calls / follow-up that we were doing about 
confidence of taking medicines post-
discharge. She participated in that which was 
really good. So for some teams that was quite 
different. They hadn’t always had full patient 
engagement in their groups so there was a lot 
of learning around that and we produced some
tools for them in how best to support their 
patient reps and that wasn’t a learning that we
were expecting to see actually, but it did 
really help some of the teams.”
Learning around 
patient engagement
6 “What is interesting is the different range of 
maturity between all those organisations. 
Some are very driven by quality improvement
say for example [place name], then [place 
name] are a Trust who have really invested 
heavily in LEAN methodology. [place name] 
have really invested in patient safety 
champions etc., so some were very skilled 
before they even came in” [for other member 
organisations it was new] “offering them the 
opportunity […] if you think your weakness 
is measurement here’s some modules in 
measurement. If you think resilience or 
understanding your culture for safety in your 
organisation is something you’ve never 
explored you can tap into this. So we didn’t 
presume everybody could be in the 
collaborative and all came in as equals really. 
We made sure there was a range of other 
opportunities to help their developments.”
Organisational 
"readiness"
Differences between 
member 
organisations/
contrasting stages of 
development
PSC as 
supportive/facilitative
role to organisations 
new to QI
6 & 7 “We’ve paid attention to Board developments 
as well, because you can send teams into 
these programmes, but unless the Board 
supports the approach and the methodologies 
etc, and their readiness to adopt some 
innovation for example it’s got to be right 
through to the leadership. So they need a 
different kind of programme. A different 
focus and attention for them to understand 
what their role is in leading improvement in 
their organisations. So yes, a range of 
approaches definitely. […] I think where 
you’ve got organisations that have got a 
maturity around improvement and innovation 
you can sense a permissiveness almost for 
their staff to be able to try things. To have a 
go and fail. Fail quickly and learn etc. There 
Leadership 
support/board level 
support
Comparisons 
between member 
organisations in terms
of leadership/control/
organisational 
readiness 
Adapting 
approach, 
needing Boards
on board.
250
are a couple of organisations I’d say who’ve 
sent people to the group who I remember 
seeing one day that their team leader wasn’t 
there and we asked them to say what’s the 2 
things you’ll do when you go back next week 
or something and they couldn’t say because 
their leader wasn’t there! And so that was a 
really interesting thing to see that the level of 
command and control was tighter in some 
organisations than it is in those who were 
open-minded to learning I guess.” 
Impact of absent 
leadership/Over 
reliance on leader
7 “Measurements, data we’re still waiting for 
the central measurement unit to be procured. 
Well it’s expected to be completed and clearly
we haven’t waited you know we’ve got on 
and done things, but actually its NHS data! 
Give me the data! As an AHSN you don’t 
have access to organisational data. I need to 
have that overview. How else do we work out 
what the priorities are? And so I’d say that is 
to some extent hindering the PSC currently.”
Implementation 
process/contextual 
factors hindering PSC
activity
Barriers to PSC 
implementation
8 “There’s quite a lot of data out there that’s 
publically available, but then for me almost to
aggregate and anonymise all those you know 
if it’s big data then you kind of need that 
analyst sort of support to be able to do that. It 
isn’t about pointing you know to the North or 
the East and saying there’s an issue you know.
You need to be able to present that back in a –
you know in a story that says we are where 
we are, but there is an opportunity to 
improve.”
Accessing data/using 
data to inform 
positive change
8 & 9 “There’s nobody saying we don’t need to do 
any better. Everybody’s actually – there’s 
quite an open and honest culture. It was 
interesting – one of our – at one of the first 
meetings we had for the collaboratives one of 
the patient reps in the room actually became 
quite un-nerved by the openness that people 
had around what can go wrong, what does go 
wrong and he said “oh gosh we trust the NHS 
to be you know secure and now I’m 
wondering whether I need to you know be 
more concerned about some of these things?” 
So they’ve been very open and honest really.”
Experience in 
practice/open and 
honest culture/honest 
about the deficiencies
and areas for 
improvement in the 
system
Culture change
in pockets, 
beginning to 
see more of an 
open and 
honest culture. 
Impact on 
patient 
perspective: 
more aware of 
the risks, 
impact on 
placing trust in 
the system
9 “When you ask people about how things 
could be better here […] there’s usually kind 
of 2 to 3 things they think we come along 
with and one’s money. Give me more money 
How PSC perceived 
by member 
organisations
According to 
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and I’ll do it differently and the other one is I 
haven’t the time and neither wash with me 
really at all [laughs]. We just need to use our 
time better and the money? Well £6.2M spent 
in [city] I don’t think we need to spend 
anymore I think we just need to spend it on 
the right things. So I kind of always put those 
aside but I have to say to be honest to do 
something on a regional footprint, time does 
seem to becoming increasingly difficult and 
by that I mean actually just getting people 
away from their organisation to a central 
location for a day so how we work with that 
because that was clearly becoming an issue 
over the year. We’re doing far more site visits 
in between all the learning events and actually
going out to people and actually seeing they 
can report at a meeting, but actually seeing 
the difficulty they have to deliver change in 
the context of the setting that they’re trying to
do it in, has really, really been useful and so 
in the work we’re commissioning going 
forward this year under the collaborative we 
have put that in so we had one programme of 
work called Advance Team Training for 
Patient Safety and teams come in and they 
work through a project that they want to do 
fully supported, capability building we 
absolutely put site visits in after each 
scheduled face-to-face meeting with them. 
The value just seems to be 1) from the 
learning but 2) not just always expecting 
people to come to you. Go to them. Yeah, so 
we’re definitely taking that as a strong 
approach.”
Perceived barriers to 
improvement within 
member 
organisations
- Time
- Money
Time as a barrier to 
PSC activity/barrier 
to effective 
engagement
Importance of site 
visits/able to witness 
contextual barriers to 
QI work
PSC lead: The 
need to spend 
time and 
money 
differently
Challenges i.e. 
How to free up 
time to 
coordinate 
busy 
professionals
9 Not encountered blame culture "No, no I've 
not seen that at all. Maybe because they are a 
self-selecting group who choose to come and 
do these things (PSC activity). They have a 
very glass half full positive approach"
Blame culture
9 & 
10
"North-west ambulance came in on one of our
projects and they were owning a whole 
problem themselves. They'd looked at the 
journey of an ambulance over the span of its 
shift, which I think was about 12 hours and 
they were concerned that their first break 
wasn’t till about seven hours and the second 
break was about an hour later" […] “If 
anything it wasn't a blame culture, they were 
owning too much of it [the problem] 
Example of people 
fully "owning" the 
problems e.g. 
ambulance service
PSC lead helped 
them to reflect that 
there were a number 
of other systemic 
factors at play 
impacting their 
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themselves" ability to take more 
regular much-needed 
breaks.
10 "Reflecting on the site visits, all I saw was a 
pride and people were so pleased that we'd 
gone to them, keen to show you where they 
worked and how they worked […] It was 
really heartening"
PSC experience RE 
site visits
11 "A couple of teams have found it more 
difficult" PSC lead identified more struggling 
organisations. 
"We haven't taken any action, we’re just 
reflecting and thinking how do we help those 
organisations move into the space where 
coming into a one-year collaborative for 
example, is do-able and possible because 
they've got the right infrastructure"
Areas where 
problematic to 
implement PSC 
activity
The need to tackle 
more "systemic" 
barriers. Difficulties 
freeing up time to 
engage.
11 “for example at our CCG Primary Care they 
don’t have the infrastructure that the acute 
providers have. So they don’t have 
organisational development teams who take a 
strong leadership role in this area. So there’s a
bit of a disparity between primary and acute 
and their provision really that I think maybe 
that needs some attention.”
Comparison acute 
and primary care 
sector
12 “There is a range and there are a couple that 
do struggle […] they have no mandate to 
work with us and we’ve got to make a 
compelling offer that they want to take up and
that’s where one size doesn’t fit all and we 
may have to tailor something differently to 
those organisations. And that’s not about 
blame. That’s – there’ll always be a range 
won’t there and some of that end of the range 
will need something different.”
Engaging 
organisations
12 "It is early days […] It's really only 18 
months if you take it from the national 
launch" […] "I think that it's a journey […] 
even the best organisations that we have in 
the patch, there is always room for 
improvement, so I would see a success is that 
[Beta] work together and that the learning is 
shared, the learning is rapid and we as a 
region improve and improve and improve"
Measurement/legacy
12 & 
13
"We need to get more agile as PSCs to 
understanding what we're doing in each of our
organisations and sharing the learning wider 
than our regions” […] “That's a mark of 
success, that people have adopted and spread 
things that have grown in [city]"
Sharing best practice
253
13 “from a capability building point of view we 
do evaluate obviously the modules that are 
offered or the short project span. We use the 
Kirkpatrick evaluation model”
“we just need to understand the impact better 
and to follow the impact whether on an 
individual or team basis or an organisation 
basis.”
Evaluation/ 
understanding impact
Also using 
AQuA to help 
with 
measurements 
see page 13
14 “I guess you articulate your objectives and 
your ambitions and aims and self-check 
against that. We have on this occasion as 
patient safety leads in this first quarter now 
started to map that out in a shared approach 
because we were all using different ways I 
guess of demonstrating what we were doing. 
So we’ve kind of drawn from the logic model 
trying to articulate in those sort of 6 spaces of 
the logic model where we’re delivering what 
we’re delivering and what the impact might 
be.”
How PSC is 
evaluating itself.
The logic model
Collaborating with 
other PSC leads
14 “We’ve now started to have a development 
session prior to what is the kind of operational
PSCLs meeting. So we have a dedicated slot 
pre-meeting to focussing on a topic. So that’s 
a space where we can do a lot more sharing. 
We shared simple things like plans on a page 
and dot matrixes of where we’re working so 
we can […] recognise where someone’s doing
something similar. […] just do that old 
fashioned thing and pick up the phone but we 
have now developed and brought forward a 
number of cluster groups.”
PSC lead 
meetings/clusters
15 Clusters were formed through sharing best 
practice and recognising that e.g. a number 
were already working on discharges: "We just
organised ourselves and these are strong 
people these patient safety leads. We don't 
wait to get given permission, so the cluster 
groups just emerged. People organised 
themselves. You know leads, they are natural 
leaders really who were taking those groups 
forward."
"Some of them are beginning to be so active 
that they may need secretarial support etc 
these can be really effective models you know
improvement labs for want of a better word, 
that have got themselves organised already"
Clusters
how 
formed/becoming 
more organised/ 
professionalised
15 Plan on a page: organised by "the Chair of the
group"
‘Plan on a page’ 
developed as 
‘marketing tool’ to 
For patient 
safety congress
planned for 
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explain AHSN and 
PSC
July 2016 
16 “We haven’t any money yet which is causing 
difficulties certainly here for us to do that 
planning for what the activities this year will 
be. All the noise and the mood music is 
patient safety collaborative money will come 
out of NHSI which is where it reports to Mike
Durkin’s team. That money will be sent to 
NHS England and NHS England will then 
send it to the AHSN but we’re almost at the 
end of quarter one and we have no money 
yet.”
Finances/ barriers to 
PSC activity
Funding flow:
DH
↓
NHS I
↓
NHS England
↓
AHSN
17 “So if you think about commissioning the 
medicines safety collaborative – the one year 
collaborative that was £210,000.00 to deliver 
over a year. So I can’t start anything of that 
volume and size until I know about the money
so that’s a real issue. Some of the PSCs – so 
the share from NHS Improvement is equal for
all AHSNs but some of your AHSN finances 
have a small amount of patient safety money 
in as well. Now that’s because AHSNs are 
given different amounts of money depending 
on whether they were Phase 1 or Phase 2 and 
depending on their size means there will be 
some variation in what comes through from 
core budget.”
Delay in accessing 
funds/barrier to PSC 
activity
Comparison 
with other 
PSCs: funding 
is equal from 
NHS 
improvement 
"but from the 
core AHSN 
budget, that's 
where there'll 
be subtle 
differences"
17 “early adopted AHSNs there was like a Phase 
1 and a Phase 2 and some got a lot more 
money in Phase 1 to get them off the ground 
quickly and then in the second year they got 
less and the Phase 2 people got more in the 
second year so it’s quite complicated 
[laughs].”
Funding distribution 
for PSCs
18 “approaches we may take this year is offering 
teams an opportunity to join an improvement 
science for patient safety group and to deliver 
this it would normally cost £15,000.00 per 
team. So what we might do is put that out as a
bursary so people could see I’m getting that 
free, the AHSN are going to pay it and they’re
paying £50,000.00” […] “grants, bursaries 
[to] broker opportunities so we’re working 
with one of our CCGs who want to do some 
identification of atrial fibulation using a new 
innovation that they’ve had to purchase so we
wrote a bid with them for the access to 
innovation fund”
Grants/bursaries
New approach to 
team learning and 
engagement
19 “It’s a bit of a bold and brave decision but we Delaying activity 
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have not pressed the go on anything until we 
get that money.”
“Some of them [other PSCs] have gone at risk
and gone ahead. So we’ve still got activities. 
We’ve got evaluation and publication work 
going on. We’ve got scoping exercises being 
undertaken. But as I say, as to triggering 
something with a high finance factor value 
that’s not going to be done until we know 
we’ve got the money in the bank!”
until funds are 
secured/contrast with 
other PSCs
19 “We would just shrink our operational – our 
business plan for the year! That’s because of 
that integral function with the AHSN. I would
look at the portfolio of work and I’d have to 
reduce what our ambitions and aims were.”
“We’re pretty under-resourced and we’re 
pretty under-powered, but it would just shrink
us even further”
Embedded in pre- 
existing AHSN/
Benefits: more 
protected if PSC 
funding stopped
19 & 
20 
“Our PSC work, I see that as an umbrella 
which also includes Signup to Safety and the 
Q initiative" […] "When you bring those 
three together, that's where I feel there's been 
more power and more movement and a sense 
of change"
Culture change
comparison across 
PSCs
All three 
announced by 
Jeremy Hunt in
response to the 
Berwick report
20 & 
21
Q initiative: 10 places for each region "we've 
surfaced people across the system who 
obviously are part of this wider, national 
network, but what does that mean locally as a 
network of improvement leaders? And what 
return to [Beta] does that give us and how do 
the AHSN and the patient safety collaborative
in particular, support those to deliver 
improvement in the wider footprint than just 
their organisation" […] “This is where you 
get the connectivity across the system that 
actually means [Beta] works together to move
us forwards. It's very exciting I think"
Recruitment to Q initiative "it's limitless now"
National networks/
impact on local 
regional structures/
Q initiative
The AHSNs 
were involved 
in the 
recruitment to 
Q initiative in 
their region: 
“the glue in the
area was the 
AHSN really 
[…] The 
Health 
Foundation and
NHS England 
offer 
opportunities 
and a national 
view, but 
locally it’s the 
AHSN that’s 
the glue”
21 All organisations in [Beta] have signed up 
"apart from six CCGs" Learning events were 
held to help this process: "now we’re looking 
at the spread and so care homes for example 
would perhaps be an opportunity to widen 
that cohort"
Sign up to Safety
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"On Signup to Safety, it was a little bit 
difficult for them [CCG's] because the 
language used is you know very sort of acute 
trust focused"
22 “One thing that we mull over a lot really at 
the patient safety leads meetings is the metrics
and demonstrating impact and some of it’s not
a number crunching thing. Some of it is a 
cultural shift as opposed to you know 
reducing mortality rates. There needs to be 
space for both really. So I think we are 
struggling to understand or we’re evolving 
our thinking really around how we might best 
demonstrate that. You know we don’t want to 
be a hostage to fortunes but you know there is
that grand ambition of reaching 5000 lives 
saved. […] there isn’t necessarily absolute 
clear lines to: “I did this; we made it better” 
because the system’s learning and evolving all
the time. Hopefully there’s a correlation but 
yeah, how best to demonstrate that I think is a
challenge for them at the moment.”
Measurement and 
impact
current stage in 
process
22 & 
23
“it’s just one of those tectonic plate shifts isn’t
it? It’s always moving really” […] “So really 
it’s just keeping up with those moving plates 
to see can we be the thread that no matter 
what changes we make, patient safety 
shouldn’t be the thing that suffers or loses the 
momentum.”
Organisational 
changes/churn in the 
system/impact on 
PSCs/ PSCs role
23 “We have had a change of Managing Director 
– just one change. Our first Managing 
Director had been in a year and so our 
second’s been with us now 15 – 16 months 
but hasn’t really had I would say any impact 
or change in our vision and approach. So 
that’s not been disruptive. We’ve been a fairly
stable organisation all the way through to be 
honest. There’s not much turnover in our 
workforce.” 
Staff 
turnover/changes in 
leadership/impact
Contrasts with 
other PSCs eg 
East of 
England
24 "I think we're just starting to pay more 
attention to that now which is probably 
reasonable in the journey we've been on”
“We made a commitment that we will put a 
call out to each patient safety lead in each 
patient safety collaborative and in a way very 
similar to the way the AHSNs did last year to 
just name the top 2/3 things that they think’s 
ready for adoption wider than the footprint 
that they have.” […]where there [is] enough 
information, enough change and enough 
Culture change
Adoption and spread
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improvement to say we shouldn’t wait any 
longer we should all be going with this now 
[…] let’s tell each other what’s ready to share.
Let’s give the evidence. Let’s make the 
recommendations and then let’s take 
something to scale.”
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Appendix 7: SCORE survey results 
Tables 39 to 45 below show summaries of first and second survey person-level domain scores from 
each unit, for each of the seven domains of the SCORE survey. On the whole, there was little 
evidence of a difference in participants’ domain scores between first and second SCORE surveys. In
one of the six units (general practice F) there was some evidence of a difference in scores on the 
local leadership and burnout climate domains (p = 0.01 for each, Tables 40 and 41). On average, 
local leadership scores were higher, and burnout climate scores were lower in the second survey, 
compared to the first. 
Table 39: Summary statistics for person-level scores on the learning environment domain of the 
SCORE survey.
LEARNING 
ENVIRONMENT 
DOMAIN
First survey Second survey
p-
value*
Number
completed 
(% response 
rate)
Mean 
(SD)
score
Number
completed
(% response 
rate)
Mean 
(SD)
score
Hospital A: ED 111 (58)
73.6 
(20.4)
150 (66)
71.2 
(22.2)
0.4
Hospital A: MAU 83 (58)
66.8 
(22.5)
96 (61)
70.0 
(24.0)
0.3
General practice D 57 (62)
67.8 
(21.9)
67 (61)
67.9 
(20.3)
0.99
General practice E 13 (100)
83.4 
(13.4)
9 (69)
83.3 
(15.5)
0.99
General practice F 36 (82)
69.6 
(20.9)
29 (94)
75.7 
(16.5)
0.2
Pharmacy G 13 (72)
78.2 
(15.5)
13 (81) 85.6 (8.8)
0.2
*From two sample t test.
Table 40: Summary statistics for person-level scores on the local leadership domain of the SCORE 
survey.
LOCAL First survey Second survey p-
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LEADERSHIP 
DOMAIN
value*
Number
completed 
(% response 
rate)
Mean 
(SD)
score
Number
completed 
(% response 
rate)
Mean 
(SD)
score
Hospital A: ED 110 (57)
57.5 
(26.3)
150 (66)
52.3 
(28.8)
0.1
Hospital A: MAU 83 (58)
59.4 
(25.9)
95 (62)
59.7 
(30.4)
0.9
General practice D 56 (61)
54.1 
(27.9)
69 (63)
62.5 
(26.4)
0.1
General practice E 13 (100)
65.6 
(28.7)
9 (69)
78.6 
(21.2)
0.2
General practice F 36 (82)
45.2 
(26.3)
28 (90)
63.6 
(31.2)
0.01
Pharmacy G 13 (72)
87.4 
(16.2)
13 (81)
74.5 
(23.4)
0.1
*From two sample t test.
Table 41: Summary statistics for person-level scores on the burnout climate domain of the SCORE 
survey.
BURNOUT 
CLIMATE 
DOMAIN
First survey Second survey
p-
value*
Number
completed 
(% response 
rate)
Mean 
(SD)
score
Number
completed 
(% response 
rate)
Mean 
(SD)
score
Hospital A: ED 113 (59)
69.9 
(21.7)
151 (67)
73.9 
(20.3)
0.1
Hospital A: MAU 84 (58)
72.7 
(19.4)
96 (61)
72.1 
(20.9)
0.8
General practice D 59 (64)
70.8 
(19.2)
69 (63)
66.0 
(20.7)
0.2
General practice E 13 (100)
50.6 
(26.3)
9 (69)
58.9 
(21.0)
0.4
General practice F 36 (82)
67.1 
(21.1)
29 (94)
52.2 
(23.9)
0.01*
Pharmacy G 13 (72)
67.3 
(16.2)
13 (81)
57.3 
(19.1)
0.2
*From two sample t test.
264
Table 42: Summary statistics for person-level scores on the personal burnout domain of the SCORE
survey.
PERSONAL 
BURNOUT 
DOMAIN
First survey Second survey
p-
value*
Number
completed 
(% response 
rate)
Mean 
(SD)
score
Number
completed 
(% response 
rate)
Mean 
(SD)
score
Hospital A: ED 113 (59)
58.3 
(26.0)
151 (67)
57.5 
(26.7)
0.8
Hospital A: MAU 85 (59)
59.2 
(24.5)
97 (62)
56.0 
(30.1)
0.4
General practice D 59 (64)
53.3 
(28.9)
69 (63)
52.0 
(26.6)
0.8
General practice E 13 (100)
40.6 
(31.4)
9 (69)
47.8 
(34.9)
0.6
General practice F 36 (82)
44.7 
(29.8)
29 (94)
40.6 
(29.7)
0.6
Pharmacy G 13 (72)
45.8 
(26.6)
13 (81)
43.8 
(22.4)
0.8
*From two sample t test.
Table 43: Summary statistics for person-level scores on the teamwork domain of the SCORE survey.
TEAMWORK 
DOMAIN
First survey Second survey
p-
value*
Number
completed 
(% response 
rate)
Mean 
(SD)
score
Number
completed 
(% response 
rate)
Mean 
(SD)
score
Hospital A: ED 113 (59)
66.0 
(16.3)
150 (66)
63.4 
(16.4)
0.2
Hospital A: MAU 84 (58)
63.9 
(19.1)
97 (62)
65.1 
(20.5)
0.7
General practice D 58 (63)
65.8 
(17.8)
69 (63)
62.8 
(20.9)
0.4
General practice E 13 (100)
83.0 
(17.6)
9 (69) 85.8 (9.9)
0.6
General practice F 35 (80)
67.2 
(17.5)
29 (94)
68.2 
(15.7)
0.8
Pharmacy G 13 (72)
59.9 
(17.5)
13 (81)
73.2 
(15.5)
0.05
*From two sample t test.
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Table 44: Summary statistics for person-level scores on the safety climate domain of the SCORE 
survey.
SAFETY CLIMATE 
DOMAIN
First survey Second survey
p-
value*
Number
completed 
(% response 
rate)
Mean 
(SD)
score
Number
completed 
(% response 
rate)
Mean 
(SD)
score
Hospital A: ED 113 (59)
66.4 
(17.8)
151 (67)
64.5 
(18.3)
0.4
Hospital A: MAU 84 (58)
62.8 
(17.3)
97 (62)
67.6 
(20.8)
0.09
General practice D 58 (63)
67.2 
(21.1)
69 (63)
66.0 
(19.0)
0.7
General practice E 13 (100)
84.1 
(16.7)
9 (69) 93.7 (7.3)
0.08
General practice F 36 (82)
66.9 
(18.9)
29 (94)
75.6 
(21.1)
0.09
Pharmacy G 13 (72)
76.4 
(17.8)
13 (81)
81.3 
(13.1)
0.4
*From two sample t test.
Table 45: Summary statistics for person-level scores on the work-life balance domain of the SCORE
survey.
WORK-LIFE 
BALANCE 
DOMAIN
First survey Second survey
p-
value*
Number
completed 
(% response 
rate)
Mean 
(SD)
score
Number
completed 
(% response 
rate)
Mean 
(SD)
score
Hospital A: ED 112 (58) 2.1 (0.7) 149 (66) 2.1 (0.7) 0.6
Hospital A: MAU 82 (57) 2.2 (0.7) 95 (61) 2.2 (0.9) 0.6
General practice D 57 (62) 2.0 (0.8) 69 (63) 2.0 (0.7) 0.6
General practice E 13 (100) 2.1 (0.9) 9 (69) 2.0 (0.9) 0.9
General practice F 36 (82) 1.7 (0.5) 27 (87) 1.5 (0.5) 0.1
Pharmacy G 13 (72) 1.8 (0.5) 13 (81) 1.7 (0.6) 0.6
*From two sample t test. 
